Batchelor v. Cain

Decision Date29 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–30802.,10–30802.
Citation682 F.3d 400
PartiesMarshall BATCHELOR, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jennifer P. McKay (argued), (Court–Appointed), Barham, Warner, Stroud & McKay, Shreveport, LA, for PetitionerAppellee.

Ross Warren Bergerthon, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, LA, Anita Tennant Mack, Counsel, Dist. Attorney's Office, Tallulah, LA, for RespondentAppellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from the district court's grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Months before his criminal trial, petitioner-appellee Marshall Batchelor moved to dismiss his appointed counsel in exercise of his constitutional right to represent himself under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The state trial court denied the motion and Batchelor was subsequently convicted by a jury of armed robbery and sentenced to sixty years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, a state appellate court reversed the conviction due to the denial of Batchelor's right to self-representation, but the court then granted rehearing, and a five-judge panel affirmed Batchelor's conviction and sentence. Batchelor subsequently filed a habeas corpus application in federal district court under § 2254, and the court granted relief.

We conclude that Batchelor made a clear and unequivocal invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself and that the state trial court erroneously denied his request in violation of Faretta. See28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The state argues that the state appellate court implicitly found that Batchelor waived his right to represent himself after asserting it and reasonably denied Batchelor's claim on that basis. We conclude, however, that the state court's implicit finding of waiver was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See id. § 2254(d)(2). We therefore AFFIRM the district court's grant of habeas relief.

I.

Batchelor was arrested in June 1998 and charged with robbing a pizza delivery driver and beating him so badly that he suffered permanent brain damage. On October 14, 1999, long before trial, Batchelor filed a pro se Motion for Dismissal of Counsel.” The two-page, legibly handwritten motion stated, in pertinent part:

The defendant moves this Honorable Court to dismiss counsel .... Pursuant to Faretta vs the State of California a Supreme Court Decision, the defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself .... Defendant avers that his request to dismiss counsel is being made with sound-mind with his eyes opened .... Defendant further prays that this Honorable Court allow him to proceed pro se in this matter with standby counsel only.

At some point that same day, the trial court attempted to hold an arraignment, but Batchelor's appointed counsel, Michael Kelly, failed to attend. The court asked Batchelor if he wanted to enter a plea despite Kelly's absence. Batchelor declined, saying, “I rather not say unless I have a presence of counsel [sic].” The following month, the arraignment took place with Kelly present, and Batchelor pleaded not guilty to all charges. Batchelor's Faretta motion was not discussed at either of these appearances.

On February 7, 2000, the trial court held a hearing at which several motions were addressed, including Batchelor's Faretta motion. The prosecutor spoke first, in a way that indicated that he erroneously thought Batchelor had moved to replace his appointed counsel rather than to proceed pro se. Kelly clarified the nature of Batchelor's motion: [Batchelor] is not necessarily asked [sic] that counselor be totally released, but that he have stand aside counsel to assist him throughout the proceedings.” The court indicated that it shared this understanding of the motion: “You mean that he would represent himself and have you stand beside him during that time?” Kelly responded, “Yes, sir, for whatever questions or pointers of law, issues as it relates, whatever procedural devices that he may be—that may be warranted.” Before ruling, the court asked Batchelor if he had anything to say. He responded, “No, sir.” The court then denied the motion and gave its reasons for doing so: Court is going to deny your motion to dismiss counsel. This matter has been set for trial on March the 20th. I believe that everything is now on track and Mr. Kelly is certainly well capable of mounting a defense on your behalf. I think everything is on track now, and we can proceed.”

The trial, with Batchelor represented by Kelly, ultimately did not begin until November 2000. The issue of Batchelor's representation was raised again by Batchelor and Kelly in motions filed on the eve of trial. First, on November 27, 2000, Kelly filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel,” in which Kelly averred that he had discovered on November 21 that Batchelor had filed a state bar disciplinary complaint against him. Kelly's motion asserted that this complaint created a conflict of interest and requested that the court appoint co-counsel or substitute counsel to represent Batchelor. At a hearing on November 27, the court denied Kelly's motion. Separately, Batchelor filed a second pro se Faretta motion, which was nearly identical to his October 14, 1999 motion. That motion was signed on November 21, 2000, but not filed until November 29. The trial court addressed this motion on November 29, the first day of trial, after the prosecution had called several witnesses. Kelly stated that it was “the same motion that has already been ruled upon by the Court, and in fact, is not a new motion,” and Batchelor agreed that this was correct. The trial court made a notation that the motion had already been denied on November 27. With respect to this exchange, the district court stated that it could “only speculate that Batchelor meant to say that the [trial] court had denied this motion on February 7, 2000, while the [trial] court believed that it had ruled on the motion at the November 27, 2000 hearing.” Batchelor v. Cain, Civil Action No. 07–1623, 2010 WL 3155985, at *7 n. 4 (W.D.La. Aug. 9, 2010). In any event, the present appeal turns on the state trial court's denial of Batchelor's initial Faretta request on February 7, 2000 and the state appellate court's rejection of Batchelor's challenge to that ruling, rather than on the denial of this much later renewal of that request.

