League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State

Citation683 A.2d 769
PartiesLEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS et al. v. SECRETARY OF STATE et al.
Decision Date19 September 1996
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Stephen E.F. Langsdorf (orally), Anne Skopp, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Augusta, for Appellants.

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Thomas D. Warren (orally), Assistant Attorney General, Augusta, and John Rich (orally), and William J. Sheils, Perkins, Thompson, Hinckley & Keddy, Portland, Samuel W. Lanham, Jr. (orally), Cuddy & Lanham, Bangor, for Appellees.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.

RUDMAN, Justice.

In January of 1993, elector petitions in support of the imposition of term limitations on the members of the Maine Legislature and several executive officers were submitted to the Legislature. The Legislature rejected the measure, and pursuant to the citizen initiative procedure of the Maine Constitution, 1 the initiative measure was submitted to the electors. On November 2, 1993, the people of Maine voted to enact the term limitations initiative into law. The Term Limitation Act of 1993 was codified as 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 551-554 (Supp.1995).

In February and March of 1996, several incumbent members of the Maine House of Representatives attempted to file primary petitions as required by 21-A M.R.S.A. § 334 (Supp.1995) 2 in order to appear on the June 1996 primary ballot in advance of November elections for the 118th Legislature. Secretary of State G. William Diamond, one of the defendants in this action, rejected the petitions of four incumbent legislators, citing the provision of the Term Limitation Act that bars members of the House of Representatives from serving more than four consecutive terms. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 553.

On February 20, 1996, the incumbent legislators, 3 along with representatives of certain groups of voters in the state of Maine 4 and several individual voters, filed a four count complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, challenging the constitutionality of the Term Limitation Act. On a motion of defendants Diamond and Attorney General Andrew Ketterer the District Court (Brody, J.), pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 57 (1989) and M.R.Civ.P. 76B, certified the following two questions:

1. Under the Maine Constitution, may limits on the number of consecutive terms that may be served by Maine legislators be enacted by legislation or do such limits require an amendment to the Maine Constitution?

2. If the answer to question 1 is that such limits may be enacted by legislation, do the provisions of 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 553-54 disqualify legislators who are currently serving the last of four or more consecutive terms from appearing on the ballot in the 1996 election and from serving in the legislature during 1997 and 1998?

Because there is no dispute as to the material facts at issue, and because our answer to the certified questions will be determinative of those portions of the pending matter that have been certified to us, the statutory requirements for our acceptance of these questions have been met. Finding that the exercise of our jurisdiction is proper, we now respond to each question. 5

Constitutionality of Popularly Initiated Term Limits

The power granted to the Legislature of the State of Maine is plenary and subject only to those limitations placed on it by the Maine and United States Constitutions. "The Legislature, with the exceptions hereinafter stated, shall have full power to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations for the defense and benefit of the people of this State, not repugnant to the Constitution, nor to that of the United States." Me.Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. The power of the Maine Legislature is distinct from that of our nation's Congress, which enjoys only those powers granted to it by the United States Constitution, such that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.

Legislative power in this State is defined by limitation, not by grant. "The Legislature of Maine may enact any law of any character or on any subject unless it is prohibited, either in express terms or by necessary implication, by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this State." Baxter v. Waterville Sewerage Dist., 146 Me. 211, 215, 79 A.2d 585, 588 (1951). See also Ace Tire Co. v. Municipal Officers of Waterville, 302 A.2d 90, 96 (Me.1973) (legislature has plenary power "except as it may have been circumscribed expressly or inferentially by the constitution of the state or nation"); Town of Warren v. Norwood, 138 Me. 180, 192-93, 24 A.2d 229, 235 (1941) (power of legislature is "absolute and all-embracing except as expressly or by necessary implication restricted by the Constitution").

Our Constitution gives the people of this State the power to enact legislation through the initiative process. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18. When the people enact legislation by popular vote, we construe the citizen initiative provisions of the Maine Constitution liberally in order to facilitate the people's exercise of their sovereign power to legislate. Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1102-03 (Me.1983). See also Opinion of the Justices, 275 A.2d 800, 803 (Me.1971) ("Our primary consideration, therefore, must be that by the initiative amendment the people, as sovereign, have retaken unto themselves legislative power and that a particular undertaking by them shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose."). The exercise of initiative power by the people is simply a popular means of exercising the plenary legislative power "to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations for the defense and benefit of the people of this State...." Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1.

