United States v. Widi

• Decision Date: 06 July 2012
• Docket Number: 10–2302.,Nos. 10–2268,s. 10–2268
• Citation: 684 F.3d 216
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. David WIDI, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

684 F.3d 216

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.David WIDI, Defendant, Appellant.

Nos. 10–2268, 10–2302.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

Heard May 10, 2012.

Decided July 6, 2012.

James S. Hewes, by appointment of the court, for appellant.

David J. Widi, Jr. on brief pro se.

Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SELYA and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges.

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

David Widi, who now appeals to this court, was convicted by a jury in Maine federal district court of possessing a firearm or ammunition as a prohibited felon and manufacturing marijuana. The saga began on November 25, 2008, with a search warrant for Widi's apartment secured by an agent of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”).

The apartment, searched three days later, contained what one of the officers described as an “elaborate growing system” for marijuana; seventeen marijuana plants; rounds of ammunition on the kitchen counter and throughout the apartment; a reloading press for ammunition; a loaded pistol in the nightstand beside Widi's bed; a .50 caliber rifle barrel in the attic; and (in a locked gun safe) six guns of varying styles, a bag of marijuana, and more ammunition.

Widi was arrested and eventually charged with both possession of firearms and ammunition as a prohibited felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and manufacturing marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict after less than two hours of deliberation. Widi was later sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment. Widi now appeals and, supplementing his attorney's brief with his own, raises a host of issues.

Competence. The first argument by Widi's appellate counsel is that Widi was not competent to stand trial. At the formal hearing on Widi's competency on November 30, 2009, his trial counsel explained that both he and Widi took the position that Widi was competent to stand trial. Although the government suggests that the issue may have been waived or is subject only to plain error review, we will assume arguendo that review is for clear error, which is the normal standard for findings by the district judge. United States v. Reynolds, 646 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.2011).

After Widi's indictment, his then-counsel, Mary Davis, raised concerns about Widi's competence with the government, saying that Widi was incapable of focusing on the issues as to whether he should plead or go to trial. The government, in turn, filed a motion for a mental examination with the court under the governing statutory procedure. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(a)–(b), 4247(b)–(c). Widi himself resisted mildly but the district judge, noting his “own concerns,” granted the motion.

A further hearing followed with a similar colloquy after which Widi underwent an examination primarily conducted by William J. Ryan, a licensed psychologist. However, Widi consistently refused to cooperate and he also refused to participate in treatment sessions with a prison psychiatrist. Dr. Ryan depended therefore on observations of Widi, conversations with his grandmother and attorneys, and a review of documents; he acknowledged that his diagnoses were made with “less than the usual degree of psychological certainty.”

In his report, Dr. Ryan ultimately concluded that

Mr. Widi is incapable of comprehending the seriousness of his case, the recommendations of defense counsel, communicating with counsel, weighing the merits of various defenses, and making decisions regarding his right to a trial, his right to an attorney, his right to enter into a plea, and his right to call witnesses. Mr. Widi is currently not capable of testifying in his own defense and speaking during sentencing proceedings should it be necessary.... Mr. Widi does not have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him, and he is incapable of assisting counsel with his defense. Within less than the usual degree of psychological certainty, it is the opinion of this evaluator, Mr. Widi is currently Not Competent to Stand Trial.

The report cited specific facts in support of its conclusion of Widi's incompetence. For example:

-Widi used a cart full of books to barricade himself inside a holding cell to prevent staff from changing his cell and shouted about having “to go to war”

-Widi asserted that the whole federal government was against him and repeatedly claimed that evaluation was unethical and unconstitutional

-Widi attempted to throw himself down a flight of stairs when his cell was changed, causing him to be placed on suicide watch

-Widi frequently displayed extreme emotional behavior

-Widi's family has a history of serious mental illness and substance abuse.

