69 F.3d 549 (10th Cir. 1995), 95-4039, U.S. v. Richardson
| Citation | 69 F.3d 549 |
| Party Name | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Maria Ann RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Case Date | October 13, 1995 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Page 549
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA10 Rule 36.3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Before ANDERSON, MCKAY and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 1
The United States filed this interlocutory appeal to challenge the district court's order granting the defendant's motion to suppress. The district court, relying on the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, concluded that while the evidence seized from the defendant's vehicle was based on her voluntary consent, it was nonetheless inadmissible because her consent was tainted by the illegal detention preceding it. Based on a proper certification by the United States Attorney, we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3731, and we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Maria Ann Richardson was charged by criminal complaint, and later indicted, on one count of possession with intent to distribute 100 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). The events resulting in this indictment stemmed from a traffic stop, by Trooper Fred Swain of the Utah State Highway Patrol, of a car driven by Ms. Richardson. The traffic stop culminated in the seizure of the methamphetamine in question.
Ms. Richardson's counsel subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by Trooper Swain, claiming it was the result of an unconstitutional search of the vehicle. The motion to suppress was referred to a magistrate judge for the preparation of a report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B). After receiving the testimony of Trooper Swain and Ms. Richardson, the magistrate judge recommended the motion to suppress be granted. The magistrate judge concluded the facts and circumstances known to Trooper Swain did not support a finding of reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the additional detention of Ms. Richardson beyond what was necessary to issue her a citation for speeding. The magistrate judge further found Ms. Richardson's subsequent consent to search the vehicle was tainted by this illegal detention, and therefore, the evidence seized was inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The United States filed timely objections to the recommendation, and the district court heard oral argument on the objections. Shortly thereafter, the district court issued a written order overruling the United States' objections and adopting the report and recommendation in its entirety. This appeal ensued.
"When reviewing an order granting a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's finding." 2 United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citations and internal quotations omitted). So viewed, the facts adduced at the suppression hearing were as follows.
On July 13, 1994, Ms. Richardson was driving a tan or brown colored Lincoln automobile northbound on Interstate 15, a few miles south of Nephi, Utah. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., Trooper Swain's radar detector monitored her vehicle at 81 miles per hour, in excess of the posted 65 mile an hour speed limit. Upon seeing the flashing lights of the police vehicle, Ms. Richardson immediately pulled off the highway onto the shoulder. Trooper Swain exited his vehicle and approached the driver's side of Ms. Richardson's car, at which time he observed it had Wyoming license plates. As he approached her car, he observed the driver was the sole occupant of the vehicle, and he proceeded to ask her for her license and registration. He advised her she had been stopped for speeding and that he was going to issue her a citation.
While Ms. Richardson immediately handed over a California driver's license in her name, she could not find the registration after looking through the glove box and around the interior of the car. Because Ms. Richardson had a California license and was driving a vehicle with Wyoming plates, Trooper Swain asked her who owned the car. Ms. Richardson responded it belonged to Kathy Dyer, a friend of hers who lived in Casper, Wyoming. She explained she flew from San Diego, California, to Casper to pick up Ms. Dyer's car so she could drive Ms. Dyer's two year old daughter from Casper to California to stay with Ms. Dyer's sister (the child's aunt). She also stated she was now driving the car back to Ms. Dyer's home in Casper, and was planning to fly from Casper back to California.
After this conversation, Trooper Swain returned to his vehicle and called in to his dispatcher with the license plate number, requesting a registration check in order to verify if the car in fact belonged to Kathy Dyer. He also asked the dispatcher to run a "Triple I" check, which reveals whether an individual has a prior arrest record in most of the states in the country. He conceded that while he suspected the vehicle might be stolen, he did not ask the dispatcher to run a stolen car check at that time. It was not until he returned to the Sheriff's office later that evening that he ran a stolen car check.
Dispatch responded that Ms. Richardson's license was valid, and that there was a positive match on the Triple I record for a woman named "Marie Ann Erickson." Dispatch believed the name Maria Ann Richardson was an alias for Marie Ann Erickson because they both had the same birthdate. A physical description of Ms. Erickson provided by dispatch appeared to match Trooper Swain's observations of Ms. Richardson, with the exception of the individual's weight. Dispatch also gave the officer Ms. Erickson's social security number and advised she had a tattoo on her left shoulder. Trooper Swain then called for backup. At this point, approximately ten to fifteen minutes had passed and he had completed about half of the citation.
Because Trooper Swain knew it would take a few minutes for dispatch to determine exactly what the Triple I record was, he exited his vehicle and asked Ms. Richardson for her social security number. The number she provided matched the number Trooper Swain had been given from dispatch. While he tried to check for the tattoo, he was unable to verify whether she had one on her shoulder. Before Trooper Swain returned to his car, Ms. Richardson provided him with the registration for the car. The registration confirmed a 1986 Lincoln was in fact registered to a Kathy Dyer in Casper, Wyoming, and the license plate on the vehicle matched the one on the registration. Trooper Swain took the registration with him back to his vehicle, at which time dispatch advised him of the nature of the Triple I match. Ms. Erickson had been arrested for battery of a police officer, in addition to several drug-related arrests between 1987 and 1990.
The prior arrest record and the different surnames raised some suspicions in Trooper Swain's mind, and he decided he wanted to obtain more information from her. He exited his vehicle, approached Ms. Richardson's vehicle for a third time and asked her to step out of her car, which she did. No one else was present at the time, and Trooper Swain's gun was not drawn. At this point, he asked her what her maiden name was, based on his assumption that the surname Erickson was her maiden name. She responded that her maiden name was "Painter." He then asked her if she ever went by the name Erickson, and this appeared to make her visibly upset. She stated "Erickson" was the name of an ex-husband who she really did not want to think or talk about. She then explained she had subsequently been married to another man named Richardson, and even though they had been separated for eight years, she continued to use his surname because they had never actually been divorced.
He then confronted her with her criminal history, and she candidly admitted what her record revealed. She also acknowledged that each of her drug-related arrests involved methamphetamine. At this juncture, Trooper Swain asked for permission to search her car, and Ms. Richardson allegedly 3 responded by saying "you may." During his search, Trooper Swain found a razor blade, a small plastic wrapper with a substance that looked like methamphetamine, a Motorola pager, several video tapes and toiletry items, a pill bottle, two baggies, one containing a white powder substance and one containing a yellow powder substance, a magnifying device, a digital gram scale, two duct taped packages, a spoon and a syringe, and a black purse with a small amount of marijuana. At no point during the search did Ms. Richardson ever ask him to stop searching the vehicle. He then placed her under arrest, which eventually resulted in her being indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
On cross-examination, Trooper Swain admitted the information Ms. Richardson gave him regarding the registration and the name of the owner of the vehicle did eventually check out as Ms. Richardson had said. He also admitted he did not run a stolen car check at the time the stop was made to issue her a citation and that when he went back to her car the third time, he was still in possession of her license and registration. In addition, she was not, at that time, free to leave the scene.
Ms. Richardson was the only other witness to testify, and the only material discrepancy between her testimony and that of Trooper Swain was she denied giving her consent to him to search the vehicle.
DISCUSSION 4
I.
The Supreme Court's recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence makes it patently clear the touchstone for judging the constitutionality vel non of a search or seizure is, according to the text of that amendment, "reasonableness." See Wilson v....
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