Jones v. Walgreen Co.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1917.,11–1917.
• Citation: 679 F.3d 9,26 A.D. Cases 261,45 NDLR P 58
• Parties: Pamela A. JONES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. WALGREEN CO.; Walgreen Co. Income Protection Plan for Store Managers; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Michael Campbell, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

679 F.3d 9

26 A.D. Cases 261

45 NDLR P 58

Pamela A. JONES, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.WALGREEN CO.; Walgreen Co. Income Protection Plan for Store Managers; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Michael Campbell, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 11–1917.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

Heard Jan. 11, 2012.

Decided May 10, 2012.

Joshua Karsh, with whom Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, John M. Brown, and Law Office of John M. Brown, were on brief for appellant.

Gregory A. Manousos, with whom Robert P. Morris and Morgan, Brown & Joy, LLP, were on brief for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, SOUTER,^* Associate Justice, and BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff–Appellant Pamela Jones (“Jones”) appeals the district court's award of summary judgment to her employer, Walgreen Co. (“Walgreens”), on her claims of (1) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Massachusetts General Laws ch. 151B and (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3 (“Title VII”), and Massachusetts General Laws ch. 151B. See Jones v. Walgreen Co., 765 F.Supp.2d 100 (D.Mass.2011). We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted as to Jones's disability discrimination claims. We further hold that no triable issues of material fact remain with regards to Jones's claim of unlawful retaliation and affirm the judgment of the district court on this issue as well.

I. Background and Procedural History

We set forth the facts in the light most favorable to Jones. Rivera–Colón v. Mills, 635 F.3d 9, 10 (1st Cir.2011).

Jones worked as a Walgreens employee for approximately twenty years, starting in 1986. During most of her tenure, Jones served as a Store Manager at a Walgreens location in Enfield, Connecticut and reported to District Manager Jerry Telson (“Telson”).

In January 2004, Jones slipped on ice in front of a Walgreens office, injuring her knee. Thereafter, Jones was on medical leave until May 2004 recovering from her injuries. Jones again stepped away from work in June 2004, this time to have surgery on her knee. In March 2005, while still on leave, Jones wrote Telson to inform him that she hoped to return to work with “reasonable accommodations.” This letter was soon followed by another, dated April 14, 2005, whereby Jones provided a report from her orthopedist, Dr. Martin Luber (“Dr. Luber”), which explained that Jones was limited to lifting weights lower than twenty-five pounds and could only exert herself to minimal bending, stooping, and squatting.

While out on leave in July 2005, Jones filed claims with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in which she accused Walgreens of discrimination against women. After Jones received the requisite right-to-sue papers from these agencies, Jones incorporated her claims into a nationwide Title VII class action complaint on behalf of over 21,000 plaintiffs, which she subsequently filed in July 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.¹

In October 2005, Walgreens offered Jones a position as Store Manager in Springfield, Massachusetts. Jones accepted the offer to relocate to Springfield and resume her employment, but warned Telson in an email that she could not climb ladders, lift objects that weighed more than twenty pounds, or work shifts greater than eight hours in a day. Jones also voiced her concerns that the Walgreens location in Springfield was understaffed and expressed her belief that she deserved a raise. In addition, Jones let Telson know that her approach as Store Manager would be to delegate, to the extent to which it was possible, the physical obligations of store operations to other staff members.

Jones then resumed her employment with Walgreens at the Springfield location. In September 2006, however, Jones communicated with Telson to inform him that she was having difficulty walking and shelving items at the store. Jones also expressed that she thought she was working longer hours than were medically advisable.Telson then asked Jones to provide updated medical information, which she did later that month. In this updated medical information, Dr. Luber tendered his medical opinion that Jones had several permanent physical restrictions. On October 13, 2006, shortly after receiving this updated information, Telson provided Jones with a notice of termination, which explained that her employment with Walgreens was being terminated effective immediately, as it was “clear” that Jones could “no longer perform the essential functions of [her] position as Store Manager.”

Jones filed suit against Walgreens in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on January 15, 2009. In relevant part,² her complaint alleged disability discrimination in violation of the ADA. In addition, Jones alleged that, in terminating her employment, Walgreens had unlawfully retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. Her complaint also asserted claims under the relevant Massachusetts statutory analogues to the ADA and Title VII. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.

On December 20, 2010, Walgreens moved for summary judgment as to Jones's discrimination and retaliation claims. Jones filed her opposition on January 21, 2011. On February 24, 2011, the district court granted Walgreens's motion for summary judgment, concluding that no reasonable jury could find in Jones's favor with regards to either her disability or retaliation claims. This timely appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We begin our discussion by framing our analysis within the relevant standard of review.

Summary judgment may suitably issue where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, ‘drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party while ignoring conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.’ ” Balser v. IUE Local 201 & Gen. Elec. Co., 661 F.3d 109, 118 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 325 (1st Cir.2009) (quotations omitted)). In doing so, “[w]e are not wed to the lower court's rationale, but rather, may affirm ... summary judgment on any ground made manifest by the record.” Okmyansky v. Herbalife Int'l of Am., Inc., 415 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir.2005).

B. Disability Discrimination

Jones's primary grounds for appeal implicate her claim that Walgreens discriminated against her based on disability, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and Massachusetts General Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16). We note that “Chapter 151B is considered the ‘Massachusetts analogue’ to the [ADA].” Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 153 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Whitney v. Greenberg, Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli, P.C., 258 F.3d 30, 32 & n. 1 (1st Cir.2001)). Accordingly, we need not conduct parallel analyses under both federal and state law since our application of either would unfold in the same manner. See Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 772 N.E.2d 1054, 1062 n. 6 (2002) (noting the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts “look[s] to the Federal cases decided under the ADA as a guide to the interpretation of [Chapter] 151B”).

A plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,

(1) that she was “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without accommodation; and (3) that she was discharged or adversely affected, in whole or in part, because of her disability.

Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.2008). If a plaintiff so establishes these factors, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.” Ramos–Echevarría v. Pichis, Inc., 659 F.3d 182, 186–87 (1st Cir.2011).

In granting summary judgment in favor of Walgreens, the district court assumed that Jones could meet the threshold issue of disability, but concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Jones was “able to perform the essential functions of her job even with reasonable accommodations.” Jones, 765 F.Supp.2d at 106. We agree with the district court and affirm its judgment on this issue for the reasons we now explain.

1. The “Essential Functions” of a Walgreens Store Manager

An essential function is “one that is ‘fundamental’ to a position rather than ‘marginal.’ ” Richardson v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir.2001)). The regulatory framework provides helpful guidance as to what constitutes such a function. Thus, in conducting the relevant inquiry a court may look to “ ‘[t]he employer's judgment as to which functions are essential’; ‘[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job’; ‘[t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job’; and ‘[t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.’ ” Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 147 (1st Cir.2006) (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).

Because the applicable statutory and regulatory framework accords a significant degree of deference to an employer's own business judgment regarding which functions are essential to a given position, our inquiry may begin by turning to the written descriptions attached to a particular job. See29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (dictating “employer's judgment” serves as evidence as to “which functions are essential”); see also Richardson, 594 F.3d at 76 (“[I]f an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing...