San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Broth. of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Cory, 81-5327

Citation685 F.2d 1137
Decision Date31 August 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-5327,81-5327
Parties111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2222, 95 Lab.Cas. P 13,758 SAN DIEGO COUNTY DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS OF the UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AMERICA, Petitioner/Appellant, v. G. L. CORY, Associated General Contractors of America, San Diego Chapter, Inc., Respondents/Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Michael B. Roger, Van Bourg, Allen Weinberg & Roger, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner/appellant.

Mark T. Bennett, San Diego, Cal., for respondents/appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before HUG, TANG and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.

TANG, Circuit Judge:

This appeal is from a district court dismissal of a petition to vacate an arbitration award entered under a collective bargaining agreement. The petition was dismissed as untimely. The issue presented is whether the 100-day limitations period of Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 1288 or the three-month limitations period of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 12, should apply to actions brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to vacate an arbitration award. We conclude that the California limitations period should apply and reverse the district court dismissal.

FACTS

San Diego County District Council of Carpenters ("District Council") and G. L. Cory, Inc. are parties to a collective bargaining agreement known as the San Diego County Master Labor Agreement (1980-83). On September 9, 1980, the District Council filed a grievance against G.L. Cory, Inc. alleging that the company had violated the agreement by subcontracting drywall construction work to a company with employees who were not affiliated with the District Council.

On October 16, 1980, an arbitration award was rendered under the San Diego County Master Labor Agreement against the District Council. On January 22, 1981, ninety-eight days after the entry of the arbitration award, the District Council filed a petition in California Superior Court to vacate the award. The respondents to the petition, G. L. Cory, Inc. and Associated General Contractors of America (collectively, "Cory"), removed the action to the federal district court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Cory then moved to dismiss the petition because it had not been filed within three months of the award as required by section 12 of the United States Arbitration Act (USAA), 9 U.S.C. § 12, 1 which, Cory argued, applied to

actions to vacate an arbitration award brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. The District Council opposed the motion on the ground that the timeliness of the petition was governed by the 100-day statute of limitations found in Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 1288 2 and not the three-month limitations period found in the USAA. The district court held that the USAA period applied both under section 301 and the USAA, and dismissed the petition.

DISCUSSION

Congress did not enact a statute of limitations for section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. When Congress does not provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, we apply the forum state's statute of limitations unless it unduly qualifies or diminishes the federal right the cause of action seeks to protect. See, e.g., Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1969). The relevant state limitations period here is Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 1288, which allows a party 100 days to petition to vacate an arbitration award. 3 The issue is whether federal labor policy requires us to disregard the general rule favoring the incorporation of a state limitations period such as section 1288 and to incorporate instead a federal limitations period such as the three-month period found in the United States Arbitration Act. 4

Supreme Court precedent sheds little light on this question. In International Union of Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the forum state limitations period governs section 301 actions seeking damages for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court, however, explicitly limited its holding to damage actions and expressed no opinion with respect to actions seeking other types of relief. Id. at 705 n.7 86 S.Ct. at 1113 n.7. Similarly, in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), the Court ruled that if a court applies a state limitations period to a section 301 action that seeks to vacate an arbitration award, it should choose the state limitations period applicable to arbitration awards rather than the limitations period applicable to contract enforcement. The Court, however, expressly reserved whether it was more appropriate to create judicially a federal limitations period rather than to borrow a state limitation period. Id. at 60 n.2, 101 S.Ct. at 1562 n.2.

Our own precedent is more helpful. 5 In Local 1020, United Brotherhood of Carpenters' & Joiners v. FMC Corp., 658 F.2d 1285, 1288-92 (9th Cir. 1981), we were asked to decide whether the 20-day statute of limitations provided in the Oregon commercial arbitration statute or the USAA limitations period should be applied to a section 301 action seeking to vacate an arbitration award. We noted that the Supreme Court had been reluctant in Mitchell to adopt the USAA limitations period and offered several reasons why that limitations period might be inapplicable. Id. at 1290-92. We also indicated that we saw no reason why the state limitation period should not be the applicable limitations period. Id. at 1289. Despite this discussion, however, we declined to base our decision on the statute of limitations issue and held instead that the plaintiff's complaint should have been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 1292. 6

Although the holding in FMC Corp. does not control our decision here, its reasoning nonetheless persuades us that we should generally apply the state limitations period rather than the USAA limitations period. We concede that a uniform federal limitation period might be desirable. Incorporating the USAA limitation period might promote uniformity in the administration of collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Communications Workers of America v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 462 F.Supp. 736, 738-39 (C.D.Cal.1978). Multi-state contracts are common and arbitration awards entered under those contracts often have an impact on more than one state. Use of a uniform federal limitation period might afford parties to a multi-state agreement clear notice of how soon they must challenge an arbitration award in court. This predictability is diminished if state limitations periods are employed. Within this circuit, the applicable state limitations periods vary substantially, from ten days in Hawaii to five years in Montana. 7 Moreover, federal incorporation of state conflict of law rules may further complicate which limitations period should apply.

We also acknowledge that the need for uniformity may be more compelling with respect to arbitration awards than with damage actions. In Hoosier Cardinal, the Court noted that "(t)he need for uniformity is greatest where its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote-the formation of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it." 383 U.S. at 702, 86 S.Ct. at 1111. The Court found that damage actions under section 301 did not require a uniform limitations period because the parties' collective bargaining relationship will have "already broken down" by the time a contractual dispute culminates in litigation. Id. at 702, 86 S.Ct. at 1111. This is not necessarily true for judicial actions seeking review of arbitration awards. Although seeking judicial review necessarily means that the parties have exhausted private dispute resolution devices, judicial review of an arbitration award is still only the last step in an on-going process of contract administration. Adopting a uniform limitations period for reviewing arbitration awards might instill additional confidence in the arbitration process by infusing predictability in the use of the arbitration mechanism. See Communications Workers, 462 F.Supp. at 738-39. But see Service Employees International Union, Local 36 v. Office Center Services, Inc., 670 F.2d 404, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1982) (need for uniformity in limitations period no more compelling for judicial review of arbitration awards than for damage actions).

Despite the apparent advantages of a uniform federal limitation period, we nonetheless reject the suggestion to incorporate the USAA limitation period here. First, we believe the decision to create a uniform federal limitations period should be left to Congress and not the courts. As noted in Hoosier Cardinal, Congress hotly debated the desirability of enacting a uniform limitations period for section 301, but failed to do so. 383 U.S. at 703-04, 86 S.Ct. at 1111-12. We interpret this absence of an explicit Congressional mandate as a tacit endorsement of incorporating state limitations periods. Cf., International Union of Operating Engineers v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1965) (fact that Congress did not provide a statute of limitations to section 301 damage actions argues against judicially creating one), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 904, 86 S.Ct. 1336, 16 L.Ed.2d 358 (1966).

Second, we question whether Congress intended the courts to look to the USAA for guidance in interpreting section 301. Section 1 of the USAA specifically excludes from its coverage "contracts of employment of ... any class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce", 9 U.S.C. § 1. This language...

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