Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–2844.,11–2844. |
| Citation | 682 F.3d 213,82 Fed.R.Serv.3d 797 |
| Parties | Brian ELLIOTT, Appellant v. ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK; Church of the Nativity of Our Blessed Lady; Marist Brothers of the Schools, Inc., A New York Corporation; Mt. St. Michael's School; Brother Damian Galligan, Individually and in his official capacity. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas C. Crumplar, Robert Jacobs, Jacobs & Crumplar, Wilmington, DE, Stephen J. Neuberger, (argued), Thomas S. Neuberger, The Neuberger Firm, Wilmington, DE, for Appellant.
Mary F. Dugan, Anthony G. Flynn, (argued), Jennifer M. Kinkus, Neilli M. Walsh, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, DE, for Appellees, Archdiocese New York and Church of Nativity of Our Blessed Lady.
Penelope B. O'Connell, (argued), Mark L. Reardon, Elzufon, Austin, Reardon, Tarlov & Mondell, Wilmington, DE, for Appellees, Marist Brothers of the Schools, Inc., and Mt. St. Michael's School.
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from the District Court's partial final judgment entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of four of the five defendants in this action, the Institutional Defendants, following the Court's conclusion that it lacked personal jurisdiction over two of these defendants and that the applicable statutes of limitations barred the plaintiff's claim against all four Institutional Defendants. Plaintiff, now appellant, Brian Elliott brought this action against the Institutional Defendants, i.e., the Archdiocese of New York (“the Archdiocese”), the Church of the Nativity of Our Blessed Lady (“the Church”), The Marist Brothers of the Schools, Inc. (“the Marist Brothers”), and Mt. St. Michael's School (“Mt. St. Michael's”), and an individual defendant, Brother Damian Galligan, seeking monetary damages for personal injuries that Elliott allegedly suffered as a result of Galligan's sexual abuse of him beginning in 1977, when he was eight years old, and continuing until 1983. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Archdiocese, a Roman Catholic entity and a governing organization of the Catholic Church, is incorporated in the State of New York with its principal place of business in New York City. The Church of the Nativity, a private religious organization and parish under the Archdiocese, also is incorporated in the State of New York with its principal place of business in New York City. The Marist Brothers is a religious order. It is incorporated in the State of New York and serves mass at the Church of the Nativity. Mt. St. Michael's is incorporated in the State of New York as a private religious high school and is located in New York City. During the period that he allegedly abused Elliott, Galligan was a brother of the Marist Order, taught at Mt. St. Michael's, and performed services at the Church. Elliott was raised in the State of New Jersey, lived in that state during the alleged abuse, and is still a resident and citizen of that state.
Elliott's grandmother, who lived in the Bronx, New York, and was a parishioner of the Church of the Nativity, introduced Elliott to Galligan. Galligan came to know Elliott's entire family but developed an especially close relationship with Elliott. Beginning in the fall of 1977, when Elliott was eight years old, Galligan allegedly began to sexually assault Elliott. Elliott charges that Galligan continued his abuse on a regular basis between 1977 and 1983 at various locations in New York and New Jersey. Elliott also asserts that Galligan abused him in Virginia and in Delaware where he took Elliott on two out-of-state trips.
Elliott originally filed his complaint in the Superior Court of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, on June 23, 2009. Elliott thereafter filed an amended complaint, in which he alleged that there was an agency relationship between Galligan and the Institutional Defendants. In this vein, Elliott contended that the Institutional Defendants employed Galligan at all relevant times and were responsible for his supervision. Elliott maintained that the Institutional Defendants gave Galligan the power to act on their behalf, and that all of Galligan's actions with respect to Elliott fell within the scope of that authority, were connected to Galligan's routine job duties, and were for the benefit of the Institutional Defendants. Elliott asserted also that the Institutional Defendants ratified, or, at a minimum, did not repudiate Galligan's abuse of him to the extent that the abuse may have occurred outside the scope of the authority that the Institutional Defendants granted to Galligan. In this vein, Elliott alleged that the Institutional Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of Galligan's sexual abuse of Elliott.
On the basis of these and other allegations that Elliott made concerning the Institutional Defendants' awareness of ongoing sexual abuse of children in the Catholic Church generally, Elliott contended that the Institutional Defendants had a duty to prevent Galligan from abusing him and to establish measures to protect him against such abuse. Elliott alleged that the Institutional Defendants, acting negligently and grossly negligently, breached those duties causing Elliott mental, emotional, and physical injury. In addition to Elliott's claim that the Institutional Defendants were negligent, his complaint included a number of other theories of liability, including breach of fiduciary duty, assault and battery, fraud, breach of an implied contract, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting.
Defendants removed this action to the District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Thereafter, the Archdiocese and the Church of the Nativity moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss all claims against them on the ground that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Alternatively, they sought a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that New York law applied to Elliott's claims and the action was untimely under New York's statutes of limitations such that Elliott failed to state a claim. Elliott responded that the Court possessed personal jurisdiction over those defendants and that Delaware law applied, such that his claims were timely under the Delaware Child Victim's Act of 2007 (the “CVA”), Del.Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8145(a)–(b) (Supp.2010).1
On December 21, 2009, the District Court granted the Archdiocese's and the Church's motion, finding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over either defendant. Alternatively, the Court concluded that New York law applied under Delaware's choice-of-law jurisprudence and that New York's statutes of limitations barred Elliott's claims.2See Elliott v. The Marist Bros. of the Schs., Inc., 675 F.Supp.2d 454 (D.Del.2009). Elliott subsequently moved for the Court to reconsider its order on the basis of an October 5, 2009 bench ruling that a judge of the Delaware Superior Court issued in a group of cases not involving Elliott that included allegations of sexual abuse against Catholic institutions similar to those Elliott brought against the Institutional Defendants. Elliott contended that application of the Superior Court's interpretation of the CVA in his case would have allowed the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Institutional Defendants and allowed the Court to apply Delaware law. The Court denied Elliott's motion.
The Marist Brothers and Mt. St. Michael's answered Elliott's complaint without objecting to the District Court's exercise of jurisdiction over them. Later, however, those entities moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) on the basis of the portion of the Court's December 21 decision regarding the application of New York law and its statutes of limitations. On September 21, 2010, the Court granted the Marist Brothers' and Mt. St. Michael's' motion, as it followed its prior ruling that New York law applied and barred Elliott's claims.
Galligan answered Elliott's complaint, and the claims against him remain pending before the District Court. That Court, however, has stayed those proceedings during our consideration of this appeal.
After the Marist Brothers and Mt. St. Michael's filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings but before the District Court granted that motion, the Archdiocese and the Church on September 16, 2010, moved for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). Then, after the Court granted the Marist Brothers' and Mt. St. Michael's' motion for judgment on the pleadings, all four of the Institutional Defendants and Elliott filed a joint stipulation requesting the entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) in accordance with the Court's disposition of the case against all four of the Institutional Defendants. On November 30, 2010, the Court denied the Archdiocese's and the Church's prior Rule 54(b) motion, stating that “[t]he court generally does not enter judgment against parties following motions to dismiss.” Appellant's resp. to the Clerk's order of July 12, 2011 (“Appellant's resp.”) tab C at 2. Instead, the Court on November 30, 2010, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) certified for interlocutory appeal its orders dismissing Elliott's claims as to all the Institutional Defendants. Elliott, however, did not file a petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, and neither the parties nor the Court took any further action in this case for approximately the next six months.
On May 27, 2011, the Institutional Defendants and Elliott once again filed a stipulation and proposed order requesting the entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b). This time, on June 9, 2011, the District Court adopted the parties' proposed order and directed the entry of final...
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