Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1996
• Citation: 680 So.2d 262
• Parties: Ex parte TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC. (In Re TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC. v. Vallie CUNNINGHAM). 1950142.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 262

680 So.2d 262

Ex parte TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC.

(In Re TRINITY INDUSTRIES, INC. v. Vallie CUNNINGHAM).

1950142.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 3, 1996.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1996.

Charles F. Carr, Rhonda Pitts Chambers and Donald B. Kirkpatrick II of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for Petitioner.

Robert W. Lee, Jr. of Lee & Sullivan, P.C., Birmingham, for Respondent.

John J. Coleman III and Tom S. Roper of Balch and Bingham, Birmingham, for Amicus Curiae Business Council of Alabama in support of petitioner.

David J. Middlebrooks and Brent L. Crumpton of Lehr, Middlebrooks & Proctor, P.C., Birmingham, for Amici Curiae Southeast Alabama Medical Center, Rust International, and O'Neal Steel, Inc., in support of petitioner.

Amy K. Myers of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for Amicus Curiae Alabama Self-Insurers Association, in support of petitioner.

Michael M. Eley, Bart Harmon and Bryan O. Balogh of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for Amici Curiae Association of County Commissions Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance Fund, Alabama Forest Products Industry Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance Fund, Occupational Safety Association

of Alabama Workers' Compensation Fund and Alacomp's, in support of petitioner.

Terry A. Moore of Adams and Reese, Mobile, for Amici Curiae Professional Business Owners Ass'n, Comprehensive Containment Services, Inc., and Med/Manage Inc.

N.T. Braswell III and William H. Webster of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for Amici Curiae James River Corporation, Skilstaf, Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., AAA Cooper Transportation, Weyerhaeuser, Inc. and Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., in support of petitioner.

Patricia K. Rea of Fann & Rea, P.C., Birmingham, for Amicus Curiae Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc., in support of petitioner.

HOUSTON, Justice.

This case presents a question regarding the proper test for determining causation in workers' compensation cases and a question regarding the proper standard for reviewing workers' compensation cases.

On September 2, 1992, Vallie J. Cunningham, who worked as a punch press operator, was rendered permanently and totally disabled as the result of a stroke he suffered while at the workplace of his employer, Trinity Industries, Inc. On December 4, 1992, Cunningham sued Trinity, seeking workers' compensation benefits. The trial court, after a bench trial, entered a judgment for Cunningham, "find[ing] that [Cunningham had] satisfied the dual burden of proving legal and medical causation." Trinity appealed, arguing, among other things, that Cunningham had failed to present substantial evidence of either legal or medical causation. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Cunningham, 680 So.2d 253 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). We granted certiorari review to determine whether, in affirming, the Court of Civil Appeals had erred in overruling caselaw regarding the test for causation in "nonaccidental" injury cases and whether that court had misconstrued the "substantial evidence" standard of review.

Cunningham's duties required him to continually lift pieces of metal weighing 15 pounds; he would place a piece in the punch press machine, punch it, remove it, and pick up the next piece. ¹ On the day he suffered the stroke, Cunningham began his work around 7:00 a.m., and he continued to work until around 11:30 a.m., taking only one 15-minute break. After he left his machine around 11:30, Cunningham walked to the bathroom, sat down on the toilet, and while sitting there experienced symptoms of a stroke. He was later informed that he had suffered a stroke, and that he was an undiagnosed hypertensive. Before the stroke, Cunningham had never experienced high blood pressure.

We have repeatedly stated that an employer is not the absolute insurer of an employee's health and should bear only the costs of compensating employees for accidents that arise out of and in the course of their employment. ² See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Gray, 278 Ala. 309, 178 So.2d 87 (1965). Section 25-5-31, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"When personal injury ... is caused to an employee by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which injury the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate cause, [the employee] ... shall receive compensation by way of damages therefor from the employer...."

