Sekor v. Board of Educ. of the Town of Ridgefield

• Decision Date: 04 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15534,15534
• Citation: 689 A.2d 1112,240 Conn. 119
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 116 Ed. Law Rep. 1049 Nancy SEKOR v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD.

Page 1112

689 A.2d 1112

240 Conn. 119, 116 Ed. Law Rep. 1049

Nancy SEKOR v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD.

No. 15534.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 1996.

Decided March 4, 1997.

Robert J. Murphy, Hartford, for appellant-appellee (defendant).

William M. Laviano, Ridgefield, with whom was Norman J. Voog, for appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Martha Watts Prestley and Linsley J. Barbato, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the Connecticut State Board of Education as amicus curiae.

Before BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal of the termination of the employment of a tenured public school teacher is the extent to which a teacher's competence to teach in one subject matter area limits a school board's decision to dismiss her for incompetence in other subject matter areas. The plaintiff, Nancy Sekor, a tenured teacher, filed an administrative appeal in the trial court, pursuant to subsection (f) of General Statutes § 10-151, ¹ to challenge the validity of the action of the defendant, the Ridgefield board of education (board), terminating her contract of employment. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and directed her reinstatement. The board appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, ² and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are not in dispute. From 1981 to the time of her dismissal in 1993, the plaintiff was employed as a teacher in the Ridgefield public school system and had obtained tenure there. She was certified by the Connecticut state board of education as a secondary school teacher with a subject area endorsement in business education. During the 1989-90 school year, because of declining enrollments in business classes, she obtained a subject area endorsement in social studies and took a voluntary leave of absence to receive necessary training in order to obtain an additional subject area endorsement in English.

During the 1990-91 school year, the plaintiff's teaching assignment consisted of four business classes and one social studies class. Thus, in that school year, the plaintiff's teaching assignment consisted of 80 percent business classes and 20 percent social studies classes. In response to difficulties she experienced in the social studies class, she was placed on the school administration's "Instructional Improvement Plan/Intensive Assistance Plan" (intensive assistance plan). Although the plaintiff's teaching of social studies improved somewhat during the 1990-91 school year, her supervisors recommended that she continue on the intensive assistance plan during the following school year.

For the 1991-92 school year, the plaintiff taught two business classes and three English classes. Thus, in that school year, the plaintiff's teaching assignment consisted of 40 percent business classes and 60 percent English classes. Despite continued administrative efforts, as prescribed by the intensive assistance plan, the principal of the school to which the plaintiff had been assigned concluded that the plaintiff was unable to teach her English classes satisfactorily. The principal, therefore, recommended termination of the plaintiff's employment. Viewed together, the plaintiff's teaching assignments in the 1990-91 and 1991-92 school years consisted of 60 percent business classes (six classes) and 40 percent social studies and English classes (four classes).

On March 23, 1992, the board voted to consider termination of the plaintiff's contract pursuant to subsection (d) of § 10-151. ³ Exercising her rights under that statute, the plaintiff requested, and received, a statement of reasons and a hearing before an impartial hearing panel. ⁴ After extensive hearings, a majority of the hearing panel found that the plaintiff was competent to teach business classes but incompetent and inefficient as a teacher of social studies and English. On the basis of this and subsidiary findings, the majority of the panel recommended to the board that it terminate the plaintiff's employment. ⁵ On October 6, 1993, the board voted to terminate the plaintiff's employment on the grounds of incompetence and inefficiency, and the plaintiff was so notified the following day. Further facts will be provided where relevant.

In the plaintiff's appeal of the board's decision to the trial court, she raised numerous procedural and evidentiary challenges to the validity of her termination, none of which the trial court found persuasive. The court concluded, however, that, in light of the protected property interests and due process rights associated with the concept of tenure, it was improper to find the plaintiff incompetent, despite her failings in English and social studies, as long as she was competent as a business teacher. The court determined, therefore, that the plaintiff's employment had been wrongfully terminated and ordered her reinstated to a full-time business position that had become available during the course of the termination proceedings. This appeal followed.

I

In its appeal, the board claims that the trial court was mistaken both in its construction of § 10-151(d) and in its remedial order. The board claims that § 10-151(d) permits the termination of a tenured teacher's contract for general incompetence despite a finding that the teacher is competent to teach in one endorsed subject area. The board further claims that the trial court lacked a sufficient factual basis for its finding that a full-time business position had become available during the pendency of these termination proceedings. We agree with both of the board's claims.

A

Section 10-151, the Teacher Tenure Act, prescribes the manner in which teachers acquire tenure. To become tenured, a teacher must hold a certificate issued by the state board of education and must complete a designated period of full time continuous employment for the same board of education. See General Statutes §§ 10-151(a)(6)(A) and 10-145 (teaching certificate requirement). The certificate indicates the particular grade level at which the teacher may be employed. See General Statutes § 10-145b (c)(1). In addition, the certificate has one or more endorsements that indicate the subjects in which the teacher is accredited to teach. See General Statutes §§ 10-145b and 10-145d (empowering board to adopt requirements related to subject area endorsements).

In this case, the plaintiff had tenure, was certified to teach at the secondary school level and had a certificate that was "endorsed" in business, social studies and English. Having attained tenure, the plaintiff was entitled to continuous employment, unless her contract was terminated for one of the reasons specified in § 10-151(d). "Inefficiency or incompetence" is one of these specified reasons. General Statutes § 10-151(d)(1).

"When considering termination of a tenured teacher's employment contract, a school board acts, like an administrative agency, in a quasi-judicial capacity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barnett v. Board of Education, 232 Conn. 198, 206, 654 A.2d 720 (1995); see also Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 712, 629 A.2d 333 (1993). "A school board has discretion to accept or reject a recommendation from an impartial hearing panel, though it is bound by the panel's findings of fact unless unsupported by the evidence.... The board is bound by the panel's findings of fact, but not by its legal conclusions or by its recommendations." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barnett v. Board of Education, supra at 206, 654 A.2d 720; see also Rado v. Board of Education, 216 Conn. 541, 555, 583 A.2d 102 (1990); Petrino v. Board of Education, 179 Conn. 428, 430, 426 A.2d 795 (1980).

Judicial review of the school board's administrative decision follows established principles of administrative law. "The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [board] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically flow from such facts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barnett v. Board of Education, supra 232 Conn. at 207-208, 654 A.2d 720; see also Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 397, 604 A.2d 351 (1992); New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988); Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986).

The issue of law presented by this case is the proper measure of a teacher's professional competence pursuant to § 10-151(d)(1). A teacher who elects to obtain numerous endorsements on his or her teacher's certificate necessarily represents his or her ability to teach in the subject area of any and all of these endorsements. ⁶ The question thus posed is the extent to which multiple endorsements affect the scope of proper administrative scrutiny of the teacher's overall competence. The board contends that a conclusion of "general incompetence" is proper whenever a teacher manifests incompetence in two of the three subject areas in which the teacher holds endorsements. The trial court concluded, to the contrary, that a teacher cannot be held to lack professional competence in any case in which the teacher is competent to teach in any one of his or her endorsed subjects. ⁷

We address this issue within the confines of the circumstances of this case. The...