U.S. v. Middleton

• Decision Date: 01 November 1982
• Docket Number: Nos. 81-5321,81-5640,s. 81-5321
• Citation: 690 F.2d 820
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifton Ray MIDDLETON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 820

690 F.2d 820

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifton Ray MIDDLETON, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 81-5321, 81-5640.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 1, 1982.

Richard R. Booth, Arthur W. Tifford, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

Barbara D. Schwartz, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HILL and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and SCOTT ^*, District Judge.

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:

This case consists of an appeal from convictions entered against the defendant for the crimes of importation of marijuana, possession of marijuana, resisting customs officers, and bail jumping.

The defendant, Clifton Ray Middleton, a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, flew into Miami from Jamaica on April 11, 1972. Upon his arrival, the Customs Inspector asked Middleton to accompany him to a room for a secondary search of his baggage. Mr. Middleton then fled the customs enclosure, pursued by a number of customs personnel, and was caught. The defendant testified that he slipped and fell shortly after reaching the street and was set upon by several men as he tried to get up. Other evidence indicates that upon his capture, the defendant fought off the law enforcement officers by flailing his arms, kicking his feet, and squirming. Middleton continued this behavior as he was taken into the search room and later across the street to the public safety department. Marijuana was found in the defendant's possession and the defendant was taken into custody. On April 14, 1972, the defendant was released on a $10,000 personal recognizance bond and was advised at that time that he was required to report to the public defender three times per week. Middleton complied with this condition until the week ending May 5, 1972.

On April 20, 1972, a federal grand jury returned a seven count indictment against Middleton. Count I charged the defendant with importation of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963. Count II charged the defendant with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Counts III through VII charged the defendant with assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain customs officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.

The defendant was arraigned on May 2, 1972 at which time the magistrate announced his trial date was scheduled for May 22, 1972. His attorney at that time, William Stiles, testified that he had numerous discussions with the defendant regarding the trial date. Middleton did not contact the public defender's office from the day he was arraigned or any time thereafter prior to the trial date. Middleton failed to appear in court when his case was called for trial on May 22, 1972. On February 1, 1973, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant for bond jumping under 18 U.S.C. § 3150.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on January 16, 1980, alleging that the statutory prohibitions pertaining to marijuana are unconstitutional per se. Middleton also asserted that the statutory prohibitions were unconstitutional as applied to him as a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church. The trial judge denied this motion. Trial commenced on both indictments on February 11, 1981. The jury found the defendant guilty under count I; not guilty under count II of possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, but guilty of simple possession; and guilty under counts IV, V, and VI. The judge directed a verdict of not guilty on count III and the jury acquitted Middleton on count VII. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to nine months imprisonment on counts I and II to be served concurrently. He also sentenced the defendant to nine months custody on counts IV through VI to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentence imposed for counts I and II. The trial judge then sentenced the defendant to a one year term of imprisonment for bond jumping which was to run consecutively to the two other sentences.

In this appeal, the defendant raises four issues. First, the defendant argues that the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (1976) is unconstitutional as an arbitrary and irrational classification. Second, Middleton asserts that he is a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church; that this is a religion within the meaning of the first amendment; and that the use of marijuana is an indispensible part of this religion. Consequently, Middleton argues that the application of the statute in this case would violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Third, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defendant's theory of self-defense since the facts reasonably supported that defense to counts III through VII. Finally, Middleton contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for bail jumping. We disagree with all of the above contentions and affirm the defendant's convictions on all counts.

I Classification of Marijuana as a Schedule I Controlled Substance

Federal statutes are presumptively valid unless it be shown that the statute in question bears no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618 (1974); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) ("where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, (judicial inquiries) must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it"). Recognizing this basic doctrine, Middleton nevertheless argues that this court should declare the congressional classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance unconstitutional as arbitrary and irrational. ¹

Under 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1976), Congress has established five schedules of controlled substances. Subsection (b) of this statute requires that a drug or other substance placed in Schedule I must (a) have a high potential for abuse, (b) have no "currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and (c) must lack "accepted safety for use ... under medical supervision." Id.

At the hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant presented expert testimony that marijuana does not satisfy any of the Schedule I requirements. For example, Middleton called Dr. Thomas Ungerleider, an associate professor of psychiatry at UCLA, who testified that his research had led him to conclude that marijuana does not satisfy any of the three Schedule I requirements. In an effort to further support his position, Middleton called other witnesses including Robert Randall, a glaucoma sufferer, who testified that he was using marijuana to treat his loss of vision. Based on this evidence, the defendant argues that this court should substitute its judgment for that of Congress and reclassify marijuana.

This evidence, however, is not sufficient to convince this court that it should interfere with the broad judicially-recognized prerogative of Congress. In rejecting a similar argument urging the judicial reclassification of cocaine, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that a court must limit its inquiry to whether a legislative classification or a refusal to reclassify is irrational or unreasonable. United States v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1982). In Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618 (1974) the Supreme Court stated that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal," 414 U.S. at 428, 94 S.Ct. at 707, and that "(w)hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation, even assuming, arguendo, that judges with more direct exposure to the problem might make wiser choices." Id. at 427, 94 S.Ct. at 706.

In enacting the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Congress explicitly recognized:

The extent to which marihuana should be controlled is a subject upon which opinions diverge widely. There are some who not only advocate its legalization but would encourage its use; at the other extreme there are some States which have established the death penalty for distribution of marihuana to minors.

H.R.Rep.No.91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News 4566, 4577. In this case, Middleton has failed to produce any evidence that the congressional classification is unreasonable or irrational. The determination of whether new evidence regarding either the medical use of marijuana or the drug's potential for abuse should result in a reclassification of marijuana is a matter for legislative or administrative, not judicial, judgment. See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831, 94 S.Ct. 62, 38 L.Ed.2d 65 (1973); United States v. LaFroscia, 354 F.Supp. 1338 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1973).

The Act contains a mechanism by which evidence such as that on which the defendant relies may be presented to the attorney general in order to determine whether a particular drug should be reclassified. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1976). Faced with the issue of whether to compel reclassification, courts have approved of this mechanism as a means of properly evaluating any new evidence. See United States v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071, 100 S.Ct. 1014, 62 L.Ed.2d 752 (1980); ...