Elkins v. Columbia

• Decision Date: 10 August 2012
• Docket Number: 10–7069.,Nos. 10–7060,s. 10–7060
• Citation: 690 F.3d 554
• Parties: Laura ELKINS and John Robbins, Appellants/Cross–Appellees, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees/Cross–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

690 F.3d 554

Laura ELKINS and John Robbins, Appellants/Cross–Appellees,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

Nos. 10–7060, 10–7069.

United States Court of Appeals,District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Dec. 12, 2011.

Decided Aug. 10, 2012.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:04–cv–00480).

Roger J. Marzulla argued the cause for appellants/cross-appellees. With him on the briefs was Nancie G. Marzulla.

Stacy Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellees/cross-appellants. With her on the briefs were Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge:

Laura Elkins and her husband John Robbins brought suit against the District of Columbia and some of its officials alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the District and its officials were entitled to summary judgment on all the plaintiffs' claims.

I

In 2001, Laura Elkins ¹ decided to renovate her home in Northeast Washington, D.C. Because the house is in the Capitol Hill Historic District, Elkins needed building permits from the District's Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA), which regulates building construction in the District, and the Historic Preservation Office (HPO), which is charged with protecting the city's historic structures. Elkins obtained permits, but once construction began her neighbors complained. In March 2002, one of them sued Elkins and the District in D.C. Superior Court seeking to halt the renovation. The court dismissed the suit, concluding that the permits were valid. In doing so, the court relied largely on testimony from a DCRA official.

Despite the court's ruling, three other District officials, Denzil Noble, Acting Administrator of the Building and Land Regulation Administration within the DCRA, his predecessor J. Gregory Love, and David Maloney, Acting Director of HPO, still questioned whether the permits were valid and suspected that the construction exceeded their scope. Largely due to their concerns, the District issued four stop work orders ² and several times requested that Elkins submit revised building plans to reflect the work being done. Elkins disregarded the orders and refused to submit any revised plans. On May 16, 2002, Love, with Maloney and Noble present, instructed Vincent Ford, DCRA's chief building inspector, to “ ‘find a way’ to stop work” at Elkins's home. Ford Decl. ¶ 20. The next day, Ford issued Elkins a notice of violation of a stop work order. SeeD.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 12A, § 113.2. Elkins and the District officials continued to clash over the type of permits and building plans necessary to authorize continued construction for several months. On March 10, 2003, Noble sent a letter requesting an on-site inspection, but Elkins refused. In response, DCRA sought from Superior Court an administrative search warrant to inspect Elkins's home for evidence of illegal construction. Noble signed the affidavit in support of the warrant. The affidavit set forth the grounds for DCRA's belief that Elkins's renovations exceeded the scope of the permits and continued despite orders that they stop, all in violation of the D.C. Construction Codes. The Superior Court issued the warrant on March 26, 2003, authorizing a search at Elkins's address for “unlicensed construction work which is in violation of the Construction Codes.” The warrant said nothing about items to be seized.

The next day officers from the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and officials from DCRA and HPO executed the warrant. The DCRA and HPO officials had no training in executing a search warrant. In fact, neither agency had ever conducted a search. After entering Elkins's home, an MPD officer announced they had the right to seize all papers related to the renovation. With that, the party searched the entire home, looking for documents and rummaging through closets, drawers, and boxes. The search included the bedrooms of Elkins's two sick children who were home from school. Elkins v. District of Columbia (Elkins I), 527 F.Supp.2d 36, 41 (D.D.C.2007). After vigorously protesting the fact and nature of the search, Elkins produced a notebook containing construction permits, drawings, invoices, and other documents related to the renovations that Toni Williams–Cherry, an HPO inspector assisting DCRA with the search, took from her. The District returned the notebook to Elkins three weeks later. Id. In December 2003, the District moved to revoke Elkins's building permits in proceedings before the District's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Id.

