First Commercial Bank v. Spivey
Decision Date | 09 May 1997 |
Citation | 694 So.2d 1316 |
Parties | FIRST COMMERCIAL BANK v. Sheryl SPIVEY. Curtis SPIVEY III v. FIRST COMMERCIAL BANK. 1951862, 1951872. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Roderick K. Nelson, Robert S. Lamar, Jr., and Lynn B. Randall of Lamar, Nelson & Miller, P.C., Birmingham, for Appellant/Cross Appellee First Commercial Bank.
J. Gusty Yearout, William R. Myers, and John G. Watts of Yearout, Myers & Traylor, P.C., Birmingham; and Perryn G. Carroll of Carroll & Carroll, P.C., Birmingham, for Appellee Sheryl Spivey and Appellant Curtis Spivey III.
The defendant, First Commercial Bank, appeals from a judgment entered on a $1,000,000 jury verdict ($500,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages) for one of the plaintiffs, Sheryl H. Spivey. Sheryl Spivey's husband, Curtis T. Spivey III, also a plaintiff, cross appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The Spiveys sought damages based on allegations of breach of contract and fraud. The jury found for Sheryl Spivey, awarding $1,000,000, but found against Curtis Spivey. The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict. We affirm, both as to the appeal and as to the cross appeal.
This is the second time these parties have been before this Court. See Spivey v. First Commercial Bank, 681 So.2d 120 (Ala.1995) (Spivey I ), for a more complete understanding of the history of this litigation. In that opinion, we affirmed the judgment for First Commercial in part; however, we reversed that portion of the judgment based on a jury verdict for First Commercial, and we remanded the case for a new trial on the Spiveys' claims. Some of the facts and allegations pertinent to this appeal were summarized in that opinion as follows:
681 So.2d at 121-22. (Emphasis in original.)
Other evidence presented at the second trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Sheryl Spivey, indicated the following: The Spiveys used the available funds from their construction line of credit after being falsely told by a representative of First Commercial, Don Garvick, that the bank would take care of the apparent shortfall in construction funds caused by the disbursement of those funds to satisfy the business debts of Curt's Cars, Inc., and Curtis Spivey. In reliance on Garvick's representations that everything would be taken care of, the Spiveys renewed the note on May 20, 1991. The disbursement of funds from the Spiveys' construction line of credit to satisfy the business debts of Curt's Cars, Inc., and Curtis Spivey ultimately had an adverse impact on Curtis Spivey's automobile business, and it eventually led to the bank's foreclosure of the mortgage securing the May 20, 1991, note. Because of the reduction in their construction line of credit, the Spiveys were forced to divert money from Curtis Spivey's business in an attempt to weatherproof their partially constructed house before it was damaged. This led to the demise of the business and the loss of the Spiveys' primary source of income. The Spiveys eventually filed for bankruptcy protection; Curtis Spivey lost his business and both he and his wife lost their real property, including their old house, the new one under construction, and approximately 21 acres of land. During this period, the Spiveys were under pressure by creditors and Sheryl Spivey was required to go back to work to help support her husband and three children.
The following issues are presented by First Commercial in its appeal:
1) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to enter a judgment for First Commercial as a matter of law on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that First Commercial's actions proximately caused the damage claimed by Sheryl Spivey;
2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to enter a judgment for First Commercial as a matter of law on the ground that Sheryl Spivey had waived her claims for damages;
3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant First Commercial a new trial on the ground that after closing arguments additional verdict forms were prepared and submitted to the jury;
4) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to order a reduction of the $500,000 compensatory damages award;
5) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to order a reduction of the $500,000 punitive damages award.
The cross appeal involves a single issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Curtis Spivey's motion for a new trial on the ground that the court had improperly admitted evidence indicating that he had orally agreed with First Commercial to pay his business debts with the proceeds from the construction loan.
We will address these issues seriatim.
First Commercial contends, as to its first issue, that there was insufficient evidence of proximate cause to submit Sheryl Spivey's fraud claim to the jury. First Commercial argues that the Spiveys mismanaged their money and that that mismanagement, not any fraud on its part, was the proximate cause of the financial losses and emotional distress Sheryl Spivey claimed.
Proximate cause is an essential element of a fraud claim. City Realty, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 623 So.2d 1039 (Ala.1993). Therefore, it was necessary for Sheryl Spivey to present sufficient evidence to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that First Commercial's actions had proximately caused the financial losses and emotional distress she alleged. After carefully examining the record, we agree with First Commercial that there was considerable evidence suggesting that the Spiveys had mismanaged their personal finances and that the mismanagement may have contributed to their financial plight. However, the record also contains evidence, including the testimony of the Spiveys'...
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