City of St. Paul v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 September 1896
• Parties: CITY OF ST. PAUL v CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

63 Minn. 330

68 N.W. 458

CITY OF ST. PAULvCHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 28, 1896.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Where land has been dedicated to a specific, limited, and definite public use, the legislature has no power to destroy the trust, or divert the property to any other purpose inconsistent with the particular use to which it was dedicated. The state holds state property, not in a proprietary, but in a sovereign, capacity, in trust for the use to which it was dedicated. While much must be left to the discretion of the legislature as to the best manner of regulating that use, yet its power of control over such property must be exercised in conformity with the purpose of the dedication.

2. The erection of a warehouse on land dedicated to public use as a levee is not necessarily a misuse of the property, as such structures may be in aid of the use for which it was dedicated.

3. The legislature may also grant, or authorize the granting, to any person or corporation having traffic with craft navigating the contiguous waters, the exclusive use of so much of a public levee as is reasonably necessary for his or its business with such craft, provided, and so long as, it does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the levee by the public. But to give a public levee, or any part of it, to a railway company, as a permanent site for its general freight warehouse, without reference to its traffic with craft navigating the contiguous waters, would constitute a diversion of the property to a use foreign to, and inconsistent with, that to which it was dedicated.

4. While the language of Gen.St.1894, § 2680, is broad enough to authorize a city to divert lands held in trust for a specific and particular use to another and inconsistent one, and while the language of Ordinance 286 of the city of St. Paul may be equally broad, it does not follow that either is void in toto.

5. The operation of the statute may be restricted by construction to a grant of authority to municipalities to grant to railway companies such rights in public grounds as the legislature itself might have granted, and the ordinance, although too broad, will be valid to the extent of such granted rights as the city was authorized to grant.

6. A grant of special privileges on land dedicated to a particular public use is always subject to the implied condition that it may be revoked whenever the needs of the public require, and the state or municipality has a large discretion in determining when such a condition has arisen; but such a grant, rightfully made, is not revocable at the mere arbitrary pleasure of the state or municipality. When such a grant has been acted on, the licensee has vested rights in the license which are subject only to the paramount interests of the public.

7. Cause remanded to the court below to try and determine the issue whether the privileges granted to the defendant by Ordinance 286 constitute, either in whole or in part, an unlawful misuse of the property, and to modify, if necessary, its order for judgment accordingly.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Kelly and Otis, Judges.

On reargument. Modified and remanded.

For former opinions, see 63 N. W. 267, and 65 N. W. 649.

Start, C. J., and Buck, J., dissenting.

W. H. Norris and Flandrau, Squires & Cutcheon, for appellant.

E. J. Darragh and Henry J. Horn, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

It is somewhat unfortunate that the questions involved in this case have been presented and considered piecemeal. On the trial in the court below the main issue was whether the defendant had acquired title to the premises by adverse possession, and very little attention seems to have been paid to the rights, if any, of the defendant under City Ordinance 286; that question having apparently been brought into the case only incidentally and almost accidentally. On the first argument of the appeal in this court, the discussion was almost wholly devoted to what had been the main issue in the court below. The result was that we disposed of the ordinance, without much consideration, by merely saying that it amounted to nothing more than a revocable license. 63 N. W. 267. Upon the reargument of this question the main point discussed, and the only point considered, was whether the state had delegated to the city authority to enact the ordinance in question. We held that the ordinance was invalid, because in excess of the granted powers of the city. 65 N. W. 649. After this opinion was filed, counsel for the defendant applied for further reargument, on the ground that they had overlooked, and failed to call the attention of the court to, Gen.St. 1894, § 2680. A further reargument was thereupon granted as to the force and effect of this section. Upon an examination of the case after it was submitted on this last reargument, it occurred to us that there might be a serious question as to the power of the state itself to grant any such authority to the city over public grounds dedicated to a specific public use. As this question was only briefly discussed by counsel for the defendant, and not at all by counsel for the plaintiff, we, on our own motion, requested additional briefs on that point. After an examination of the additional briefs filed in response to this request, we are inclined to think that perhaps a more important question was whether the purposes for which a portion of this levee was granted to the defendant by this ordinance constituted a diversion of it from the particular and specific public use to which it was dedicated. In order that the precise questions involved may be clearly in mind we shall again quote in full the statute now relied on, and also the ordinance enacted in pursuance of it, and which defendant claims constitutes a binding contract between it and the city, an impairment of the obligation of which is forbidden by the federal constitution.

“The common council, board of aldermen, trustees, commissioners or other corporate authorities of any city, town, village or other municipal corporation, are hereby authorized and empowered to grant, sell, convey, or lease any public grounds or place within their corporate limits to any railroad corporation; subject nevertheless to all the rights of the original proprietors of such grounds.” Gen. St. 1894, § 2680. This statute was enacted over 30 years ago. Gen. Laws 1866, c. 41.

Ordinance 286 reads as follows:

“Section 1. That permission be and the same is hereby given to the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company to take down and remove the old freight house, which is owned and used by said company, standing next below Sibley street on the levee, and to erect a new freight building upon the site now occupied by said old freight house, provided that the new structure may be extended a distance of ten feet nearer the Mississippi river than the old one, if the city engineer shall be of the opinion that the same shall in no manner interfere with the navigation of said river. And provided further that said new freight house shall be built substantially in accordance with the plans on file in the office of the city clerk. And provided, that the basement or lower story fronting on the river shall be laid with substantial floor, and said lower story, together with the platform on the river front, and the railway track along the said river front, shall be open and subject to the use of the public for all wharfage and transfer purposes, without charge, and a sufficient platform and entrance for drays shall be provided for said lower story at the end of said building.

“Sec. 2. Nothing in this ordinance contained shall be construed as waiving any of the rights of the city of St. Paul in and to the real property proposed to be occupied by said building.”

We shall, without further discussion, take as settled that the premises in question were dedicated by the owner, Hopkins, to public use, as a “levee” or “landing.” The word “levee” has a well-understood meaning in the West and South. It is a place, on a river or other navigable water, for lading or unlading goods, or for the reception and delivery of passengers. It is either the bank, or the wharf, to or from which persons or things may go from or to some vessel in the contiguous waters. State v. Randall, 1 Strob. 111;State v. Graham, 15 Rich. Law, 310;Coffin v. City of Portland, 27 Fed. 418. It means the land contiguous to a river or other navigable water, used as a landing place for water craft, and for the transfer of freight and passengers to and from such craft. In a general way, this is at once the definition and limitation of the particular and specific public use to which this land was dedicated by the owner. It is elementary and fundamental law that, if a grant is made for a specific, limited, and definite public use, the subject of the grant cannot be used for another and different use. Its use must be restricted to that for which it was dedicated. Even the legislature itself has no power to destroy the trust, or to divert, or to authorize a...