Pfister v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk County

• Decision Date: 10 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-1513.,02-1513.
• Citation: 688 N.W.2d 790
• Parties: Steve L. PFISTER and Scott Mariner, Plaintiffs, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

688 N.W.2d 790

Steve L. PFISTER and Scott Mariner, Plaintiffs, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 02-1513.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 10, 2004.

Scott A. Sobel of Sobel Law Firm, Des Moines, for plaintiffs.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, John R. Lundquist and Chantelle C. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, and Josh Henningsen, Student Legal Intern, for defendant.

TERNUS, Justice.

In the 2002 legislative session, the Iowa General Assembly adopted several amendments to the Iowa Code addressing the appointment of state-paid counsel for indigent persons alleged to have violated parole. In the matter before us, the district court ruled the amendments were unconstitutional to the extent they denied court-appointed counsel to indigent parolees who would otherwise be entitled to such counsel under the principles set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). The court concluded, however, that the amendments eliminating the involvement of the public defender's office in providing representation and removing authorization for payment of court-appointed counsel from that office's budget did not violate parolees' constitutional rights. Based on these conclusions, the court denied court-appointed counsel's motions to withdraw in these parole revocation proceedings, but held "such representation shall not be reimbursed from any public funding source."

This court granted the plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari. We think the district court erred in concluding court-appointed counsel was not entitled to be compensated by the state. Finding no other illegality in the district court's ruling, we sustain the writ in part and annul the writ in part. We remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Prior to the 2002 legislative session, Iowa Code section 908.2 required that an alleged parole violator "be advised of the right to appointed counsel under rule 26 of the rules of criminal procedure." Iowa Code § 908.2 (2001). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 (renumbered as rule 2.28) provided that every indigent defendant was "entitled to have counsel appointed to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceedings ... including probation and parole revocation hearings...." To ensure that such counsel was readily available, the general assembly had authorized the public defender to "provide for the representation of indigents in proceedings instituted pursuant to chapter 908," the chapter governing violations of parole and probation. Iowa Code § 13B.4(1) (2001). Costs associated with such representation were authorized to be paid from funds appropriated to the state public defender's office. See id. § 815.11 (authorizing payment of costs "incurred under ... the rules of criminal procedure on behalf of an indigent").

In 2002 the legislature amended several code provisions in an apparent effort to eliminate the right to counsel previously granted parolees in Iowa. Iowa Code section 908.4(2) (2001) was amended to provide that an alleged parole violator "shall not have the right to appointed counsel." 2002 Iowa Acts ch. 1067, § 21 (codified at Iowa Code § 908.4(2) (2003)). (The right to counsel in parole revocation hearings found in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.28 was subsequently removed from that rule.) At the same time, the requirement that alleged parole violators be advised of their right to appointed counsel at their initial appearance was taken out of section 908.2. Id. § 20 (codified at Iowa Code § 908.2 (2003)). The 2002 legislation also eliminated the statutory authority for the state public defender's office to provide legal representation for indigent parolees, as well as the funding for such representation previously included in the budget for that office. Id. §§ 1, 18 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 13B.4(1), 815.11 (2003)).

In response to these statutory changes, the state public defender's office instructed its contract attorneys to decline appointment for indigent representation in parole revocation matters after July 1, 2002, the effective date of the new legislation, and to seek to withdraw from any appointments made after this date. See generally Iowa Code § 13B.4(3) (2003) ("The state public defender may contract with persons admitted to practice law in this state for the provision of legal services to indigent persons.").

In early July 2002 contract attorney Scott Sobel was appointed to represent Steve Pfister and Scott Mariner in parole revocation proceedings. As directed by the state public defender's office, Sobel filed applications to withdraw as counsel in both cases, citing the recent statutory amendments. The district court considering the applications was concerned the amendments did not comport with an alleged parole violator's constitutional rights under the Gagnon case and so set the applications for hearing. In response to the order setting a hearing, the Iowa Board of Parole filed a response, contending the amendments were constitutional.

After the scheduled hearing, the district court ruled that the amendments to Iowa Code sections 908.2 and 908.4(2) were squarely at odds with Gagnon because "parolees are neither provided a vehicle to request counsel in those cases where counsel may be required, nor would they be appointed counsel where they would otherwise be entitled to representation." The court concluded these amendments violated the United States and Iowa Constitutions to the extent the amendments denied alleged parole violators their right to court-appointed counsel. The district court held the amendments pertaining to funding and the involvement of the state public defender's office in parole revocation proceedings did not violate parolees' constitutional rights and therefore should stand. In supplemental orders the court held that "any required court appointments in parole revocation proceedings may be of any attorney licensed to practice in the state of Iowa" and that the responsibility of appointing counsel, when required, would rest with the judicial officer presiding over the alleged violator's initial appearance. With respect to attorney Sobel's applications to withdraw, the court denied his applications and held that any fees or costs associated with such representation would not be paid by the State.

During the time Sobel's applications were under consideration by the district court, the plaintiffs were brought to hearing on their alleged parole violations. Both appeared without counsel. An administrative law judge (ALJ) revoked Pfister's parole, and based on the record before us, it appears his sentence was completed a short time later. The determination on Mariner's parole revocation was continued by the presiding ALJ pending disposition of criminal charges in another matter. The record does not reveal that the issue of whether Mariner's parole should be revoked has been resolved.

The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the board resisted. See generally Iowa R.App. P. 6.301 (providing for original certiorari proceedings in supreme court). This court granted the writ, and the matter proceeded to briefing.

The plaintiffs appear to argue in their brief that all indigent alleged parole violators have a constitutional right to representation, not just some indigents as held by the district court. In addition, the plaintiffs challenge the court's determination that the State is not obligated to pay for such representation. The plaintiffs ask that this court give no effect to the amendments denying the right to counsel to indigent alleged parole violators in parole revocation proceedings, and that we provide for reimbursement of counsel appointed to represent these parolees.

The Attorney General of Iowa filed a brief on behalf of the nominal defendant, the Iowa District Court for Polk County. Although ostensibly representing the district court, the Attorney General espouses the position of the Iowa Board of Parole in his brief. Therefore, we will refer to the board as the putative defendant.

The board points out that under Gagnon not all parolees have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in parole revocation matters. The board further asserts the amendment removing the requirement that alleged violators be advised of the right to appointed counsel is constitutional. Finally, the board asks this court to uphold the remainder of the district court's decision that the legislature constitutionally eliminated the responsibility of the state public defender's office for the legal fees of court-appointed counsel for indigent alleged parole violators.

II. Scope and Principles of Review.

A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally. For this reason, this court "may examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its actions." "Illegality exists when the court's findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law." Our review of the district court's action is therefore for correction of errors of law.

State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Black Hawk County, 633 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted). If constitutional issues are raised, however, we independently evaluate the totality of the evidence, and our review is de novo. Brummer v. Iowa Dep't of Corrs., 661 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Iowa 2003).

When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, "we presume the statute is constitutional and `give it any reasonable construction necessary to uphold it.'" State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden to demonstrate there is no reasonable basis upon which the statute can be sustained. Id.

III. Constitutionality of 2002 Amendments to Chapter 908.

A. Right of indigent alleged...