After the trial, the jury convicted Batchelor of armed robbery and the court sentenced him to sixty years of imprisonment. Batchelor appealed his conviction and sentence to the state appellate court and argued, in a pro se brief, that the trial court violated his right to represent himself when it denied his October 14, 1999 Faretta motion, “even though [he] filed [it] six months before trial,” without “conduct[ing] any or a more sufficient hearing to decide whether ... [he] was literate, competent, and understanding, or to see if [he] was voluntarily exercising his right's on his own free will [sic].”

On direct appeal, a three-judge panel of the state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court had violated Batchelor's right to self-representation when it denied his Faretta motion at the February 7, 2000 hearing. State v. Batchelor, 823 So.2d 367, 372–73 (La.App. 2d Cir.2002) (majority opinion of Norris, C.J.) (“Batchelor first filed his written motion to dismiss counsel and represent himself on October 14, 1999 .... Batchelor specifically cited Faretta and claimed the constitutional right to represent himself, stating that he desired to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel only, and that he was making this request ‘with his eyes opened.’ Batchelor clearly and unequivocally declared his desire to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself .... The motion was heard in open court February 7, 2000, at which time trial was set for March 20, 2000 .... [T]he trial court did not conduct any meaningful inquiry to determine if Batchelor was competent to waive his right to counsel [ ] ... [before it] denied his motion .... Because we find that the trial court made no meaningful effort to inform Batchelor of the consequences of proceeding without counsel, ... or determine whether [his] waiver of counsel was ‘intelligent and voluntarily made,’ we must reverse the conviction and sentence ....”). One judge dissented, arguing that at the November 29, 2000 “hearing[,] ... like at the hearing on February 7, 2000, ... [Batchelor] never mentioned a desire for self-representation. Clearly this was a delaying tactic. The court did not deny a request for self-representation .... Under these circumstances, I question whether [Batchelor] sought self-representation and, if he did, it was implicitly waived.” Id. at 374 (Brown, J., dissenting). The state petitioned for rehearing and the court granted rehearing by a five-judge panel.

By a three-to-two vote, the rehearing panel affirmed Batchelor's conviction and sentence. Id. at 374–77 (majority opinion of Brown, J., on rehearing). The two judges who had formed the majority of the original three-judge panel dissented. Id. at 378–80 (Norris, C.J., dissenting). The rehearing majority focused on whether the trial court erred in denying Batchelor's November 29, 2000 Faretta motion. Id. at 375–77. Of that request, the court wrote: “Assuming ... that he did seek to represent himself, [Batchelor]' s vacillation between wanting to be represented by counsel and desiring to undertake his own defense, together with his failure to specifically assert this right at the November 27 hearing, constitutes an implicit waiver of his request.” Id. at 377. The court mentioned Batchelor's October 14, 1999 Faretta motion only in a footnote, stating...

To continue reading

Request your trial
113 cases
  • Granger v. Dir., TDCJ-CID
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • February 24, 2023
    ...to show that a reasonable factfinder must conclude that the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable. Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The court must presume that a state court's factual determinations are......
  • Castillo v. Stephens
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • November 12, 2014
    ...right to self-representation at trial when he knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel."); Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 2012) ("In Faretta, the Supreme Court announced that the right of a criminal defendant to represent himself at trial is implicit in the st......
  • Woodfox v. Cain
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • November 20, 2014
    ...the same issue as the earlier one: whether or not Woodfox had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. 46. Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir.2012) (quoting Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 47. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188......
  • Cassano v. Shoop
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • June 17, 2021
    ..."acquiescence and waiver argument" relied upon by the district court in this case, Freeman , 878 F.3d at 590 (citing Batchelor v. Cain , 682 F.3d 400, 412 (5th Cir. 2012) ; Buhl v. Cooksey , 233 F.3d 783, 803 (3d Cir. 2000) ; Wilson v. Walker , 204 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000) ; United States......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Review Proceedings
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...defendant of elements of offense prior to guilty plea was structural error not subject to harmless error review); Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405-06 (5th Cir. 2012) (denial of right to self-representation is structural requiring reversal); U.S. v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 413-15 (6th Cir......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT