Montford v. Robins Federal Credit Union

• Decision Date: 06 July 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 86-288-3-MAC(DF).
• Citation: 691 F. Supp. 347
• Parties: Debra K. MONTFORD, Plaintiff, v. ROBINS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

691 F. Supp. 347

Debra K. MONTFORD, Plaintiff, v. ROBINS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 86-288-3-MAC(DF).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division.

July 6, 1988.

Joseph W. Popper, Jr. and Richard B. Miller, Sell & Melton, Macon, Ga., for plaintiff.

R. Joneal Lee, Warner Robins, Ga., E. Scott Smith, Ford & Harrison, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

FITZPATRICK, District Judge.

Plaintiff Debra K. Montford brought the above-referenced action in the State Court of Houston County, Georgia, following her termination from Defendant Robins Federal Credit Union (Robins or the Credit Union). In her Complaint, Montford asserted claims under the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1751, et seq. and various provisions of Georgia law. Defendants removed the action to this court by the filing of a Petition and Bond for Removal on September 18, 1986. The matter presently is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Robins is a private, non-profit corporation chartered by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Moore was the General Manager at Robins, and Defendant Levins was the Assistant Manager of Administration. Defendant Moore was employed under a written contract entered into on behalf of Robins by its board of directors. Defendant Levins reported directly to Moore.

Plaintiff Montford was hired by Moore as an Account Clerk in March of 1973. Montford was employed in various positions at Robins between 1973 and 1982. In the Spring of 1982, Moore transferred Montford from the Teller Department to the Loan Department. After approximately four to six weeks of training, Montford received an official appointment to the position of loan officer from the Credit Union's credit committee. Along with her appointment Montford was given the authority to sign loans.

Even before Montford became a loan officer she had expressed an interest in union representation for Robins' employees. This interest was first brought to light in January of 1981, when Montford contacted a Mr. Seidenfaden with the Retail Clerks Local 1063 in Atlanta. They discussed the possibilities of organizing the employees, but Seidenfaden expressed some concern as to the extent to which Montford could participate in such an effort because of her possible status as a "supervisor" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). At the time Montford first contacted Seidenfaden, she was Assistant Head Teller in the Teller Department.

During the Summer of 1983, after she had become a loan officer, Montford again contacted Seidenfaden. Seidenfaden referred Montford to Mr. Emory Walden, the organizing Director for Local 1063. Montford informed Walden that she was no longer in the Teller Department, that problems at the Credit Union still existed, and that several Robins' employees were in favor of union representation. Subsequently, Montford began soliciting employee interest in the union, passing out union-representation cards, and arranging and attending meetings between employees and Walden. Montford continued her organization efforts on behalf of the union until October 19, 1983, the day she was terminated from the Credit Union.

During the time Montford was working as a loan officer, certain loan policies were in full force and effect at Robins. One of these policies prohibited loan officers from processing or acting upon loan applications submitted by relatives of the loan officer or members of the loan officer's family. On April 19, 1983, Montford received a loan application from Michael D. Driggers. Driggers was the husband of one of Montford's cousins and the son-in-law of Montford's uncle, Jimmy Sims. Montford approved Driggers' application for a loan in the amount of $6,000.00 to purchase a 1983 Chevrolet pickup truck from Dixie Truck & Parts Company. Montford was aware of Driggers' relationship to her cousin and her uncle at the time she processed the loan.

Between September 20, 1983, and October 12, 1983, Levins and Barbara Marcu, a subordinate of Levins, investigated the circumstances surrounding Montford's April 19th approval of Driggers' loan application. On October 12, 1983, Moore, Levins, and Henry Johnson, the Assistant Manager of Operations at Robins, met and discussed the results of the investigation. At this meeting the three men jointly decided to terminate Montford.