In March 2004, while the OAH proceedings were underway, Elkins brought this suit in federal district court against the District, the Mayor, Love, Maloney, Noble, and Williams–Cherry, alleging that the search of her home and the seizure of her notebook violated the Fourth Amendment. She also claimed that the defendants' “outrageous” conduct trampled her Fifth Amendment due process rights. Elkins sought millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages from each defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court stayed the lawsuit pending the outcome of the administrative proceedings.

In those proceedings, Elkins moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of her home: documents from her notebook, photos taken, and written accounts from those present during the search. OAH allowed the use of the photos and reports from the search, ruling the search warrant valid because there was probable cause to believe the construction was unauthorized. Pls.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. 21 (OAH Order on Motion to Suppress), at 15, 22. But OAH barred the use of the documents from the notebook because the warrant said nothing about seizing them, or anything else. Id. at 21–22. After three separate hearings held over several months, OAH upheld the permits on March 20, 2007, id. Ex. 20 (OAH Final Ruling), at 45–46, in a ruling that also concluded that Elkins and the District officials had acted in good faith throughout despite charged accusations of misconduct coming from both sides. Id. at 21 n.13.

Following the OAH decision, the district court took up Elkins's lawsuit again, addressing the parties' dueling, updated motions for summary judgment. On December 12, 2007, the district court agreed with the District that Elkins was collaterally estopped from pursuing her substantive due process claim because of OAH's determination that the District and its officials had acted in good faith. Elkins I, 527 F.Supp.2d at 50. The district court likewise rejected Elkins's procedural due process claim, finding the OAH proceeding was in fact wholly adequate. Id. at 48–49. Addressing Elkins's Fourth Amendment claims, the district court held that both sides were collaterally estopped from relitigating OAH's determinations that the search was lawful and the seizure unlawful. Id. at 46. The only issue remaining was which, if any, of the defendants to hold liable for the unlawful seizure of Elkins's notebook. See id. at 51–52. Having dismissed the Mayor from the suit (claims against the Mayor in his official capacity are treated as claims against the District), the court rejected the assertion of qualified immunity from the remaining officials and ordered discovery on the issue of liability. Id. at 51.

Following discovery, the defendants moved again for summary judgment, arguing that none of them were liable for the seizure of the notebook. The district court dismissed the District because Elkins had not properly pled any theory on which it could be held liable for the seizure, but denied the motion with respect to the other defendants. Elkins v. District of Columbia (Elkins II), 610 F.Supp.2d 52, 58–59 (D.D.C.2009). On a motion for reconsideration, the court later granted judgment to Maloney, finding there was no evidence linking him to the seizure. Elkins v. District of Columbia (Elkins III), 636 F.Supp.2d 29, 33–35 (D.D.C.2009). Elkins then filed her own motion for reconsiderationchallenging Maloney's dismissal from the suit and the application of collateral estoppel to her Fourth Amendment claim. The court rejected the motion. Elkins v. District of Columbia (Elkins IV), 685 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2010).

Thus, on the eve of trial, all that remained of Elkins's suit were her claims that Love, Noble, and Williams–Cherry were liable for the unlawful seizure of her notebook. To expedite a final ruling and subsequent appeal, Elkins agreed not to proceed to trial. Instead, preserving her right to appeal, she asked the court to enter judgment in her favor against the remaining defendants, but stipulated that she was entitled to no more than nominal damages from each. See Elkins v. District of Columbia (Elkins V), 710 F.Supp.2d 53, 60 (D.D.C.2010). Finally, in May 2010, the district court entered judgment against Noble and Williams–Cherry and assessed nominal damages of one dollar each, but dismissed Love from the case, holding that although the evidence against him was enough to get before a jury, it was insufficient, without a trial, to establish his liability. Id. at 62, 65.

Both parties appealed and we assumed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Elkins seeks to reverse the district court's grants of summary judgment against her, which would allow her Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims to go forward against all of the defendants. Noble and Williams–Cherry seek to reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment against them and ask for entry of summary judgment in their favor. We review the district court's grants of summary judgment de novo. Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 908 ...