Velez v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 31 July 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. 11–90–cv.
• Citation: 693 F.3d 308
• Parties: Linda VELEZ, Plaintiff–Counter–Defendant–Appellant, v. Betsy SANCHEZ, Defendant–Counter–Claimant–Third–Party–Plaintiff–Appellee, Shari Munoz, Yolanda Munoz, Defendants–Counter–Claimants–Appellees, v. Hernando Sanchez, Third–Party–Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

693 F.3d 308

Linda VELEZ, Plaintiff–Counter–Defendant–Appellant,

v.Betsy SANCHEZ, Defendant–Counter–Claimant–Third–Party–Plaintiff–Appellee,Shari Munoz, Yolanda Munoz, Defendants–Counter–Claimants–Appellees,

v.Hernando Sanchez, Third–Party–Defendant.

Docket No. 11–90–cv.

United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.

Argued: March 19, 2012.

Decided: July 31, 2012.

Andrew S. Amer, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Sheldon Karasik, Simon, Eisenberg & Baum, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants–Appellees.

Suzanne B. Goldberg, New York, NY, for the Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic of Columbia Law School as amicus curiae in support of Plaintiff–Appellant.

Before: RAGGI and DRONEY, Circuit Judges, and MATSUMOTO, District Judge.^*

DRONEY, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff and its prior grant of a motion to dismiss one count of the amended complaint. Plaintiff–Appellant Linda Velez (“Velez”) brought this action against Betsy Sanchez (“Sanchez”), Sanchez's sister Shari Munoz, and Sanchez's and Shari's mother Yolanda Munoz under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19, and New York state law.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background and Standards of Review

Velez filed this action on November 5, 2004. In January of 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss her amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). The district court dismissed certain claims, including Velez's breach of contract claim, and converted the motion to dismiss as to the remaining claims into a motion for summary judgment. The court then allowed the parties to complete discovery and submit additional materials. After discovery, the court found sua sponte that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Velez's ATS claims and converted them to a claim for a civil remedy under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595, but granted summary judgment to the defendants on all federal claims. Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F.Supp.2d 488, 495–500 (E.D.N.Y.2010). The district court also declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and counterclaims. Id. at 500.

This posture requires us to apply different standards of review to Velez's appealed claims. We review the dismissal of her breach of contract claim de novo, “accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir.2011) (citation omitted).

We also review the district court's summary judgment decision on her claims under the TVPRA and FLSA de novo and apply “the same standards that govern the district court's consideration of the motion.” Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 546 (2d Cir.2010). A grant of summary judgment should be affirmed “only where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant the entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” Id. at 545 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2)). In making its determinations, the court deciding summary judgment should “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

Finally, we review “questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir.2010), cert. granted,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 472, 181 L.Ed.2d 292 (2011). We are entitled at any time during the proceeding to “ sua sponte ... delve into the issue of whether there is a factual basis to support” the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, and we are not limited in “our right to refer to any material in the record.” Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div. of Ace Young Inc., 109 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1997).

Keeping these standards in mind, we describe the relevant facts below, taking them in part from Velez's complaint and in part from the deposition testimony and other evidence provided at summary judgment.

II. Factual Background

Velez is a citizen of Ecuador and lived there with her mother and Luis Munoz, who is also Sanchez's biological father. Sanchez lived in New York with Shari Munoz and their mother Yolanda Munoz. In 2001, Sanchez asked her father, Luis Munoz, to find a girl who would be willing to move to the United States to help take care of Sanchez's daughter. After some discussions, Velez, who was then 16 years old, agreed to leave Ecuador and move in with Sanchez in New York. Velez was to provide babysitting, and in return, Sanchez promised to provide Velez with room and board and an $80 weekly wage, to enroll her in high school, and to assist her with enrolling in and paying for college. With Sanchez's help, Velez obtained a tourist visa and flew to New York on September 20, 2001. Shortly after her arrival in New York, Sanchez took Velez's passport and put it in an unlocked drawer for safekeeping.

During her time at the Sanchez house, Velez provided childcare as well as household services such as laundry, cleaning, and vacuuming. Her services were substantial; she stated at her deposition that for months she worked eleven to twelve hours a day, seven days a week, all without the promised pay. Her childcare responsibilities also prevented her from attending high school.

Velez admits that Sanchez took steps to integrate her into her family and life in the United States. Velez was allowed to send emails from Sanchez's computer and to use the telephone while staying with Sanchez. She also maintained several friendships and spent unsupervised time with those friends outside of the Sanchez home. Velez also regularly exercised at the local YMCA without supervision through a membership paid for by Sanchez, visited the library by herself, opened a bank account on her own, and temporarily held a part-time job and attended classes as part of a General Educational Development program. Sanchez took Velez to movies and other “performances,” and Velez participated in holiday celebrations with the family. Beginning in mid–2002, Velez began attending English classes on Saturdays, and those classes were paid for by Sanchez.

During the course of her stay in the Sanchez household, Velez was not paid the promised weekly salary, even though she repeatedly requested it. According to Velez's deposition testimony, a few months before Velez left the Sanchez household in late 2003, Sanchez signed a document again promising her a salary of $80 per week and that Velez would be free to do as she wished once Sanchez returned from work.¹

As some of Sanchez's promises continued to remain unfulfilled, however, the relationship between Velez and the Sanchez family began breaking down. Sanchez and Shari Munoz called Velez ungrateful and disobedient and a “whore,” told Velez that “they could do anything with [her] because they own [her],” and repeatedly threatened to send her back to Ecuador. Velez Dep. at 554–56. Sanchez also eavesdropped on Velez's telephone conversations with her family in Ecuador. The conflict ultimately led to a confrontation on November 8, 2003, while Velez was visiting a friend. During this confrontation, Shari Munoz grabbed her by the arm and pushed her into a car. Later that day, when Velez then refused to obey Sanchez's instructions, Sanchez grabbed Velez by the arm and told her to stay in a room of her house until given permission to leave.

Velez left the Sanchez home on November 11, 2003. She obtained a T-visa, available to trafficking victims, remains in New York, and has received psychiatric help for depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Velez claims that she remained in the Sanchez household for so long in part because she loved Sanchez's children and wanted to help them, but also because she wished to stay in the United States. Velez considered Sanchez a sister, but denies that she considered Sanchez a parent with parental control over her. Sanchez maintains, however, that she considered herself Velez's “proxy parent” and felt responsible for supervising her. Sanchez Aff. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 14. Sanchez describes Velez as desperately wanting to stay in the United States and “[f]latly and unequivocally” refusing to leave the Sanchez household even when her visa expired. Id. ¶ 15. She claims that Velez only left the Sanchez household to pursue a romantic relationship with Sanchez's husband. For the purposes of summary judgment, however, we assume that these factual disputes will be resolved in favor of Velez.

Velez brought this action against Sanchez, Shari Munoz, and Yolanda Munoz, claiming in her amended complaint that she was deceived when asked to come to New York and made to work long hours without compensation. She claimed that Sanchez, with the aid of the other defendants, kept her isolated and psychologically abused her while forcing her to provide domestic services. The three defendants asserted various state-law counterclaims, alleging that Velez refused to leave the United States, stole from Sanchez, and started an affair with Sanchez's husband. Sanchez also brought a third-party complaint against her now ex-husband, Hernando Sanchez, for indemnification and contribution.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction Under the ATS

Velez alleged ATS violations for involuntary servitude, slavery, forced labor, and trafficking. The district court determined that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over violations of the law of nations committed in the United States, and therefore it sua...