Beaulieu v. Ludeman

• Decision Date: 29 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1845.,11–1845.
• Citation: 690 F.3d 1017
• Parties: Wallace James BEAULIEU; Lionel Tohannie Yazzie; Larry DeLaney, Sr.; Emery Eugene Bush; John Louis Beaulieu, III; Michael J. Gimmestad, Plaintiffs–Appellants v. Cal R. LUDEMAN; Joan Fabian; Terry Carlson; Jack Erskine; Dean Mooney; Paula Johnson; Denise Considine; Eric Hattenberg; Dennis Benson; Greg Carlson; Brian Ninneman; Ann Linkert, in their official and personal capacities, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

690 F.3d 1017

Wallace James BEAULIEU; Lionel Tohannie Yazzie; Larry DeLaney, Sr.; Emery Eugene Bush; John Louis Beaulieu, III; Michael J. Gimmestad, Plaintiffs–Appellants
v.
Cal R. LUDEMAN; Joan Fabian; Terry Carlson; Jack Erskine; Dean Mooney; Paula Johnson; Denise Considine; Eric Hattenberg; Dennis Benson; Greg Carlson; Brian Ninneman; Ann Linkert, in their official and personal capacities, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 11–1845.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 15, 2012.
Filed: Aug. 29, 2012.

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Brian B. O'Neill, argued, Minnetonka, MN, for appellants.

Angela Behrens, AAG, argued, St. Paul, MN, for Appellees Joan Fabian and Terry Carlson.

Corrie Oberg, AAG, argued, St. Paul, MN, for Appellees Cal R. Ludeman, Jack Erskine, Dean Mooney, Paula Johnson, Denise Considine, Eric Hattenberg, Dennis Benson, Greg Carlson, Brian Ninneman, and Ann Linkert.

Barbara E. Berg Windels, AAG, on the brief, St. Paul, MN, for appellees.

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SMITH and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Wallace James Beaulieu (“Beaulieu”), Lionel Tohannie Yazzie, Larry DeLaney Sr., Emergy Eugene Bush, John Louis Beaulieu III (“Beaulieu III”), and Michael J. Gimmestad (collectively, “Patients”) are patients civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). The Patients brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Minnesota Department of Human Services officials (“DHS officials”) ¹ and Minnesota Department of Corrections officials (“DOC officials”),² alleging that various MSOP policies and practices relating

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to the Patients' conditions of confinement are unconstitutional. The district court ³ granted summary judgment to DHS officials and DOC officials on all of the Patients' claims. On appeal, the Patients assert that the district court erred in finding that (1) the Patients will not be housed again at the Annex—two units on the grounds of the Minnesota Correctional Facility—Moose Lake (MCF–ML); (2) there was no triable issue of fact on their claims that (a) Beaulieu and Yazzie were transferred to the Annex in retaliation for filing a lawsuit and (b) Beaulieu was transferred to the Behavioral Therapy Unit (BTU) located at the MSOP's Moose Lake Facility in Moose Lake, Minnesota, in retaliation for filing the instant suit; (3) the MSOP's unclothed visual body searches are constitutionally reasonable; (4) the MSOP's use of restraints during transport to and from the facilities is reasonable; (5) the MSOP's seizure of the Patients' televisions did not constitute an unreasonable seizure; (6) no actual harm or injury resulted from the MSOP's mail policies; (7) the MSOP's telephone policy, as it applies to privileged communications, is rationally related to the legitimate penological interests of security and conserving limited staff resources; (8) the temporary double-bunking of inmates and use of communal showers did not violate the Patients' privacy rights; (9) the Patients' claims of unsanitary conditions either were not supported by admissible evidence or were of such a short duration that they did not result in a due process violation; and (10) Beaulieu failed to identify any property or liberty interest implicated by the officials' refusal to give him access to a computer for legal research. We affirm.

I. Background A. Facilities

The MSOP houses its patients at several facilities, including facilities located in Moose Lake, Minnesota. The MCF–ML, which the DOC operates, is located near the Moose Lake Facility. In 2006, because the MSOP patient population increased, the DOC agreed to permit the DHS to temporarily take over two units on the MCF–ML site known as the Annex. A razor wire fence marked the exterior perimeter of the MCF–ML. The MSOP took over Units 8 and 10 of the MCF–ML, which were separated from the remainder of the facility by a separate razor wire fence. The Annex units were shaped like a “Y,” shared an outdoor courtyard separate from the MCF–ML, and were connected by a corridor under the MSOP's control. Both DOC and DHS staff monitored the Annex entrance; however, the DOC staff did not interact with Annex patients or visitors.