Since by the initiative process the people of Maine are exercising their legislative power, the constitutional validity of a citizen initiative is evaluated under the ordinary rules of statutory construction. Opinion of the Justices, 460 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Me.1982). Thus, the Term Limitation Act of 1993 carries a heavy presumption of constitutionality, and the burden of overcoming that presumption rests on the challenger. Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 17 (Me.1983). "Before legislation may be declared in violation of the Constitution, that fact must be established to such a degree as to leave no room for reasonable doubt." Orono-Veazie Water Dist. v. Penobscot County Water Co., 348 A.2d 249, 253 (Me.1975) (citing York Harbor Village Corp. v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 549, 140 A. 382 (1928)). We have had occasion to find that the people of Maine have overstepped the limits of their constitutionally granted powers in enacting initiative measures. See, e.g., Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 93, 106-08, 83 A.2d 556 (1951) (revocation of emergency tax laws enacted by the legislature); Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 449-51, 89 A. 944 (1914) (removal of public officers). The question before us relates to a proper exercise by the people of Maine of their legislative power.

Term limits have in the past been placed on executive officers by constitutional amendment in Maine. See, e.g., Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 2 (governor); Me. Const. 1819 art. V, pt. 4, § 1 (state treasurer) (repealed in 1951 by Amendment LXX). The decision to proceed by constitutional amendment in enacting term limits for the governor and the treasurer does not provide compelling evidence that the framers of our Constitution intended amendment of that document to be the only means of imposing qualifications on those who would serve in the legislature. 6 In fact, the first legislature to convene after the ratification of the new Constitution enacted two measures that served to prevent certain persons from taking state office, including legislators. One of the two, concerning dueling, is still in effect. Laws 1821, ch. II, § 7, now codified as 17 M.R.S.A. § 1351 (1983) ("Whoever fights a duel with deadly weapons or is present thereat as aid, second, surgeon or as advising, encouraging or promoting it, [shall] be incapable of holding any office or place of honor, trust or profit for 20 years after conviction"). The second law was not repealed until the codification of our modern penal code in 1976. Laws 1821, ch. XXI, § 2, codified as 17 M.R.S.A. § 601, repealed effective May 1, 1976 (anyone convicted of bribery shall be "forever after incapable of sustaining any office or place of trust within this State").

The plaintiffs suggest that we look to the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995), and apply to our own Constitution the Court's holding that the United States Constitution is the exclusive source of qualifications for legislative office. We decline the invitation. The decision in Thornton concerned the particular history of the federal constitution, not that of our state, and we find no evidence compelling an application of the same analysis to both documents. 7 The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that the Framers wanted to ensure that elections for federal office would not take disparate forms within the several states. "Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States." Thornton, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1844, 131 L.Ed.2d at 888. No such need for uniformity is present in our elections, and the reasoning of the Thornton Court is inapplicable here. Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. at 97, 83 A.2d at 561 (1951) ("It is to be remembered that we are now interpreting our own Constitution. In so doing, we are not bound by any of the interpretations which others may have made of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
35 cases
  • In re Op. of the Justices, Docket No. OJ–17–1
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 2 Febrero 2017
    ...directly on proposed legislation. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 ; see 21–A M.R.S. §§ 901 –906 (2016) ; League of Women Voters v. Sec'y of State , 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996). It important to note that the Maine Constitution, citizen-enacted legislation, and legislatively enacted legislat......
  • Op. of Justices of Supreme Judicial Court Given Under Provisions of Article VI
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 23 Mayo 2017
    ...vote directly on proposed legislation. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18; see 21-A M.R.S. §§ 901-906 (2016); League of Women Voters v. Sec'y of State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996). It important to note that the Maine Constitution, citizen-enacted legislation, and legislatively enacted legisla......
  • Gerberding v. Munro
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 8 Enero 1998
    ...prescribed qualifications may be changed only by constitutional amendment is intuitively sound."). Contra, League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769 (Me.1996) (upholding statute, enacted by initiative, adding to qualifications of state constitutional Respondents assert the ......
  • Cathcart v. Meyer
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • 4 Mayo 2004
    ...Maine Supreme Court also found that state's term limits initiative constitutional in 1996. That holding, in League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996), was based on two principles: that initiatives are to be construed liberally to facilitate the people's sove......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT