Martin v. Strasburg, s. 526

• Citation: 689 F.2d 365
• Decision Date: 20 September 1982
• Docket Number: 706,D,Nos. 526,s. 526
• Parties: Gregory MARTIN, Luis Rosario, Kenneth Morgan, and all others similarly situated, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Paul STRASBURG, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, Respondent-Appellant, Robert Abrams, as Attorney General of the State of New York, Intervenor-Appellant. ockets 81-2175, 81-2193.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 365

689 F.2d 365

Gregory MARTIN, Luis Rosario, Kenneth Morgan, and all others similarly situated, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Paul STRASBURG, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, Respondent-Appellant Robert Abrams, as Attorney General of the State of New York Intervenor-Appellant.

Nos. 526, 706, Dockets 81-2175, 81-2193.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Jan. 12, 1982.

Decided Sept. 20, 1982.

Judith A. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of N.Y., George D. Zuckerman, Asst. Sol. Gen., Florence E. Abrams, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, for intervenor-appellant.

Martin Guggenheim, Bruce J. Ennis, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City, Lenore Gittis, Janet R. Fink, Charles A. Hollander, The Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, N.Y., for petitioners-appellees.

Before OAKES, NEWMAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges.

RALPH K. WINTER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to a provision of the New York Family Court Act ¹ authorizing preventive detention of accused juvenile delinquents. It was brought in the District Court as a habeas corpus class action against the defendant Paul Strasburg, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, intervening as a defendant. Judge Carter certified the class as "all juveniles who are now being held or will be held before these proceedings are concluded, in pretrial detention ...," under the challenged statute. A trial resulted in a record of documentary and testimonial evidence about the actual practice of the Family Court in utilizing preventive detention, including expert testimony by a Family Court Judge, statistical studies and a collection of representative case studies.

Judge Carter held the statute unconstitutional. 513 F.Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). He issued a judgment granting the writ to all juveniles detained under the challenged provisions at any time before conclusion of this action. Defendants appealed. We affirm on the grounds that the statutory scheme and practice under it violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the period of pre-trial detention is utilized principally to impose punishment before adjudication of the alleged criminal acts.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME SUMMARIZED

Since our decision rests on a belief that the Family Court Act does not accord procedural due process, it is important to understand the procedural structure of New York delinquency adjudications. Although these juvenile proceedings are somewhat The statutory scheme can be summarized as follows. The challenged provision is Section 739(a)(ii). It authorizes detention of a juvenile after filing of a petition, but before fact-finding, when a Family Court Judge determines "there is a serious risk that (the juvenile) may before the return date do an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." Juveniles detained under 739(a)(ii) are entitled to a probable cause hearing within three to six days and an expedited fact-finding hearing. ⁵ If delinquency is adjudicated at fact-finding, a probation investigation and, in the case of "designated felony acts," ⁶ a The statutory scheme thus contains facial incongruities. Preventive detention is authorized solely upon a finding that a juvenile may do an act in the interim between the petition and fact-finding which would be a crime if done by an adult. The potential crimes are not limited to felonies or violent crimes but include every act which constitutes a crime under the New York Penal Law. ¹⁵ The statute itself offers no procedural safeguards and does not set out substantive criteria, other than the conclusory "serious risk" test, such as prior court contacts or lack of family supervision, to limit which accused juveniles may be detained. ¹⁶ At disposition, on the other hand, elaborate statutory provision is made for collecting diagnostic and other information, and specific criteria are established to guide the Family Court Judge. ¹⁷