In February 2006, MSOP and DOC staff met to address operational issues regarding the MSOP's temporary use of the facilities. During these meetings, Warden Carlson shared the DOC's security policies with the MSOP staff to ensure the security of the DOC's facility. Aside from sharing DOC policies, the DOC did not use any other means to ensure that the MSOP used DOC procedures.

The MSOP sought the DOC's advice regarding the upgrading of the MSOP's security practices in light of recent security breaches at another MSOP facility in St. Peter, Minnesota. According to Mooney, a director for the MSOP and the Annex, a DOC official strongly recommended that the MSOP implement unclothed visual

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body searches upon patients leaving and entering the Annex. Mooney testified that he and Erskine, another MSOP director, had already determined that they were going to implement unclothed searches in light of the security risks that patients posed, population growth, and the need to strengthen security. Mooney testified that the MSOP made the decision to implement unclothed visual body searches of patients.

Erskine, who was Mooney's supervisor at the time, did not attend the meetings between the MSOP and the DOC as to the MSOP's use of the Annex. But his understanding, based on what Mooney told him, was that the only policy that the MSOP had to adopt regarding its use of the Annex was the unclothed-search policy. According to Erskine, the MSOP carefully made its decision to implement the DOC's requested unclothed-search policy. Erskine testified that DHS and therapy staff reviewed the policy because of a concern that the unclothed searches would disrupt the therapeutic environment. According to Erskine, the MSOP adopted the unclothed-search policy because it needed the space temporarily and because his staff reported to him that if the MSOP did not adopt the search policy, the DOC would not permit the MSOP to use the Annex. Aside from the unclothed-search policy, the MSOP developed its own security policies, and it did not implement any other DOC policies at the Annex. The MSOP would, however, refer to DOC policies in some cases.

From August 2006 to June 2009, the MSOP operated the Annex. In July 2009, the MSOP moved out of the Annex, and the DOC converted the Annex into living units for its inmates.

After the MSOP vacated the Annex, the MSOP continued to operate the Moose Lake Facility and opened Complex 1. The Moose Lake Facility has four conventional units, the BTU, and a special needs medical unit. In July 2009, Complex 1 opened with five units.

B. Patients' § 1983 Suit

The Patients brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DHS and DOC officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and practices relating to the Patients' conditions of confinement at the Annex, the BTU, and Complex 1 are unconstitutional.⁴

The DOC officials moved for summary judgment as to all claims, arguing that they had no decisionmaking authority over the MSOP. The DHS officials also moved for summary judgment on all claims, asserting that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Patients' constitutional claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DHS and DOC officials.

II. Discussion

On appeal, the Patients argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the DHS and DOC officials because triable issues of fact exist as to their claims that the DHS's and DOC's policies and practices violate their constitutional rights. Specifically, the Patients claim that the DHS and DOC officials, through the challenged policies and procedures, violated their constitutional rights by (1) retaliating against them for filing other civil actions; (2) forcing them to endure invasive, full-body strip searches whenever they leave a facility's secure perimeter;

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(3) placing them in full restraints for transport, regardless of an individual's risk; (4) seizing their televisions without compensation; (5) opening their legal mail outside of their presence; (6) restricting their telephone access, including attorney calls; (7) not providing them with adequate privacy in showers and toilets; (8) subjecting them to unsanitary conditions; and (9) denying them access to legal computers. The Patients also assert that the district court erred in denying them injunctive relief pertaining to the Annex based on its finding that there was no indication that any MSOP patients will be housed at the Annex again.

“We review summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004). A district court properly grants summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

A. Injunctive Relief

The Patients argue that the district court erroneously determined that the Patients will not be housed at the Annex again. According to the Patients, because the MSOP population is growing at a faster rate than the MSOP's capacity, the MSOP will likely use the Annex again for additional space. They also maintain that the MSOP's voluntary cessation of the alleged illegal practice does not deprive the court of its ability to determine the legality of the practices.

“In general, a pending claim for injunctive relief becomes moot when the challenged conduct ceases and there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.” Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 976 (8th Cir.2009) (quotation and citation omitted). A court properly dismisses a claim as moot “if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if [the court is] to...