Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N. C., 81-1766
| Citation | 682 F.2d 1055 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1766,81-1766 |
| Parties | 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 359 James SMITH, Appellee, v. The TOWN OF CLARKTON, NORTH CAROLINA; and J. Dwight Fort, Individually and as Mayor of Clarkton; Dewitt Clark, Individually and as Commissioner of Clarkton; Steve Prince, Individually and as Commissioner of Clarkton; Linda Revels, Individually and as Commissioner of Clarkton, Appellants, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., Amicus Curiae, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation, Inc., Amicus Curiae. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
W. Osborne Lee, Jr., Lumberton, N. C. (Lee & Lee, Lumberton, N. C., on brief), for appellants.
James J. Wall, Wilmington, N. C. (James B. Gillespie, Jr., Legal Services of the Lower Cape Fear, Wilmington, N. C., on brief), for appellee.
Martin E. Sloane, Rachel M. Hopp, Washington, D. C., on brief, for amicus curiae The National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc.
Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, Lowell Johnston, Leslie J. Winter, New York City, on brief, for amicus curiae The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation, Inc.
Before PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which requires the town of Clarkton, North Carolina, to take affirmative steps to facilitate the construction of fifty units of public housing, originally planned in cooperation with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
The action was filed by James Smith, a retired black man living in Bladen County, in which Clarkton lies, against Clarkton, its mayor-J. Dwight Fort, and three commissioners-Linda Revels, Dewitt Clark and Steve Prince, in their individual and official capacities. Clarkton, together with two similar, neighboring towns in Bladen County, had formed a joint housing authority which applied for and received preliminary approval and preliminary funding from HUD to construct fifty units of public housing in Clarkton. Fifteen acres of land was purchased and an architect was engaged, who made preliminary sketches for the project. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the town officials, bowing to pressure from public sentiment in Clarkton, ordered the town's withdrawal from the multi-municipality housing authority, effectively blocking the construction of the fifty units of housing. The complaint further alleged that the public opposition to the housing was racially motivated and that the mayor and council, in pursuing official action terminating the project, were aware of the racial orientation of the opposition and acted as a result of it. The trial court, after a one-day bench trial, agreed, finding liability under the fourteenth amendment and section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, commonly known as Title VIII (the Fair Housing Act). 1 The trial court found no personal racial animus on the part of the defendants as individuals, and denied an award of general damages to Smith. It ordered affirmative remedial action, however, and the principal ground of the defendants' appeal contests the validity of that portion of the court's order requiring such action to assure the construction of public housing in Clarkton. We affirm for the most part the court's judgment and order, but modify that portion which orders Clarkton to itself construct the public housing if the other avenues of financing fail to materialize.
Initially, we dispose of the defendants' procedural argument that the trial court erred in allowing the complaint to be amended five weeks prior to trial to allege jurisdiction under the Fair Housing Act. The complaint was filed on July 30, 1980. In it, the plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under various statutory sections, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 2201, and sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1982 and 1983. On April 27, 1981, the plaintiff by motion asked leave to amend his complaint to allege jurisdiction under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a). There is no merit to the defendants' contention that the trial court erred in allowing this amendment or that the Fair Housing Act allegations were barred by that Act's 180-day statute of limitations. The Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), emphasized that leave to amend under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) "shall be freely given when justice so requires" and stated that "if the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits" and concluded that in the absence of any apparent improper motivation, such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory tactics, the amendment should be "freely given." In Foman, the plaintiff had filed a complaint sounding in contract and subsequently attempted to amend under rule 15(a), asserting a right of recovery on a quantum meruit theory. The Court, in reversing the trial court's refusal to allow the amendment, stated that "the amendment would have done no more than state an alternative theory for recovery." Here, the original complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 () or section 3612 of the Fair Housing Act. The addition by amendment of the specific allegation of jurisdiction under the Fair Housing Act sections merely states specifically an alternative theory of recovery, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing that amendment. Since we hold that the amendment was properly allowed under rule 15(a), the "relation back" provision of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) is effective to satisfy the 180-day time limitation contained in 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a). 2
We next consider defendants' contentions that the trial court's factual determinations were clearly erroneous, that it improperly admitted certain testimony in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 802, that even if the trial court was correct in determining liability on their part for discriminatorily obstructing the construction of the public housing, it committed serious error in devising its remedy, and that the award of attorney fees was excessive.
