Joseph A. by Wolfe v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Services, 94-2160

• Decision Date: 09 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-2160,94-2160
• Citation: 69 F.3d 1081
• Parties: JOSEPH A. and Josephine A., by their next friend, Corrine WOLFE; Michael B., by his next friend Dr. Lucy Gale McMurray; Michelle C., by her next friends La Donna Harris and Dr. Lucy Gale McMurray; Joel D., by his next friend Dr. Lucy Gale McMurray; Susan E. and Donald E., by their next friend Barbara Burns, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; Lawrence B. Ingram, individually and as Secretary of the New Mexico Department of Human Services; Margaret Larragoite, individually and as Director of the Social Services Division of the New Mexico Department of Human Services; Darold Christiansen, individually and as Director of the Bernalillo County Social Services Division of the Department of Human Services; Janet Bryan, individually and as Director of the Santa Fe County Social Services Division of the Department of Human Services, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1081

69 F.3d 1081

33 Fed.R.Serv.3d 873

JOSEPH A. and Josephine A., by their next friend, Corrine WOLFE; Michael B., by his next friend Dr. Lucy Gale McMurray; Michelle C., by her next friends La Donna Harris and Dr. Lucy Gale McMurray; Joel D., by his next friend Dr Lucy Gale McMurray; Susan E. and Donald E., by their next friend Barbara Burns, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; Lawrence B Ingram, individually and as Secretary of the New Mexico Department of Human Services; Margaret Larragoite individually and as Director of the Social Services Division of the New Mexico Department of Human Services; Darold Christiansen, individually and as Director of the Bernalillo County Social Services Division of the Department of Human Services; Janet Bryan, individually and as Director of the Santa Fe County Social Services Division of the Department of Human Services, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-2160.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Nov. 9, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1995.

Marcia Robinson Lowry of the Children's Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City (Susan Lambiase and C. Eduardo Rodriguez of the Children's Rights Project, and Robert Levy, Levy & Greer, Albuquerque, N.M., with her, on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robyn B. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Albuquerque, N.M. (Tom Udall, Attorney General, and Robert Tabor Booms, Office of the Attorney General, and Stevan Douglas Looney, Crider, Calvert & Bingham, Albuquerque, N.M., with her on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MOORE, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

This case involves the dissolution of a consent decree governing the New Mexico foster care system. The decree requires that the State of New Mexico's Department of Human Services ("the Department") and its top officials (collectively "Defendants") fulfill certain goals and specific requirements. Furthermore, the decree, spawned by a class action brought by a number of children in the state's foster care system ("Plaintiffs"), provides that it may be terminated when Defendants maintain "substantial and continuous compliance" for twelve consecutive months. The district court dissolved the decree based on a Special Master's report that the state had met this requirement. Plaintiffs appealed. However, we are unable to evaluate the claim that the Special Master incorrectly defined and applied the "substantial compliance" standard because the Special Master's factual findings and conclusions of law do not conform to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Therefore, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND this case for further proceedings. ¹

I. BACKGROUND

Because we dispose of this case on Rule 52(a) grounds, we only outline the basic facts and history concerning the consent decree. Plaintiffs are a certified class of neglected and dependent children under the care and in the custody of the Department. Judge Juan Burciaga certified Plaintiffs as a class as a result of a 1980 suit brought by the ACLU Children's Rights Project which challenged the state's foster care system on the ground that the Department failed to develop and implement adequate plans for the permanent placement of children within its custody. On September 23, 1983, Judge Burciaga approved a consent decree providing for long-term and wide-ranging reform of the state's foster care system to ensure that homeless, neglected or otherwise dependent children would not languish in the state's care. The terms of that decree are attached to Judge Burciaga's opinion in Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 575 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.M.1982).

