State v. Comried
Decision Date | 18 March 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 03-1166.,03-1166. |
Citation | 693 N.W.2d 773 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bradley James COMRIED, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, and Timothy W. Dille, County Attorney, for appellee.
James Comried was convicted of vehicular homicide while having a controlled substance in his blood, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (2001). He contends the district court misapplied this Code section and that his conviction is unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree on both points and therefore affirm his conviction.
Comried, in attempting to outrun a police car, ran into a vehicle driven by Donald Rotenburger, who died as a result of the collision. Pursuant to a search warrant, the officers obtained a blood sample that, together with a urine sample voluntarily provided by Comried, was sent to the state's criminalistics laboratory for analysis. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 661-7.4 (2003). This laboratory performs two types of tests: an initial screening test and a confirmatory test. The initial test is performed at certain "cutoff levels," meaning that only drug concentrations over the cutoff level will yield a "positive" test result. Any concentration below the cutoff level is reported "negative." See Iowa Admin. Code r. 661 — 7.9 ( ). If the initial screening test shows positive, a second test is performed on the sample. This second test, the confirmatory test, is presumably more expensive but is also more reliable and produces very accurate results.1
This case is somewhat unique because it involves samples of both blood and urine. When the lab performed the initial screening tests, Comried's blood sample tested negative, but his urine sample tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Both samples were subjected to confirmatory testing, and both tested positive for methamphetamine.
Comried was charged with vehicular homicide while intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1), which states: "A person commits a class `B' felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, as prohibited by section 321J.2." Section 321J.2 states:
Iowa Code § 321J.2 (emphasis added). The State charged that, because Comried had "any amount" (80 ng/ml) of methamphetamine in his blood at the time of the accident, he violated section 321J.2(1)(c), and because of Rotenburger's death, he violated section 707.6A(1) as well.
Before trial, Comried moved for an adjudication of law points, arguing that the "any amount" language of section 321J.2(1)(c) impliedly incorporated a Department of Public Safety (DPS) rule setting cutoff levels for concentration of a drug. According to him, "any amount" means any amount above the cutoff level. The State countered that "any amount" means what it says — if a test detects any amount of a controlled substance, the any-amount element is satisfied. Judge Morrison agreed with the State, holding that "`[a]ny' means any." Judge Wilson, in a jury-waived trial, found Comried guilty.
A. Principles of construction. We recently summarized the principles of statutory construction:
61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 1385, at 274 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
B. The statute's text. Section 321J.2(1) lists three separate offenses. The first criminalizes driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(a). The next two subsections delineate specific concentrations of those substances that automatically trigger a violation. Id. § 321J.2(1)(b), (c). Under these subsections, the State need not prove the defendant was under the influence — only that he was driving a motor vehicle with a specific amount of alcohol or drugs in his body. In 2002 the specific amount for alcohol was a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 or more. Id. § 321J.2(1)(b).2 As to controlled substances, "any amount" violates the statute. Id. § 321J.2(1)(c).
C. The statute's purpose. We have said the purpose of chapter 321J is "`to reduce the holocaust on our highways[,] part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor.'" State v. Kelly, 430 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1988) (quoting State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980)). At the time Kelly was decided, there were only two ways a person could violate the statute. The first was if the person was under the influence of alcohol or drugs; the second was if he had a blood-alcohol content of more than .10. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1) (1987).
In 1998, however, that changed. The legislature added subsection (1)(c), prohibiting driving with any amount of a controlled substance in the body. 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1138, § 11. Although there is no direct legislative history, the legislature likely included the "any amount" language in the amendment to create a per se ban. Subsection (1)(a) already prohibited driving while under the influence of drugs. Thus, subsection (1)(c) was intended to do something more — to prohibit people from operating motor vehicles with controlled substances in their bodies, whether or not they are under the influence.
State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368, 873 P.2d 706, 708 (Ct.App.1994); accord Shepler v. State, 758 N.E.2d 966, 969-70 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) () . Our court of appeals has reached a similar conclusion in a license revocation case based on driving with controlled substances in the body. The court, noting the difficulty in relating the amount of drugs in the body to driving impairment, said:
Unlike the blood alcohol concentration test used to measure alcohol impairment there is no similar test to measure marijuana impairment. There is, though, as was used here, a test to measure the use of marijuana, a drug illegal in the State of Iowa, in a person's body. There being no reliable indicator of impairment, the legislature could rationally decide that the public is best protected by prohibiting one from driving who has a measurable amount of marijuana metabolites.
Loder v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 622 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa Ct.App.2000) (footnote omitted).
Comried argues that the above statutory analysis is altered by Iowa Administrative Code rule 661 — 7.9, a recently promulgated DPS regulation. He contends that this regulation — which, as explained below, sets cutoff levels for initial screening tests for drugs in urine samples — modifies the definition of "any" in Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(c). We do not agree.
The DPS regulation relied on by Comried was promulgated under Iowa Code section 321J.2(8)(c), which states:
The department of public safety shall adopt nationally accepted standards for determining detectible levels of controlled substances in the division of criminal investigation's initial laboratory screening test for controlled substances.
(Emphasis added.) This statute limits the DPS's power to set cutoff levels: they are to apply only to "initial laboratory screening tests," not to confirmatory tests. As directed, the DPS adopted this rule:
[Federal initial test requirements] are hereby adopted as standards for determining detectable levels of controlled substances in the division of criminal investigation criminalistics laboratory initial screening for...
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