State v. Williams

Citation79 Ohio St.3d 1,679 N.E.2d 646
Decision Date11 June 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-2572,95-2572
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio

James A. Philomena, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michele G. Cerni, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

John Juhasz and Mary Jane Stephens, Youngstown, for appellant.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, Justice.

We have reviewed the appellant's nine propositions of law, independently weighed the evidence relating to the death sentence, balanced the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors, and compared the sentence to those imposed in similar cases. As a result, we affirm the convictions and sentences of death.

I ALLEGED JUROR MISCONDUCT

In Proposition of Law I, the appellant argues that the conduct of the prospective jurors deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury, guaranteed by both the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Thus, the appellant argues, the trial court should have granted his motion for mistrial during voir dire. The appellant claims that the trial court erred by improperly curtailing inquiry into prospective jurors' misconduct, and by refusing to conduct an investigation or allow counsel to investigate. Included in the appellant's allegations are that prospective jurors concealed prior knowledge of the case, rumors about the case, and anxiety concerning court security.

A claim of juror misconduct must focus on the jurors who were actually seated and not those excused. Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80. Thus, to establish a constitutional violation in this situation, the appellant must demonstrate that one of the jurors seated was not impartial. Further, unless a juror is challenged for cause, he or she is presumed to be impartial. State v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 288, 533 N.E.2d 682, 695.

Appellant claims that two individuals who served on the jury, Joann Eddleman and Martha Forsyth, concealed their misconduct on voir dire and contends that this court should therefore presume they were biased. A court may infer bias if it finds deliberate concealment; however, if the concealment was unintentional, the appellant must show that the juror was actually biased. Zerka v. Green (C.A.6, 1995), 49 F.3d 1181, 1184-1186.

Because appellant did not challenge Forsyth or Eddleman on the ground that they had concealed information, appellant waived any errors involved. State v. Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 247, 530 N.E.2d 382, 397. However, we will examine these allegations for plain error.

On voir dire the judge asked Eddleman if she knew anything about the case, to which she replied she did not. However, according to prospective juror Janet Parsons, Eddleman told her that a Youngstown resident had informed her that the case "involved drugs" and the authorities had been unable to find the defendant. However, Eddleman told Parsons that "she [Eddleman] didn't know if that was true." Parsons admitted she was only "half listening" and "wasn't paying that much attention" to Eddleman. The appellant argues that Eddleman concealed her alleged conversation with the person from Youngstown. However, this court does not find that Eddleman deliberately concealed the conversation because she had previously indicated that she did not know whether those rumors were true. Thus, her voir dire response was truthful--she did not know anything about the case. She was not asked whether she had discussed the case with anyone. Therefore, Eddleman's answers create no presumption of bias.

Appellant claims Forsyth may have concealed a conversation with prospective juror John Gombaski. Gombaski, who was excused for cause, allegedly overheard a conversation between court employees about the case. Gombaski allegedly told two other prospective jurors what he had heard. While he did not recall which two prospective jurors he told, at that point in voir dire there were only four possibilities. When the judge read the four names, Gombaski said Forsyth "might" ring a bell. The judge asked Forsyth whether she had heard any discussion about the case in the courthouse. She replied that she had not, although the venire had speculated about what type of questions would be asked. A review of Gombaski's and Forsyth's voir dire does not provide a basis for Janet Smith was the other possible prospective juror who served on the jury and with whom Gombaski may have spoken. The trial court questioned Smith about whether she had heard or seen any pretrial publicity about the case. She replied that she had not. Further, the trial court asked her whether she had heard comments about the case or discussed the case with other jurors. Again, she replied that she had not and that she did not know anything about the case other than what the judge told her in the courtroom. The other two prospective jurors who might have spoken with Gombaski did not serve on the jury. Having reviewed for plain error, we find none.

finding that Forsyth concealed information. Therefore, we presume no prejudice regarding Forsyth.

The appellant claims that juror Margaret Rohwedder was biased because she allegedly overheard discussion about security and possible retaliation. When questioned on voir dire, Rohwedder indicated that she had heard no such discussion. Because appellant presented no proof that she lied, there is no merit to the bias claim. The remaining jurors who the appellant alleged were biased did not sit on the jury.

The appellant also argues that the trial judge did not sufficiently inquire into the extent and effect of the alleged juror misconduct. However, the scope of voir dire is within the discretion of the trial court and varies depending on the circumstances of each case. State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 529 N.E.2d 913, 920. The trial judge and counsel questioned all of the jurors allegedly involved in the misconduct. Upon review of the voir dire, we do not find that the trial judge unreasonably or arbitrarily restricted examination or investigation into the preconceptions of the prospective jurors. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in overruling the appellant's motion for mistrial. Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law I.

II ALLEGED JUROR PREFERENCE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

In appellant's second proposition of law, he claims that the trial court wrongly overruled nine challenges for cause concerning alleged pro-death-penalty jurors. The standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded for cause due to his or her views on capital punishment is whether that prospective juror's views would " 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " (Emphasis deleted.) Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 420, 105 S.Ct. 844, 850, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 849, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589. This court specifically adopted that standard in State The United States Supreme Court has held in Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229-2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 502-503, that "[a] juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains such views. If even one such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence." The rationale behind this is that "a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function under such misconception." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 735-736, 112 S.Ct. at 2223, 119 L.Ed.2d at 507.

v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph three of the syllabus, vacated and remanded on other grounds (1985), 474 U.S. 1002, 106 S.Ct. 518, 88 L.Ed.2d 452, where we held that voir dire would constitute reversible error only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion. Id., 17 Ohio St.3d at 178-179, 17 OBR at 418, 478 N.E.2d at 990.

Many times during voir dire in death penalty cases, prospective jurors are asked for the first time to face their views about the death penalty. Often, they have not defined in their own minds what their views are, and they are forced to define their beliefs amidst extremely leading questioning from both parties. Some have very strongly held views, but have never had to define them within the context of following the law. It is the duty of the trial judge to sort through their responses and determine whether the prospective jurors will be able to follow the law. We find that the trial court permitted this appellant to question the prospective jurors both before and after the court's questions. Therefore, we find that the trial judge properly complied with the requirements of Morgan v. Illinois.

Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in denying nine challenges for cause. Of the nine challenges, the appellant excused five prospective jurors (Frances Scanlon, Magda Subecz, V.F. Allen, Khim Standen, and Richard Mains) through peremptory challenges. The appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges. Of the four prospective jurors remaining, two (Edna Lewis and Linda Tanski) were excused for...

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