The well-considered decision of the trial court, announced orally at the conclusion of the trial and reduced to written findings of fact and conclusions of law, was thorough in its treatment of the issues presented and the evidence adduced. The factual findings are fully supported by the record and inescapably lead to the conclusion that racially-discriminatory motives played a determinative part in the defendants' actions which blocked the construction of public housing in Clarkton. The pattern of racially-inspired decision making was not subtle, as such prejudice in the consideration of public housing often is, and as the trial court noted in its order, the reasons advanced by the town for withdrawing from the HUD project were "flimsy."
The demographic makeup of Clarkton and its environs paints a sharp picture of a community in which there exists a distinct pattern of racial separation. Clarkton proper is an unincorporated municipality of 664, 3 with whites making up 87.7% of the population. Clarkton in turn is part of Brown Marsh Township. The population of the latter is 62% white, but discounting the residents of Clarkton, its population is only 49% white.
Bladen County, in which Brown Marsh Township is located, has an agriculturally-dependent economy, is one of the poorest counties in North Carolina, and ranks in the bottom ten percent of the state in terms of per capita income. Within the county, 39.8% of all families live at less than 125% of the federally-defined poverty level, the eligibility threshold for low-income housing. Although blacks make up less than 40% of the total county population, 56% of all poverty-level families in the county are black, and 69.2% of all black families in Bladen County are presumptively eligible for low income housing, while only 26% of the white population is so qualified.
The effect of poverty on housing in the county is also well documented. Eighty percent of all housing is substandard, 60% of this is black-occupied, and the median price of housing in the county is approximately $5,000. The county-wide per capita income is $3,206, with that of blacks averaging $1,722. In contrast, the per capita income in Clarkton is $4,261. In spite of this, the trial court found that there was no evidence that Clarkton had any history of overt racial discrimination.
In 1968 the town commissioners of Clarkton established the Clarkton Housing Authority (CHA) in order to seek public housing funds for the town, but none had been secured by 1979. In February 1979, the Bladen County Planning Office held a public hearing attended by approximately 110 citizens of Bladen County, who, in a voice poll, enthusiastically supported public housing for the County. In May 1979, the Joint Municipal Housing Cooperative (JMHC) was formed by Clarkton and the nearby towns of Bladenboro and Elizabethtown to assist in acquiring and operating low-income public housing. As a joint governmental venture, the JMHC hired a director to coordinate its operations. Its governing body was composed of representatives of the participating municipalities, each of which contributed $2,000 to the JMHC. The JMHC determined that there was a need for 660 low-income housing units in Bladen County, and consulted with HUD, which determined that at least 150 units of public housing would be funded in Bladen County. That agency then set aside the necessary funds for these 150 units of public housing for use by the JMHC, with 50 units to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., No. CIV.A. MJG-95-309.
...by denying a plaintiff a housing opportunity (as opposed to an actual brick-and-mortar dwelling). See e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682 F.2d 1055, 1065-66 (4th Cir.1982) (a town's withdrawal from a multi-municipality housing authority may ground § 3604(a) liability); Resident Advis......
-
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections
...because of their desire to discriminate against a racial minority.’ " Veasey, 2014 WL 1340077, at *3 (citing Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682 F.2d 1055, 1064 (4th Cir.1982) ). In other words, the availability of alternate evidence will only supplement—not supplant—the evidence sought by......
-
Antonio v. Sec. Serv. Of Am. LLC
...[Section 1982], a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant.”) (citations omitted); Smith v. Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir.1982) (courts consider four factors in determining whether “a violation [of the FHA] has occurred, namely, ... (2) is there some ......
-
United States v. Machic-Xiap
..."desire to discriminate against a racial minority" are relevant. Arce , 793 F.3d at 978 (quoting Smith v. Town of Clarkton , 682 F.2d 1055, 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982) ). Statements made by opponents of a bill, however, are generally not appropriate evidence of Congress's motive for enacting......
-
City governments and predatory lending.
...(2d Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. (71.) See, e.g., Langlois, 207 F......