different from adult criminal proceedings in both ends and means, their major procedural stages have analogues in the adult criminal justice process. A juvenile proceeding is initiated by a petition for delinquency, ² a step analogous to an indictment. The case then goes to fact-finding before a Family Court Judge, at which time the juvenile is either adjudicated a delinquent or the petition is dismissed. ³ The analogue in the criminal law is, of course, the trial and verdict. The final stage is a determination of the disposition by a Family Court Judge, ⁴ analogous in the criminal law to adult sentencing. We set out these analogues, not to argue that the constitutional limitations on juvenile courts are identical to those imposed on adult criminal tribunals, but solely to facilitate an understanding of the result we reach diagnostic assessment ⁷ precede the dispositional hearing. The Family Court Judge can choose among several alternative dispositions, including suspension of judgment, ⁸ probation, ⁹ placement at home or with other individuals, ¹⁰ placement in a facility or school where treatment is available ¹¹ or restrictive placement (incarceration). ¹² The statutory criteria for determining the appropriate disposition emphasize the needs and best interests of the juvenile, the information provided by the probation investigation and diagnostic assessment, the character of the offense and the need for protection of the community. ¹³ Some alternatives, however, are foreclosed or available only on a limited basis. The Family Court Judge has no option to transfer the juvenile to an adult criminal tribunal. In addition, placement in a treatment facility turns upon the availability of space and the consent of the particular facility. ¹⁴ Even though a Family Court Judge may determine that placement for treatment is the appropriate disposition, therefore, the actual options in a particular case may be limited to probation or incarceration.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME IN PRACTICE

The incongruities of the statutory scheme yield a paradoxical result in practice. The The result in practice is that the vast majority of juveniles considered sufficiently dangerous by the Family Court to justify pre-trial incarceration under 739(a)(ii) are in fact released by prosecutors or by the Family Court within days or weeks. Defendants attribute this peculiar result to the statutory incongruities described above. Detention decisions under 739(a)(ii) emphasize crime prevention and are made on the basis of limited information presented in summary fashion. Dispositional determinations, on the other hand, take the juvenile's welfare and potential for treatment into account and are based on more detailed and extensive information.

parties have waged a battle of statistics regarding the actual disposition of cases involving juveniles detained under 739(a)(ii). ¹⁸ However, one critical fact has been established-the vast majority of juveniles detained under 739(a)(ii) either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after adjudication. Of the representative case studies submitted as evidence, for example, the defendants' version of events indicates that well over two-thirds of the juveniles held under 739(a)(ii) were released at or before the dispositional hearing. ¹⁹

The defendants offered expert testimony by a Family Court Judge concerning the actual practice under the statutory scheme. ²⁰ He testified that the detention hearing under 739(a)(ii) usually involves only the Family Court Judge, a prosecutor, a Court Liaison Officer, the juvenile, his or her attorney, and the parents or their representative. ²¹ It takes place soon after the arrest and a stenographic record is kept. In the typical case, the evidence before the The Family Court Judge testified that the criteria utilized in practice under 739(a)(ii) emphasize matters going solely to the protection of the community. These include prior record, recent court contacts, seriousness of the charge, and adequacy of supervision. ²³ He emphasized that the criteria do not include the interests of the child and often result in confinement under circumstances harmful to the juvenile. ²⁴ The same witness testified that the factors taken into account at the dispositional hearing differ substantially from those utilized at the 739(a)(ii) hearing. At disposition, the best interests of the child are the principal concern and further detention is regarded as a "harsh solution." ²⁵ Moreover, considerably more information about the child is before the Family Court Judge at the dispositional hearing than is available at the 739(a)(ii) hearing. Not only is the information more complete and up-to-date, but psychological assessments are also provided. ²⁶

Judge is limited to: (a) the petition for delinquency and an affidavit by a witness stating the petition is accurate; (b) a recommendation by the Court Liaison Officer to detain or release the juvenile based on inquiries and recommendations made by a probation officer who is usually not present; (c) statements by the juvenile or his or her attorney and by the parents or other persons accompanying the juvenile. ²²

Two other facts influence the lenient disposition of adjudicated delinquents. First, as the evidence of the defendants demonstrated ²⁷ and as they emphasized at oral Second, as already noted, placement in a treatment facility, an intermediate disposition between probation and incarceration, is feasible only when a treatment facility has space and agrees to accept the child. In some cases, therefore, the Family Court Judge may face a choice between a disposition regarded as too lenient and another regarded as too harsh. The former may then be chosen as more likely to further the best interests of the child. The practical inability to provide placement in a...