Joseph v. Landon, 81-1782

Decision Date22 March 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-1782,81-1782
Citation679 F.2d 113
PartiesEdmund JOSEPH d/b/a Joseph Brothers Food Market and Michel Cham, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael H. LANDON, Jr., District Director and the United States Immigration& Naturalization Service, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Joseph D. Keenan, III, Puchalski, Keenan & Puchalski, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Edward J. Moran, Asst. U. S. Atty., Dan K. Webb, U. S. Atty., Frederick H. Branding, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Civil Division, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, WOOD, Circuit Judge, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. **

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of defendants-appellees, Michael H. Landon, Jr., District Director and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter "INS"), by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. We affirm.

Plaintiff-appellant Michael Cham is a citizen of Lebanon who came to the United States in June, 1971, on a visitor's visa. In June, 1972, the plaintiff-appellant Edmund Joseph (d/b/a Joseph Brothers and hereinafter "Joseph Brothers") filed an application for labor certification on behalf of Cham with the Illinois State Employment Service. In the application, Joseph Brothers listed the minimal experience necessary for the job Cham was to fill to be six to eight months training and three years experience as a manager or ten years experience in meat sales. The Labor Certification Application was accompanied by a form signed by Cham listing his prior experience as a general store manager in his father's grocery in Lebanon from 1944 to 1960. The Department of Labor certified the application and issued the certificate in July, 1972.

On July 19, 1972, Joseph Brothers filed a petition on behalf of Cham for sixth preference classification pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6). Joseph Brothers was seeking for Cham an immigrant visa with a classification of preference status based on his occupation. The issuance of this sixth preference immigration visa would allow Cham to remain in this country in an immigrant status rather than return to Lebanon to seek a numerically limited immigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1151. This sixth preference visa petition was approved by the INS on May 24, 1973, based upon the supporting affidavit of Cham's father in Lebanon.

On June 27, 1973, Cham applied pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255 for permanent resident status based upon the approved sixth preference visa petition. A subsequent investigation by the INS obtained information through the American Embassy in Beirut that the affidavit supplied by Cham's father regarding Cham's work experience was false. Based upon this information, the INS, on October 20, 1975, notified Joseph Brothers of its intent to revoke Cham's visa petition. The basis of the revocation was the fraudulent documentation. Joseph Brothers was given 15 days to submit information or documents to refute the proposed revocation.

In August, 1976, an attorney for Cham requested to review the documents in Cham's file. In September, 1977, a different attorney requested a review of the file. Joseph Brothers was again notified on December 23, 1977, of INS' intent to revoke the visa petition and advised that nothing had been submitted in refutation since the prior notice of October 20, 1975. Joseph Brothers was given to January 5, 1978, to submit supporting documents. On February 7, 1978, notice of revocation of the visa petition was sent to Joseph Brothers. Only after this action was supporting documentation submitted on February 21, 1978 by appellants' counsel.

Cham appealed the revocation but the Regional Commissioner denied the appeal on January 5, 1979, as improperly filed on the ground that a beneficiary of a sixth preference visa petition has no standing to appeal. Cham was given to February 15, 1979, to voluntarily depart the United States. On March 26, 1979, Joseph Brothers filed a motion to reopen and reconsider the denial of the appeal. It was rejected on October 30, 1979. The appellants filed suit in the district court below on November 29, 1979, alleging that the revocation of the visa petition was unlawful and asking for a de novo hearing. The second count of appellants' complaint alleged that the INS' failure to reopen the appeal was unlawful and violative of due process. Both parties submitted motions for summary judgment and in a Memorandum Opinion, the district court denied the motion of Joseph Brothers and granted the motion of the INS. The court held that in reviewing a visa petition revocation, it must base its determination upon the administrative record and that it is not empowered to conduct a de novo hearing. The court also held that based upon the Attorney General's broad statutory authority to revoke visa petitions for good and sufficient cause, the INS' finding in this case of such cause based upon the fraudulent statements submitted in support of the petition was adequately supported by the administrative record. The court further held that Cham did not have a vested right upon approval of the sixth preference immigration visa petition.

In this appeal, Joseph Brothers argues that Cham had acquired a vested right upon approval of his visa petition; that an improper standard was applied in the review by the district court of the visa revocation; that there was not good and sufficient cause on the record to support a visa revocation; that the INS did not have statutory authority to revoke the labor certification; and that the INS wrongfully dismissed Cham's administrative appeal.

I.

An initial approval of a visa "petition does not alone give the beneficiary of the petition an immediate right to an immigrant visa." De Figueroa v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 501 F.2d 191, 193 (7th Cir. 1974). Rather, the petition is approved merely because there appears "prima facie evidence of qualification for issuance of the visa." Id. After initial approval, the alien must satisfy the standard of admissibility for permanent residents upon arrival in this country or upon application for a change of status while within the country. As we held in De Figueroa, the initial approval of a petition does not give an alien an immediate right to a visa. The district court thus correctly held that Cham did not have a vested right upon approval of this visa petition. See Menezes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979) and Wright v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1967).

The Attorney General of the United States is empowered to administer and enforce the immigration laws of this country. 8 U.S.C. § 1103. As such, "(he) may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him." 8 U.S.C. § 1155. A court reviewing the revocation of a visa petition by the INS is limited to determining whether the agency's action was "arbitrary, capricious, (or) an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The abuse of discretion may be found "only if there is no evidence to support the decision or if the decision is based on an improper understanding of the law." Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg, 437 F.2d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960). Therefore, the trial court correctly held that it was not empowered to conduct a de novo hearing but was limited to the administrative record. Navarro v. District Director of United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 574 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861, 99 S.Ct. 182, 58 L.Ed.2d 170 (1978).

A review of the statement filed by Cham and attached to his Labor Certification Application shows that he listed experience as a general store manager from June, 1944, to June, 1960. In a sworn statement given by Cham on March 11, 1974, to an Immigration Examiner, with the use of an interpreter, he testified that he worked for his father from 1945 to 1957, worked in shipping and receiving for another employer from 1957 to 1963, and drove a taxi from 1963 to 1970. Yet his father's affidavit...

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