State ex rel. BF Goodrich Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 2015–1243.
| Decision Date | 06 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2015–1243.,2015–1243. |
| Citation | 2016 Ohio 7988,69 N.E.3d 728,148 Ohio St.3d 212 |
| Parties | The STATE ex rel. BF GOODRICH COMPANY, SPECIALTY CHEMICALS DIVISION, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
148 Ohio St.3d 212
69 N.E.3d 728
2016 Ohio 7988
The STATE ex rel. BF GOODRICH COMPANY, SPECIALTY CHEMICALS DIVISION, Appellant,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio et al., Appellees.
No. 2015–1243.
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Submitted Aug. 16, 2016.
Decided Dec. 6, 2016.
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., William L.S. Ross, Cleveland, and Christopher M. Ward, Columbus, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission.
Stephen E. Mindzak Law Offices, L.L.C., and Stephen E. Mindzak, Columbus, for appellee Marilynne J. Earles.
PER CURIAM.
{¶ 1} Appellant, BF Goodrich Company, Specialty Chemicals Division ("Goodrich"), appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying its request for a writ of mandamus to require appellee Industrial Commission to vacate its order awarding appellee Marilynne J. Earles compensation for working-wage loss, as authorized by R.C. 4123.56(B), attributed to Earles's lack of overtime earnings while working in a light-duty position.
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
{¶ 3} On August 12, 2011, Earles was injured in the course and scope of her employment with Goodrich. She returned to work on February 13, 2012, with temporary restrictions on climbing, heavy pushing, lifting and carrying, and performing overhead work. There were no restrictions on the number of hours she could work.
{¶ 4} Earles was placed in Goodrich's light-duty/restricted-employee work program. The terms of the work program were set forth in a 2007 collective-bargaining agreement between Goodrich and the United Auto Workers of America, Local 128. Its purpose was "to provide medically-restricted employees an opportunity to work and make a value-added contribution to the products manufactured."
{¶ 5} The collective-bargaining agreement provided that employees assigned to the program were eligible for overtime only if their medical restrictions allowed and "only after all other employees in the classification and shift to which they have been borrowed have been given the opportunity to work overtime." A subsequent collective-bargaining agreement, effective February 19, 2012, provided that "[e]mployees on light duty outside of their own job classification will not be eligible for overtime."
{¶ 6} Earles filed an application for wage-loss compensation based on a reduction in her earnings attributed to the lack of overtime in her light-duty
position for the following periods: February 13 to
March 2, 2012, and March 12 to 18, 2012. A district hearing officer denied the application. The order, mailed on November 23, 2012, notified the parties and their representatives that an appeal could be filed within 14 days of receipt of the order.
{¶ 7} On December 13, 2012, a union representative, William Hannah, filed an appeal on behalf of Earles. A staff hearing officer refused the appeal for lack of jurisdiction after finding that it had not been timely filed. Hannah again appealed for Earles, this time with an affidavit in which he attested that he had received the previous commission order on November 29, 2012, and had timely filed the appeal within 14 days on December 13, 2012.
{¶ 8} The commission accepted the appeal and awarded wage-loss compensation. The commission determined that Earles's medical restrictions resulted from the allowed conditions of her claim, that she had worked overtime prior to her work-related injury, and that when she returned to light-duty work, she was not eligible for overtime in that position under the 2012 collective-bargaining agreement.
{¶ 9} Goodrich filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the commission had abused its discretion. According to Goodrich, there was no evidence that Earles's medical restrictions prevented her from working overtime. Moreover, Goodrich argues, the commission failed to apply the "mailbox rule" and therefore wrongly determined that Earles's administrative appeal was timely filed.
{¶ 10} The court of appeals denied the writ.
{¶ 11} This matter is before this court on Goodrich's appeal as of right.
Working Wage Loss
{¶ 12} Working-wage-loss-compensation is payable to a claimant who suffers a wage loss as a result of returning to employment other than the employee's former position of employment due to an injury or occupational disease. R.C. 4123.56(B)(1). Ohio Adm.Code 4125–1–01(A)(15) clarifies that "the extent of the diminishment [in wages] must be the direct result of physical and/or psychiatric restriction(s) caused by the impairment that is causally related to an industrial injury or occupational disease in a claim allowed under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code."
{¶ 13} Goodrich contends that for Earles to be entitled to compensation for working wage loss, her lack of overtime earnings must be directly caused by medical restrictions that specifically limit overtime work. Goodrich argues that because Earles had physical restrictions but no restrictions on the amount of hours she could work, her wage loss was the result of the 2012 collective-bargaining agreement's prohibition on overtime.
{¶ 14} We do not agree. There are two components of a wage-loss claim—actual wage loss and a causal connection with the workplace injury. State ex rel. Jordan v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 153, 2004-Ohio-2115, 807 N.E.2d 351, ¶ 4 ; State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 121, 623 N.E.2d 1202 (1993). There is no dispute that Earles suffered a reduction in wages during the periods of time at issue. As to the second...
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