In 1988, Defendants filed with the district court a Motion for Judicial Review and an Order of Compliance requesting that the court find that they had substantially complied with the provisions of the decree for twelve continuous months so as to require its dissolution. See Joseph A., 575 F.Supp. at 364. As a result of this motion, and because of Plaintiffs' motion for contempt, the special master, Frank Zinn ("the Special Master"), held hearings to resolve these outstanding issues. In June, 1989, the Special Master reported that Defendants had substantially complied with the decree for a continuous period of twelve months and recommended that the district court terminate the decree. Judge Burciaga rejected the findings in the Special Master's report as inadequate to terminate the decree, explaining that "[t]he court must be satisfied that the spirit and intent of the Consent Decree will continue to be served beyond termination of the Consent Decree." quoted at Aplt.Br. at 4. The court then ordered the Special Master to hold further hearings and make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law to address the court's concerns.

On April 30, 1993, after holding additional hearings, the Special Master issued a further report recommending that the court dissolve the consent decree because the Department had been in substantial compliance with the decree for twelve continuous months. In this report, the Special Master considered both expert opinions and statistical evidence in determining that Defendants were adequately complying with the terms of the decree. The Special Master organized the requirements of the decree and his report into ten distinct areas: (1) training; (2) caseloads; (3) planning & review; (4) adoptions; (5) legal services; (6) information & records; (7) staff qualifications; (8) citizens review board; (9) general compliance; and (10) future comportment. The Special Master's report contained three main sections: (1) findings of fact; (2) summary of evidence; and (3) discussion. At the end of all but two of the findings of fact made in each of the ten areas, the Special Master concluded that Defendants were in substantial and continuous compliance with the specific requirements of the decree. Based on these findings, the Special Master recommended that the court terminate the decree.

On September 14, 1993, Judge Burciaga affirmed the Special Master's 1989 and 1993 reports. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration, and Defendants filed a motion requesting the termination of the consent decree. Plaintiffs specifically highlighted the alleged unreliability of the Department's computer record keeping system (the ADAPT measurement system), relied upon by the Special Master, as well as the low levels of compliance in certain areas. ² Moreover, Plaintiffs also criticized the Special Master's conclusion that case studies of several children who languished under the state's care constituted "selected instances" which should not influence his finding of "substantial compliance." See Aplt.Br. at 20. On June 30, 1994, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and terminated the consent decree. Plaintiffs now appeal the district court's order denying the motion for reconsideration and terminating the decree, as well as the court's order adopting the reports of the Special Master.

II. DISCUSSION

In order to review whether the dissolution of the consent decree was proper, we must (1) define the "substantial compliance" standard and (2) then consider whether the Special Master (and district court) correctly applied that standard to the facts of the instant case. However, because the findings of the Special Master lack the requisite degree of specificity and clarity, we are unable to complete the second step of our review. ³

A. The "Substantial Compliance" Standard

The term "substantial compliance" appears in the consent decree and thus we treat it like a contract term. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-38, 95 S.Ct. 926, 934-35, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975) (explaining that consent decrees "should be basically construed as contracts"). Accordingly, we review the district court's definition of that term de novo. North Shore Lab. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 518-19 (5th Cir.1983) (interpretation of a consent decree, like that of a contractual provision, requires de novo review). See NLRB v. Monfort, Inc., 29 F.3d 525, 528 (10th Cir.1994) (reviewing special master's conclusions of law de novo ).

The phrase "substantial compliance" is not susceptible of a mathematically precise definition. In interpreting a similar phrase in a consent decree, the First Circuit in Fortin v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mass. Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 795 (1st Cir.1982) observed that:

no particular percentage of compliance can be a safe-harbor figure, transferable from one context to another. Like "reasonableness," "substantiality" must depend on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the interest at stake and the degree to which noncompliance affects that interest.

692 F.2d 790, 795 (1st Cir.1982) (internal citation omitted). See also Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F.Supp. 112, 147 (S.D.Tex.1986) (citing Fortin and comparing concept to "reasonableness").

We have explained that the contract law doctrine of substantial compliance ⁴ is simply a doctrine to assist the court in determining whether conduct should, in reality, be considered the equivalent of compliance under the contract. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts Sec. 11-15, at 454 (3d ed. 1987) ("If a party has substantially performed, it follows that any breach he may have committed is immaterial.").

Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1052 (10th Cir.1992). Judge Cardozo, in the seminal substantial compliance case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, concluded that performance of a contract will not be considered in substantial compliance of the contract if the deviation from the contract requirements ... "in any real substantial measure ... frustrate[s] the purpose of the contract." 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921)....