Whether an accidental injury "arises out of" the claimant's employment is basically a question of whether there is a causal relationship between the claimant's performance of his or her duties as an employee and the complained-of injury. Determining whether a causal relationship has been established between the performance of the claimant's duties as an employee and the complained-of injury is especially difficult and troublesome when the complained-of injury was not produced by some sudden and traumatic external event. ³ For simplicity, we will refer to such events as "nonaccidental" injuries. More than 50 years ago, in Pow v. Southern Constr. Co., 235 Ala. 580, 180 So. 288 (1938), this Court held that the term "accident arising out of employment" included more than just incidents in which injuries arise from sudden and traumatic external causes. In Pow, the Court allowed recovery to the family of a person who had contracted and had subsequently died from pneumonia, after having been forced by his employment duties to work outside in very wet conditions. However, the Court did not hold that every injury that could conceivably be argued to have been linked to a person's employment would be compensable. Instead, the Court held that a claimant in such a situation must prove:

"[ (1) That the employment] he was engaged [in exposed him] to a danger, materially in excess of that to which people commonly in that locality are exposed, when not situated as he is when thus performing his service, and that such excessive exposure may be found to have been the direct cause of the injury, though operating upon other conditions of common exposure."

Pow, 235 Ala. at 584, 180 So. at 290 (quoting Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, 228 Ala. 622, 154 So. 565, 569 (1934)).

The Court of Civil Appeals, in City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 701, 318 So.2d 729 (Ala.Civ.App.1975), grappled with the very difficult problem of determining when heart attacks and other similar physical ailments of a "nonaccidental" nature, which, like pneumonia, can and do occur independently of on-the-job risks, "arise out of" the claimant's employment and, therefore, are compensable under our workers' compensation statutes. That court, following the general development of workers' compensation law nationwide, adopted and further refined the two-part causation test set out in Pow v. Southern Constr. Co.. ⁴ In order to establish "legal causation," which is the first prong of the causation standard that the Howard case set out, the injured employee had to show that "the performance of the duties for which he [or she] is employed ... expose[d] [him or her] to a danger or risk materially in excess of that to which people not so employed are exposed [ordinarily in their everyday lives]." Howard, 55 Ala.App. at 705, 318 So.2d at 732. Once a claimant establishes "legal causation," he or she then must establish "medical causation," the second prong of the Howard standard, by producing evidence tending to show that the particular exposure to risk proven in regard to prong one "was in fact [a] contributing cause of the [complained-of] injury." Howard, 55 Ala.App. at 706, 318 So.2d at 732.

In its review of this case, the Court of Civil Appeals overruled Howard, based on its conclusion that the holding in Howard "was contrary to our Supreme Court's holding in [Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wynn, 266 Ala. 327, 96 So.2d 159 (1957) ]." Trinity, 680 So.2d at 257. In Wynn, this Court allowed recovery for a claimant who was "stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage" while he was shoveling coal for his employer. The Court of Civil Appeals correctly pointed out:

"The petitioner, Southern Cotton Oil Co., contended that even though Wynn's injury was caused by the exertion of shoveling coal, the trial court could not conclude that the injury arose out of his employment without also finding that Wynn was subjected to unusual strain or overexertion or extrahazardous circumstances in the performance of his work[, relying on] Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Lively, 239 Ala. 684, 196 So. 870 (1940) (heat exhaustion); Pow, [235 Ala. 580, 180 So. 288 (1938),] and [Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, 228 Ala. 622, 154 So. 565 (1934) (heat exhaustion) ]. [The Court rejected the petitioner's argument. In doing so, the Court] stated: 'The rule which can be drawn from these cases is that when an injury to an employee results from exposure, the injury cannot be regarded as arising out of his employment unless he is subjected to unusual risk and excessive exposure because of the nature of his work.' [Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wynn, 266 Ala. 327, 332, 96 So.2d 159, 163 (1957) ]. The Court further stated: 'It seems clear that this court has limited application of the foregoing rule to injuries resulting from exposure.' Id. (emphasis added [by the Court of Civil Appeals] ).... '[A] finding by the trial court that [Wynn] had been subjected to unusual strain or overexertion was not necessary to support a conclusion that [Wynn's] injury was caused by an accident arising out of his employment.' Wynn, 266 Ala. at 333, 96 So.2d at 163-64."

Trinity, 680 So.2d at 256.

The causation standard applied in Howard is not inconsistent with this Court's holding in Wynn. A claimant does not have to show any "unusual strain or overexertion" in order to satisfy the first prong of the Howard standard. Rather, to establish "legal causation," one seeking redress under the Workers' Compensation Act for "nonaccidental" injuries need only establish that the...