Walker v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date07 September 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-5445,81-5445
Citation684 F.2d 1355
Parties29 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1259, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,028 Clyde WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Northgate Lincoln-Mercury Dealer, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Joseph R. Moss, Cocoa, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.

William E. Sizemore, Tampa, Fla., Thomas M. Gonzalez, Tampa, Fla., for defendants-appellees, cross-appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TUTTLE, KRAVITCH and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge.

In this Title VII case, both Clyde Walker and Ford Motor Company appeal from a judgment entered for Walker after a bench trial. Walker contends that the trial court erred in not awarding him sufficient backpay and in not permitting him to recover compensatory and punitive damages; Ford asserts that the trial court improperly found that it violated Title VII. Finding no error below, we affirm.

I.

Appellant Walker is a black man who in 1975 entered a minority dealer training program instituted by Ford and administered through participating local dealerships. During the 18-month training program trainees received a stipend of $1500 per month. Walker was assigned for his training to the Northgate Lincoln-Mercury dealership in Tampa, Florida. He began the program on October 27, 1975, and over the course of the next few months complained to Ford that Northgate management and employees repeatedly used offensive racial epithets, including referring to poorly repaired cars as "nigger-rigged" and referring to the salesman with the lowest sales volume as "the black ass." On one occasion the Northgate leasing manager called Walker a "dumb nigger"; 1 another time, this same employee stated that one of the lease cars had been damaged by "niggers." On still another occasion, when a black man created a disturbance at the dealership, a salesman was instructed to call the police to "get this nigger out of here."

Walker was terminated from the training program on June 17, 1976, four days after a Northgate co-owner Parks incorrectly reported Walker absent from work and shortly after Walker had requested a transfer to another dealership because of the racial slurs used by Northgate personnel. Walker sought reinstatement from Ford, and when it refused, filed a complaint with the EEOC. After receiving his right-to-sue letter, Walker filed this action in federal district court, alleging that the termination violated Title VII. The district court found that the pervasive use of racial slurs at the Northgate dealership was an unlawful employment practice under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and that the inaccurate attendance report which resulted in Walker's discharge was motivated by Walker's complaints about the racial epithets. Accordingly, the court found that Ford and Northgate were guilty of retaliatory discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The court awarded Walker reinstatement in the training program, or alternatively backpay for the remainder of the training period missed by Walker after the discharge, and attorney's fees, but denied compensatory damages claimed by Walker and also denied punitive damages.

II.

We first address the issues raised by Ford's cross-appeal. Ford makes two separate arguments concerning the trial court's finding that it violated Title VII. First, it claims that while a work atmosphere tainted by pervasive racially abusive language can be unlawful under § 2000e-2, the racial slurs used at the Northgate dealership were not sufficiently pervasive to rise to a violation of Title VII.

We disagree. As Ford correctly notes, "an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects (the psychological well-being of) an employee because of his race or ethnicity, regardless of any other tangible job detriment to the employee." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972); Calcote v. Texas Education Foundation, Inc., 458 F.Supp. 231, 237 (W.D.Tex.1976), aff'd, 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978). Accord Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981); Cariddi v. Kansas Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1978). Ford argues, however, that the racial slurs used by Northgate personnel were either common parlance of an automobile dealership (i.e., "nigger-rigged") or else were sporadic references and in most instances not aimed at Walker.

This court recognized in Henson that "the mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee 'does not rise to a Title VII violation.' For ( ) harassment to state a claim under Title VII, it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment." Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. Here, however, the district court specifically found that Northgate personnel's use of the terms "nigger-rigged" and "black-ass," as well as other racially abusive language was "repeated," "continuous," and "prolonged" despite Walker's objections, and that the language made Walker feel unwanted and uncomfortable in his surroundings. These findings were findings of fact which must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. See id. at 907-07 (whether harassment is severe enough to seriously affect the psychological well-being of employees is a question to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances).