As Davis and Widi continued to disagree about his competency, she withdrew and was replaced by Peter Rodway. Rodway, after conferring with Widi, concluded that Widi could adequately assist in his defense and, thereafter, the formal hearing on competency took place on November 30, 2009. Both Rodway and the prosecutor disagreed with Dr. Ryan's report, which the judge admitted into evidence on his own motion. Neither side called any other witness nor provided any other evidence beyond Rodway's express representation that he found Widi competent.

The judge ruled that Widi was competent, saying:

I've had the opportunity to review the report. I agree with counsel that I believe the report's conclusion is erroneous. I think it's based on insubstantial predicate. In my view, the doctors arrived at a hasty conclusion based on inadequate evidence and I reject the result of that report.

I'm entirely in agreement with counsel's position. I find by a preponderance of the evidence this defendant is presently and will in the reasonable future be competent to stand trial.

I find specifically this defendant—and I would note I've observed him every time he has been in court and my decision is based in part on my interaction with this defendant. I find that he has sufficient present ability to consult with his counsel with the reasonable degree of rational understanding.

I further find that this defendant has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him and the possible consequences. I also might note as an aside that his interaction with the earlier examiners, as indicated in the report, underlines that understanding.

Three circumstances lend support to the district court's finding. First, defense counsel's conclusion of competence is generally given great weight because of counsel's “unique vantage,” United States v. Muriel–Cruz, 412 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.2005). True, Davis had strongly questioned Widi's competency and found that she could not effectively discuss matters with him. But Rodway found that he could work with Widi, a relationship possibly enhanced by Rodway's willingness to go to trial.

Second, the district judge may take into account his own observations of the defendant, Muriel–Cruz, 412 F.3d at 13;United States v. Pryor, 960 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1992), and in this case the district court had several times dealt with Widi in the courtroom. On these appeals this court has itself reviewed pertinent transcripts which confirm that Widi was far from incoherent. See United States v. Huguenin, 950 F.2d 23, 28 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1991).

Third, Widi's own insistence on his competency is also entitled to consideration. See Muriel–Cruz, 412 F.3d at 13. Widi might be mistaken and, if plainly incoherent or irrational, his assertion to the contrary could hardly be accepted. See Reynolds, 646 F.3d at 71. But he was not in this state. And, as between an additional four month confinement for observation, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), and a trial that might go on being postponed after that, most would give some thought to the defendant's own preference and profession.

Dr. Ryan deemed Widi incompetent and, as the only clinician, his views too are entitled to weight, Muriel–Cruz, 412 F.3d at 13, even if his examination was handicapped by Widi's refusal to cooperate. But competence to stand trial is a functional inquiry. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); Robidoux v. O'Brien, 643 F.3d 334, 339 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 866, 181 L.Ed.2d 556 (2011). A defendant may have serious mental illness while still being able to understand the proceedings and rationally assist his counsel. Brown v. O'Brien, 666 F.3d 818, 826–27 & n. 9 (1st Cir.2012), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, ––– S.Ct. ––––, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2012 WL 1379023 (June 25, 2012).

The district judge did not have a wealth of choices. Calling Dr. Ryan as a court witness might have been helpful, but his position and explanations were both set forth in his report. As Widi had refused to cooperate with Dr. Ryan's evaluation and the prison psychiatrist's attempt at treatment, it is unclear that more information would be gained by ordering another immediate examination. About the only remaining option was a postponement of trial and continued observation—over the objection of both Widi and his counsel.

Like many factual issues presented in district court, this one had no inescapable single answer. Dr. Ryan knew more than anyone else about diagnosing mental states; the judge, more about what help and understanding is needed from a defendant in a criminal trial; Rodway, about what kind of cooperation Widi was giving. The district judge made a debatable call; but the factual determination on which it rests was not clear error.

Pretrial Motions. Widi argues that the affidavit that underpinned the search warrant was inadequate. Widi succeeded in suppressing evidence seized from his vehicle and pre- Miranda statements made in response to questioning, but the search warrant was readily upheld, as it should have been. It rested on statements by two different...