Helm v. Solem

Decision Date04 August 1982
Docket NumberNo. 82-1039,82-1039
Citation684 F.2d 582
PartiesJerry HELM, Appellant, v. Herman SOLEM, etc., Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

John J. Burnett, Rapid City, S. D., for appellant.

Grant Gormely, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, S. D., for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Jerry Buckley Helm appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He asserts that the sentence he received as an habitual offender, life imprisonment without parole, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We agree, and, accordingly, reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background.

Helm entered a guilty plea to a felony charge of uttering a "no account" check for $100. Against the advice of counsel, Helm also admitted to six prior felony convictions 1 and, as a result, was sentenced as an habitual offender. 2

The record indicates that Helm, age thirty-six at the time of his conviction, is an alcoholic and has spent much of the last fifteen years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary. State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 499 (S.D.1980). Alcohol contributed to Helm's actions leading to this conviction and each of his prior convictions. In describing the facts prior to his guilty plea to the bad check charge, Helm stated:

"I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would have known this, I would have picked the check up. I was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several places." (State v. Helm, supra, 287 N.W.2d at 501.)

Following entry of his guilty plea, Helm waived his right to a presentence investigation and requested immediate sentencing. The state trial judge acceded to his request and made the following statement in pronouncing Helm's life sentence from the bench:

"Well, I guess most anybody looking at this record would have to acknowledge you have a serious problem, if you've been drinking all this time and your prior imprisonments have not had any effect on your drinking problem, so far as motivating you for change. If you get out in the near future, you're going to be committing further crimes, so I can't see any purpose in my extending any leniency to you at all here and I intend to give you a life sentence.

It will be up to you and the parole board to work out when you finally get out, 3 but I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll have plenty of time to think this one over." (State v. Helm, supra, 287 N.W.2d at 500.)

The statute in effect at the time of Helm's sentencing provided that "(a) person sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 24-15-4 (1979). Thus, by imposing a life sentence, the sentencing judge committed Helm to the state penitentiary for the remainder of his natural life, barring a pardon or commutation of his sentence.

Helm appealed from his sentence, contending that the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole denied him due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court of South Dakota, with two justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Helm, supra.

Helm then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court alleging that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that the sentencing procedure violated his right to due process because the judge imposed the maximum sentence allowed by law without a presentence investigation. The State filed an answer to Helm's petition, and the district court denied the petition without a hearing. In a memorandum opinion, the district court determined that Helm had effectively waived any right to a presentence investigation, and that Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), disposed of Helm's claim that the sentence imposed constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Helm filed this appeal.

II. Discussion.

On appeal, Helm presses only his claim that a life sentence without parole under the circumstances of this case violates his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 4 Helm contends that Rummel v. Estelle does not control this case, because the life sentence imposed on Rummel carried with it the possibility of parole. We agree that Rummel is not dispositive.

In Rummel, the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a mandatory life sentence under Texas' recidivist statute upon Rummel's felony conviction for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. At the time, Rummel had two prior felony convictions-passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services. 445 U.S. at 265-66, 100 S.Ct. at 1134-35. Rummel challenged his life sentence on the ground that it violated the proscription of the eighth and fourteenth amendments against cruel and unusual punishment because it was so grossly disproportionate to the severity of his crime. The Court rejected the disproportionality analysis urged by Rummel, concluding that the task of drawing lines between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years properly belonged to the legislature, not the courts. Id. at 275-76, 100 S.Ct. at 1139-40. The Court stated that

one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. (Id. at 274, 100 S.Ct. at 1139 (footnote omitted).)

The Court in Rummel, however, did not totally reject the idea that a term of imprisonment might be so disproportionate to the offense as to be unconstitutional. The plurality noted: "This is not to say that a proportionality principle would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent, * * * if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." Id. at 274 n.11, 100 S.Ct. at 1139. More importantly for the analysis in this case, the Court distinguished the life sentence at issue in Rummel from a life sentence without parole.

Texas, we are told, has a relatively liberal policy of granting "good time" credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as little as 12 years. * * * We agree with Rummel that his inability to enforce any "right" to parole precludes us from treating his life sentence as if it were equivalent to a sentence of 12 years. Nevertheless, because parole is "an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (92 S.Ct. 2593, 2598, 33 L.Ed.2d 484) (1972), a proper assessment of Texas' treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life. If nothing else, the possibility of parole, however slim, serves to distinguish Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist statute like Mississippi's, which provides for a sentence of life without parole upon conviction of three felonies including at least one violent felony. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp.1979). (Id. at 280-81, 100 S.Ct. at 1142-43.)

The State in this case contends, however, that no meaningful distinction exists between a life sentence with parole and one without parole. It relies on Hutto v. Davis, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (per curiam), to support its contention that a disproportionality analysis does not apply in noncapital cases. There, the Court upheld the imposition of two consecutive twenty-year sentences upon Davis' convictions for possession and distribution of less than nine ounces of marijuana. In rejecting Davis' cruel and unusual punishment claim, the Court stated that

Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts should be "reluctan(t) to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment," id. at 274, 100 S.Ct., at 1139, and that "successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences" should be "exceedingly rare," id. at 272, 100 S.Ct., at 1138. (102 S.Ct. at 705 (footnote omitted).)

We recognize that Rummel and Davis caution federal judges against imposing their subjective views of sentencing upon the states when reviewing claims that state sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment because of their length. Neither case, however, addressed the precise issue before us. Davis received consecutive sentences for a definite term of years. More significantly, the sentences imposed upon both Rummel and Davis carried the prospect of parole. 5 By contrast, Helm must serve the rest of his life behind bars. 6

A life sentence without parole differs qualitatively from a sentence for a term of years or a life sentence with the prospect of parole. As with the death penalty, the State totally rejects rehabilitation as a basic goal of our criminal justice system by imposing a life sentence without parole. Because a life sentence without parole differs in kind from other sentences of imprisonment, the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires that it bear some relationship to the severity of the underlying crime. 7

In comparing the length of sentence in this case to the offense, we remain mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that a determination...

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  • Russell v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2022
    ...Circuit had determined "that Helm's sentence was grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." Id. (quoting Helm v. Solem , 684 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd , 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1983). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Solem , 463 U.S. at 2......
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  • Wilson v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • August 31, 2001
    ...distinguishing Helm's sentence from Rummel's sentence because Rummel's sentence included the possibility of parole. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir.1982). The Court of Appeals considered Helm's offenses, his sentence, and the sentence imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions, ......
  • Hatter v. Warden, Iowa Men's Reformatory, C89-0062.
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    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • April 17, 1990
    ...Circuit Court of Appeals that a life sentence without parole qualitatively differs from other sentences of imprisonment. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir.1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). A life sentence without parole "totally rejects rehabilitatio......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Pronouncements of the U.s. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1982-1983
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 12-9, September 1983
    • Invalid date
    ...reversed, distinguishing Rummel and finding that respondent's sentence was disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted. 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment......

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