The findings were not clearly erroneous. Co-owner Karras admitted to repeatedly using the term "black ass." Although Parks claimed he had never heard the phrase "nigger-rigged" around the dealership, he admitted it was a common term in the car business. Both men asserted, however, that neither of these terms were intended to carry racial overtones. All other instances of opprobrious language alleged by Walker were confirmed by the record, and even Judson Powell, the manager of Ford's trainee program, tacitly admitted the conditions at the Northgate dealership by advising Walker that the racial slurs were "just something a black man would have to deal with in the South," and that Walker should not dwell on "trivialities" but concentrate on the broad goal of finishing the training program. Accordingly, we find no error in the court's conclusion that the work atmosphere at the Northgate dealership violated § 2000e-2. 2

Ford's next argument is that even if the trial court was correct in finding a § 2000e-2 violation, it erred in finding a retaliatory discharge under § 2000e-3. Ford contends that the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Ford to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the discharge contrary to the Supreme Court decision in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Further, Ford asserts that no evidence of a retaliatory discharge existed to support the trial court's findings.

We find both these arguments without merit. As to the first, we agree with Ford that Burdine mandates that the plaintiff always bear the burden of persuasion on the ultimate fact of discrimination. We also agree that under the traditional three-step proof in Title VII cases, 3 once a plaintiff carries his prima facie case, the employer must only articulate, not prove by a preponderance, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. See Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc., 680 F.2d 98, 101 (11th Cir. 1982). We do not agree, however, that the court applied the incorrect burden of proof to Ford. Although the district court's findings did not clearly delineate the various steps in the proof of a Title VII claim, the transcript makes clear that the judge examined the pertinent facts and applied the proper burden of proof to the ultimate finding of discrimination. 4 As the former Fifth Circuit has held, the absence of the labels "prima facie case" and "pretextual" in the trial court's findings is not fatal to the plaintiff's claim as long as the plaintiff proves under the correct allocation of the burden of proof the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. 5 E.g., Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1980).

Ford's second claim is likewise meritless. The court found after reviewing all the evidence that "a significant motivation" for Walker's discharge was his complaints about the racial slurs at the Northgate dealership. This finding of ultimate fact can be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1787-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc., supra at 101. The trial court's finding was amply supported by the record. Walker's discharge resulted from co-owner Parks' report to Ford that Walker had been absent from work without excuse and Parks' request that Walker be removed from the Northgate training program. Parks had signed work reports for Walker indicating that the trainee had attended work on the disputed day, however, and the incorrect report and request for Walker's removal came shortly after Walker had asked Ford for a transfer because of the racial slurs at Northgate. Ford, moreover, offered Walker no viable explanation for his removal other than that he had "failed to live within the discipline of the dealership" and its proffered excuse at trial-Walker's alleged absenteeism-was rebutted by work reports introduced by Walker. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Ford was guilty of retaliatory discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.

III.

We next turn to the claims raised by Walker...

To continue reading

Request your trial
142 cases
  • Kiper v. LA. STATE BD. OF ELEMENTARY EDUC., Civ. A. No. 81-204-A.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
    • 1 de agosto de 1984
    ...no mention of punitive damages as to the title VII claim. Punitive damages are not available under title VII. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th Cir.1982). Punitive damages are available under §§ 1983 and 1981, as well as injunctive relief, back pay (with no two year limita......
  • Irby v. Sullivan, 82-1566
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 6 de agosto de 1984
    ...Bar Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 249, 66 L.Ed.2d 117 (1980); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-65 (11th Cir.1982). In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs' counsel conceded that Trabue sought no Title V......
  • Police Officers for Equal Rights v. CITY OF COL.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • 8 de janeiro de 1985
    ...in promotions and assignments, Title VII prohibits terms and conditions that discriminate against one racial group. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir.1980); Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 588 F.2d ......
  • Minority Police Officers v. City of South Bend
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 5 de setembro de 1985
    ...job detriment. See, e.g., Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical Control, 690 F.2d 88, 97 (6th Cir.1982); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.1982); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C.Cir.1981); C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • When the Pig Is in the Barnyard, Not the Parlor: Should Courts Apply a "coarseness Factor" in Analyzing Blue-collar Hostile Work Environment Claims?
    • United States
    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 17-3, March 2001
    • Invalid date
    ...way." Cahill, supra note 43, at 1152. [95]. Jackson, 191 F.3d at 662. [96]. Id. at 660. [97]. Id. at 666; cf. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that the work environment at a car dealership was racially hostile in a case in which the defendant character......
  • Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 18-2, February 1989
    • Invalid date
    ...See, Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986). 12. Supra, note 8 at 622. 13. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1982) (black employees do not have to tolerate racial slurs as part of Southern social milieu). 14. Smemo-Rosenquist v. ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT