Screven County v. Reddy
| Citation | 69 S.E.2d 186,208 Ga. 730 |
| Decision Date | 13 February 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 17699,17699 |
| Parties | SCREVEN COUNTY v. REDDY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. An equitable petition seeking a decree of court declaring that, as against the defendant, a certain road and a described tract of land had been impliedly dedicated to the public, is not a case respecting title to land, which under the Constitution (Code, § 2-4902) must be brought in the county where the land lies.
2. The petition for equitable relief, not praying for any substantial relief against the resident defendant, was properly dismissed on general demurrer of the resident and non-resident defendants.
W. C. Hawkins, Sylvania, for plainfiff in error.
Hilton & Hilton, Sylvania, Curry & Curry, Pierce Bros., Augusta, for defendants in error.
This writ of error seeks the review of a judgment of the Superior Court of Screven County, dismissing an equitable petition on the ground that no substantial relief was prayed against the resident defendant. Screven County brought an equitable petition against Willie Reddy, a resident of that county, and Briar Creek Hunting and Fishing Club, a corporation created in Richmond County, with its office and place of business therein. The petition alleged: that the defendant corporation owned a large tract of land in Screven County adjacent to the confluence of Briar Creek and the Savannah River, with the exception of a landing tract of 5 acres more or less and a public road running through the club's property to the landing; that the public had enjoyed the use and benefit of the road and landing for more than 50 years, and, by reason of the public's long use of the road and landing tract without objections of the defendant corporation or its predecessors in title, the public has acquired a title by implied dedication to the road and the landing tract; that the defendant corporation claims title to the road and landing tract by virtue of a warranty deed dated December 18, 1941, and asserts the exclusive title and the right to the use and occupancy of the road and landing tract, which is in direct conflict with the rights of the county and the public, and that such corporation is now in possession of the landing tract and road; and that the defendant Reddy resides on this tract of land either as a renter, cropper, or caretaker of the defendant, and in conjunction with the defendant corporation has conspired to obstruct and has obstructed the public road leading to the landing tract, by erecting a locked gate which prevents the general public from using the road. The prayers were for a judgment enjoining the defendants from obstructing the road, and for a decree of court vesting title in the plaintiff to the landing tract.
1. The petition does not assert that the defendant Reddy has any claim, right, title, or interest in the road or landing tract which the plaintiff claimed to have been impliedly dedicated for public use. The relief in this regard is prayed against the non-resident defendant corporation. This raises the following question: Is this a case respecting title to land, which under the Constitution, Code Ann., § 2-4902, Const. Art. 6, § 14, par. 2, must be brought in Screven County, notwithstanding the non-residence of the defendant corporation? Cases respecting title to land mean actions at law, such as ejectment, where the plaintiff relies on legal title to recover possession of land, and do not include actions by which the plaintiff seeks the aid of equity to perfect his title, the test being whether the plaintiff can recover on his title alone or whether he must ask the aid of a court of equity to render a decree in order for him to recover. Owenby v. Stancil, 190 Ga. 50(1), 8 S.E.2d 7. Where a petition shows that the defendant has legal title to the land and seeks to set up a perfect equity in the plaintiff, and prays that the property be decreed to be that of the plaintiff, such action cannot be brought in the county where the land lies if the defendant be not a resident thereof. Clayton v. Stetson, 101 Ga. 634, 28 S.E. 983. The petition in the instant case asserts that the defendant corporation claims title to the road and landing tract by virtue of a paper title. The plaintiff does not claim that it has title by virtue of a grant, deed, or judgment of condemnation, but claims that, by virtue of public use for a long period of time, the road and landing tract have been impliedly dedicated to the public, and that the owner has no right, by itself or through others, to exclude the public from the use and enjoyment of the road and landing tract.
Assuming without deciding that the facts alleged in the petition are sufficient to authorize the court to decree that the road and landing tract have been dedicated by the owner to the public use, the action here is not one respecting title to land. On the question of implied dedication, see Swift v. Mayor, etc., of Lithonia, 101 Ga. 706, 29 S.E. 12; Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. City of Atlanta, 118 Ga. 486, 45 S.E. 256; Healey v. City of Atlanta, 125 Ga....
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Screven County v. Brier Creek Hunting & Fishing Club
...state court, apparently on determination of improper venue, the Supreme Court of Georgia later affirming the decision. Screven County v. Reddy, 208 Ga. 730, 69 S.E.2d 186. In the instant case in the court below, the appellee's petition alleged that appellants, in spite of the ruling of the ......
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