Harris v. Marsh
| Decision Date | 28 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-60-CIV-3,80-168-CIV-3.,81-60-CIV-3 |
| Citation | 679 F. Supp. 1204 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Mattiebelle HARRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John O. MARSH, Jr., Defendant. Leonza LOFTIN, Plaintiff, v. John O. MARSH, Jr., Defendant. |
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J. LeVonne Chambers, NAACP, New York City, Gilda Glazer, Geraldine Sumter, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas, Adkins, & Fuller, P.A., Charlotte, N.C., Penda Hair, Legal Defense Fund of NAACP, Washington, D.C., J. LeVonne Chambers, Ronald L. Gibson, Gilda F. Glazer, Chambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Fuller, P.A., Charlotte, N.C., and Jack Greenberg, Charles Steven Ralaron, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Cressie Thigpen, Raleigh, N.C., for Beulah Mae Harris.
Chris Godwin, Fayetteville, N.C., for Amon Harris.
Peter B. Loewenberg, Asst. U.S. Atty., Lt. Col. Robert B. Williams, JAGC, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C., Capt. Stephen L. Berry, JAGC, Ft. Bragg, N.C., for defendant.
Racism, and all its collateral effects, is a doctrine abhorrent to any modern, civilized society. "At its core, it is an act of violence — a denial of another's right to equal dignity." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2629, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Unfortunately, in the not very distant past, racism "was openly acknowledged as official policy of the United States government." R. Kluger, Simple Justice 84 (1977). Laws designed to assure the inferiority of black citizens remained on the books until well into this century. Id., Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F.Supp. 161, 164-65 (E.D.N.C. 1984) citing Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 359-61 (E.D.N.C.1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). See also B.D. Adams, The Survival of Domination: Inferiorization and Everyday Life, 21-24 (1978). Indeed, discrimination as a matter of state policy continues to flourish in many parts of the world.
Fortunately, the policy of the United States government has changed. Notwithstanding that fact, however, significant effects and results of the previous policy linger. Prior state-condoned racism encouraged similar attitudes among our citizens which have persisted long after state policy has been reversed. Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F.Supp. 521, 530-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.1986). Many claims of discrimination today deal with systemic, subtle and stereotypical practices which developed when overt discrimination was lawful and remain imbedded in basic institutional or organizational structures. Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 Vand.L.Rev. 1205, 1224 (1981). To understand why this has occurred, one need only consider the definition of racial prejudice.
Invidious discrimination, in the form of racial prejudice, is the "result of subjective, irrational perceptions, which drain individuals of their dignity because of their perceived equivalence as members of a racial group." Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 528 (4th Cir.1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). "Misperception lies at the heart of prejudice and the animus formed of such ignorance sows malice and hatred wherever it operates without restriction." Id. at 529.
It is not surprising that prejudice and racial stereotyping have, at times, "severely impaired the operating effectiveness of our society." J. Levin, The Functions of Prejudice 33 (1975). Yet, discrimination persists, in part because of its function in the lives of certain members of the minority and majority groups involved. Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F.Supp. at 529. For members of the perceived majority group, prejudice may be used to displace aggression, protect self-esteem, define self-image, and reduce uncertainty about the world as they view it. Id. citing The Functions of Prejudice at 61-62. For members of the perceived minority group, prejudice directed against it "often exerts pressure for group cohesiveness and pride, forces emphasis in its history and achievement, and brings about the development of organizations which further its interests as a group." Id. at 100.
However, racial prejudice is not strictly limited to members of the "majority." Unfortunately, persons of any color or national origin are susceptible to the misperceptions and animus referred to by Judge Wilkinson. No segment of our society's population possesses a monopoly on morality in this regard. Reverse racial discrimination by blacks against whites can be and, on occasions, has been as virulent and diseased as the discrimination by whites against blacks. One need only recall the race riots which engulfed our inner cities in the 1960's and 1970's to comprehend this phenomenon.
Notwithstanding the above, however, this nation can generally point with some pride to the remarkable progress that has been made in the last four decades in eliminating the effects of past discrimination. Some of the improvement is directly attributable to anti-discriminatory laws passed by Congress and the state legislatures, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upon which this action is predicated, and the strict enforcement of those laws by the courts. But much of the change has stemmed from educative institutions substantially more powerful than the courts or the political branches of government. Progress has most significantly occurred through the schools, churches and synagogues of this nation as well as from the example of enlightened public leaders representing all aspects of our society. With notable exceptions, widespread segregation in the nation's academic institutions, public facilities, and places of employment has ended. Racial discrimination at the ballot box, in the halls of justice, and in the legislative chambers is no longer tolerated. Equal academic and employment opportunity has become the rule rather than the exception. Racial tensions in this country, by anyone's definition, have diminished in recent years through the persistent and cooperative efforts of hundreds of thousands of our citizens.
By the above statements, the court does not blithely suggest that racial discrimination in this nation has been eradicated. To the extent that dream can ever be realized, it certainly has not yet come true. Race remains this nation's most divisive problem. Subtle vestiges (and some not so subtle) of heretofore overt discrimination and racism continue in many aspects and segments of our society as the frequent and disgusting marches of the Klu Klux Klan and the recent incidents in Howard Beach, New York and Forsyth County, Georgia, make all too clear.1 Fort Bragg, North Carolina, site of the litigation at bar, being a microcosim of that society, is not immune from this disease of the heart and mind. Nonetheless, comparing the status of race relations in the United States, in general, and at Ft. Bragg, in particular, one cannot help but notice the progress which has been achieved over the last twenty years.2
Whatever prejudice continues to manifest itself in society at large, Congress has flatly ruled that it will not be allowed, in any form or degree, in the workplace of the United States. Prejudice, whether blatant or subtle, practiced by black or white, invoked by those wearing blue collars or white collars, or wearing officers' uniforms or grey flannel suits, will not be tolerated when directed against employees in the workplace. Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F.Supp. at 531. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as enacted, serves as a check on the legitimate exercise of an employer's discretion vis-a-vis the improper exercise thereof. To this end, the statute promotes the national policy of equality of treatment between persons of different races, colors, religions, sexes, and national origins. "The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
Title VII, thus, provides a comprehensive federal remedy for employees injured by the use of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Simply stated, Congress enacted Title VII as a broad remedial statute of the highest priority, designed "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Consistent with this purpose, and mindful of the crucial role played by the private litigant in the statutory scheme, many procedural provisions of the Civil Rights Act have been liberally construed by the courts in favor of the complaining employee in a determined effort to reach the merits of any cognizable allegation of discrimination. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527, 92 S.Ct. 616, 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972); Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 595 F.2d 711, 727 (D.C.Cir.1978); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462-63 (5th Cir.1970); Dickey v. Greene, 603 F.Supp. 102, 105 (E.D...
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