S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc.

• Citation: 690 F.2d 1235
• Decision Date: 03 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 79-3720,79-3720
• Parties: S. A. EMPRESA DE VIACAO AEREA RIO GRANDENSE (VARIG AIRLINES), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER KIDDE & COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 1235

690 F.2d 1235

S. A. EMPRESA DE VIACAO AEREA RIO GRANDENSE (VARIG

AIRLINES), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER KIDDE & COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 79-3720.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 5, 1980.

Decided Feb. 26, 1982.

As Amended June 3, 1982.

Phillip D. Bostwick, Washington, D. C., argued, for plaintiff-appellant; James B. Hamilin, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, D. C., on brief.

H. G. Robert Fong, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for defendant-appellee; Joseph E. Gregorich, Robert C. Packard, Kirtland & Packard, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before FERGUSON and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and PANNER, ^* District Judge.

PANNER, District Judge:

Varig Airlines sued the Boeing Company and a component manufacturer, Weber Aircraft, a division of Walter Kidde & Co., for loss of the Boeing 707 that crashed outside Paris, France, on July 11, 1973, en route from Brazil. Varig appeals from the summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of Weber. ¹

The crash occurred after dense smoke completely filled the aircraft, suffocated many passengers, and obscured the pilot's vision. One hundred twenty-four persons died and the aircraft was destroyed. The French Commission of Inquiry concluded that the probable cause of the crash was a fire that apparently broke out in the used towel receptacle in an aft lavatory. Weber manufactured the aft lavatory sink and cabinet unit which included the receptacle for used towels. Varig sought recovery from Weber on theories of (1) negligent design and manufacture of the sink and dispenser unit, (2) post-delivery negligence, and (3) strict liability in tort.

I. NEGLIGENT DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE THEORY

The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that Boeing, not Weber, was responsible for the design of the unit, and that the unit was manufactured by Weber to Boeing's design specifications. ²

Weber argued that it had no responsibility for the design of the unit. This "carpenter-architect" defense is based upon a line of California cases involving the construction industry. ³ Massei v. Lettunich, 248 Cal.App.2d 68, 56 Cal.Rptr. 232 (1967); Barnthouse v. California Steel Buildings Co., 215 Cal.App.2d 72, 29 Cal.Rptr. 835 (1963); Johnson v. City of San Leandro, 179 Cal.App.2d 794, 801, 4 Cal.Rptr. 404 (1960). The district court found, as a matter of undisputed fact, that the design of the Weber-built unit was dictated by Boeing with no real opportunity for participation by Weber. ⁴

Varig contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Weber's participation in the design of the used towel component of the unit. Performance requirements for the sink and dispenser unit are set forth in a "specification control document" which Weber received from Boeing. Varig contends this document supports an inference that Weber had considerable responsibility for the design of the used towel receptacle subject to Boeing's final approval. Varig also cites the deposition testimony of Don Swett, sales manager for Weber and argues that Weber had detailed design responsibility for the unit within the general design parameters dictated by Boeing.

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. E.g., Spectrum Financial Companies v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1979). In reviewing a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment. E.g., Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 1980).

Here, however, appellant has not cited any portion of the record that demonstrates or even implies the validity of its propositions. Reversal should not occur because of confusion in the record. ⁵ The deficient appellate record has required that significant court time and effort be spent to sift through the numerous volumes. Under certain circumstances, dismissal of this appeal would be appropriate. See Thomas v. Computax Corp., 631 F.2d 139, 141-43 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, a party cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in its legal memoranda. Angel v. Seattle-First National Bank, 653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981); Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310, 1321 (9th Cir. 1981); British Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 1790, 60 L.Ed.2d 241 (1979).

None of the affidavits, depositions, or documents raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the design responsibilities of Weber with respect to the work Weber was directed to perform. The specification control document is a general document relating to all vendors of Boeing. The difficulty with relying upon that document in this case is that the only evidence available indicates Weber was given detailed specifications for a particular component that had to be combined with materials from other vendors and integrated into the lavatory.

Swett made it clear that Weber designed only certain components that would go into a proposed lavatory envelope. Weber's design responsibility was limited to the sink and cabinet and a dispenser. Boeing's specifications required holes in the cabinet at designated locations and of required size. These are the same holes objected to by Rudolph Kapustin, who furnished the evidence as to the cause of this fire.

There is nothing in the record to indicate any responsibility on the part of Weber to either close the holes specified by Boeing or to fill them with non-flammable material. The components supplied by Weber had to be matched with other components supplied by other manufacturers to make the unit. The entire assembly was done at Boeing. Weber had a right to assume that the holes would be closed or that non-flammable material would be placed therein. ⁶

There is nothing in the record to indicate that any item or any materials furnished by Weber to be assembled by Boeing within the cabinet were not fire resistant, which was the requirement of the civil air regulations. It is true that Kapustin testified that "the large door, was of a wood composition material, which although it could have been fire resistant, to a degree, contained fabric, trim which was not." Kapustin Deposition at 1069-72. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the fabric or the trim on the large door was supplied by Weber or that it contributed in any way to the fire or the spread of it.

Kapustin, in his testimony, raised serious doubt about his competence to testify as to the cause of the fire. Varig never rebutted Weber's claim that Kapustin was not qualified to testify about possible defects in the sink and cabinet unit. His testimony, therefore, is entitled to no weight. Even accepting his testimony, however, he only suggests that the lavatory design might have had something to do with the fire. Were we to conclude that this speculative opinion created a factual issue we must still find some evidence that the defendant had some duty of design with respect to the lavatory. The design of the lavatory was done by Boeing and was significantly more expansive than the design of a sink and the cabinet. Even accepting that Weber had some design authority under the general document relating to all Boeing vendors, that design authority was limited to the specific items to be furnished by Weber, i.e., the sink and the cabinet.

Most of the evidence offered by Varig relates to the possibility of hot water heater malfunctions causing the fire. Such cause was ruled out by the French authorities. ⁷

Section 21.03 of the specification control document requires the disposal container to be of fire resistant material with incorporated covers. Plaintiff cites no substantial evidence to indicate that Weber was deficient in this regard.

II. POST-DELIVERY NEGLIGENCE THEORY

Varig also argues that manufacturers have a continuing duty to warn operators of design defects which have come to the manufacturer's attention after delivery. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.App.2d 855, 32 Cal.Rptr. 754 (1963). See also Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959, 90 S.Ct. 431, 24 L.Ed.2d 423 (1969). Appellant again fails, however, to cite substantial evidence that would give rise to a triable issue of fact as to whether Weber became aware of any alleged design defect after delivery.

III. STRICT LIABILITY THEORY

The district court dismissed Varig's strict liability claim against Weber on the authority of Scandinavian Airline System v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979) ("SAS "). Varig argues that SAS is inapplicable to the facts of this case, or alternatively that there are unresolved issues of fact concerning the applicability of SAS.

This court held in SAS that, as a matter of California law, the doctrine of strict liability does not apply to negotiated transactions between large commercial enterprises. 601 F.2d at 427-29. See also Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1980); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965, 95 S.Ct. 1953, 44 L.Ed.2d 451 (1975); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 55 Cal.App.3d 737, 746-48; 127 Cal.Rptr. 838, 844-45 (1976).

In the companion to this case, Varig Airlines v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981), we held that the rule of SAS was fully applicable to Varig and Boeing. That holding controls this case as well. The involvement of Weber as a component manufacturer does not materially alter the analysis; all three parties-the airline, the manufacturer of the aircraft, and the manufacturer of the component-were negotiating from positions of relatively equal economic strength, and were able to allocate...