During the afternoon of October 19, 1983, Montford was summoned to a meeting in Robins' board room at which Moore, Levins, and Johnson were present. Montford was presented with a notice which stated that she was being terminated because she had violated certain loan policies of the Credit Union. Montford protested her termination and inquired as to whether she could appeal the termination decision. Moore told Montford she could appeal to the board of directors. After this brief exchange, Johnson escorted Montford to her desk so that she could get her belongings. Montford claims that while she was crying, she was paraded through the offices of the Credit Union and forced to clean out her desk while an escort stood over her.

On October 25, 1983, Montford requested a meeting with the board of directors. By letter dated November 21, 1983, Montford's request was denied. The November 21st letter stated in part: "Management has the authority to make all decisions regarding employment and it is the policy of this Board not to interfere with those decisions." Deposition of Debra Montford, Vol. I, Defendants' exhibit 15, p. 1.¹

Montford's termination came one day before a union organization meeting was to be held at the Credit Union. After her termination and the board's refusal to entertain an appeal, Montford filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In her charge Montford alleged that in an effort to discourage membership in labor organizations, the Credit Union had discriminated against her in regard to her termination and in regard to the terms and conditions of her employment.

The NLRB Regional Director issued a complaint on Montford's charge, and on February 14 and 15, 1984, the case was tried before an NLRB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Montford was represented by counsel at the NLRB proceeding. On July 20, 1984, the ALJ issued an order in which he found that the Credit Union did not discharge Montford, or otherwise discriminate against her, because of her union activities. Montford sought review of the ALJ's decision before the NLRB. On January 19, 1985, a three-member panel of the NLRB affirmed the ALJ's ruling and adopted his recommended order. Montford did not seek review of the NLRB's decision at the circuit court level.²

On May 15, 1985, Montford filed an action in this court alleging violations of the FCUA, tortious interference with employment rights, and bad faith conduct. On April 17, 1985, through new, substituted counsel, Montford moved for voluntary dismissal of her Complaint. By Order dated April 18, 1986, this court dismissed Montford's Complaint without prejudice.

On July 25, 1986, Montford filed the present action in the State Court of Houston County, Georgia. Montford's State Court Complaint also asserted violations of the FCUA, and tortious interference with contractual and employment rights. On September 18, 1986, Defendants removed the case to this court asserting federal question jurisdiction. Montford subsequently amended her Complaint adding a fourth count alleging that the individual Defendants tortiously conspired to interfere with her contractual, employment, proprietary and other rights.³

II. DISCUSSION

The crux of Montford's argument in this case is that Moore and Levins, both of whom were in management positions, lacked the authority to terminate her since she had been appointed to the position of loan officer. Montford bases her contention on certain provisions of the Credit Union's bylaws which seem to indicate that the credit committee alone has the authority to remove loan officers. The relevant portion of the bylaws reads as follows:

Article VIII. Executive Officers, Executive Committee, and Management Staff

Sec. 7. The board of directors shall employ, fix the compensation, and prescribe the duties of such employees as may in the discretion of the board be necessary, and have the power to remove such employees, unless it has delegated these powers to the treasurer or manager; except that neither the board, the treasurer, nor the manager shall have the power or the duty to employ, prescribe the duties of, or remove any loan officer appointed by the Credit Committee or necessary clerical and auditing assistants employed or utilized by the Supervisory Committee.

Federal Credit Union Bylaws, August, 1970, Art. VIII, § 7 (emphasis added). The above-quoted provision was part of the standard form bylaws promulgated as official regulations by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). See 12 C.F.R. § 701.2(a)-(d)(1) (1988). In addition, both parties agree that these bylaws were binding on the Defendant Credit Union during the time period relevant to this suit.⁴

A. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

In their Petition for Removal, Defendants claimed that this court has original jurisdiction over the present action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since Montford's Complaint alleges violations of the FCUA. Defendants also urge this court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over any separate, state-law claims raised in the Complaint. In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' main argument is that all of Montford's claims, both state and federal, are preempted under federal labor law. In support of this argument, Defendants contend that "the single unifying thread running through all of Montford's claims is that she was unlawfully discriminated against because of her union activity," that such...