Ne. Ohio Coalition for Homeless v. Sec'y of Ohio

• Decision Date: 30 August 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 11–3035,11–3036,11–3037.,s. 11–3035
• Citation: 695 F.3d 563
• Parties: NORTHEAST OHIO COALITION FOR the HOMELESS; Service Employees International Union, Local 1199, Plaintiffs–Appellees/Cross–Appellant, Kyle Wangler; Columbus Coalition for the Homeless, Plaintiffs, Ohio Democratic Party, Intervenor, v. SECRETARY OF State of OHIO, Defendant, State of Ohio, Intervenor–Appellant/Cross–Appellee. Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, Service Employees International Union, Local 1199, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Secretary of State of Ohio, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

695 F.3d 563

NORTHEAST OHIO COALITION FOR the HOMELESS; Service Employees International Union, Local 1199, Plaintiffs–Appellees/Cross–Appellant,

Kyle Wangler; Columbus Coalition for the Homeless, Plaintiffs,

Ohio Democratic Party, Intervenor,

v.SECRETARY OF State of OHIO, Defendant,State of Ohio, Intervenor–Appellant/Cross–Appellee.

Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, Service Employees International Union, Local 1199, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.Secretary of State of Ohio, Defendant–Appellant.

Nos. 11–3035, 11–3036, 11–3037.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: April 20, 2012.

Decided and Filed: Aug. 30, 2012.

ARGUED:Erick D. Gale, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant/Cross–Appellee. L. Bradfield Hughes, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees/Cross–Appellants. ON BRIEF:Erick D. Gale, Richard N. Coglianese, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant/Cross–Appellee in cases 11–3035/3036 and Appellant in 11–3037. L. Bradfield Hughes, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur LLP, Columbus, Ohio, Caroline H. Gentry, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, Dayton, Ohio, Subodh Chandra, The Chandra Law Firm, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, H. Ritchey Hollenbaugh, Carlile Patchen & Murphy LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees/Cross–Appellants in cases 11–3035/3036 and Appellees in 11–3037.

Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and ALARCÓN, Circuit Judges.^*

GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MOORE and ALARCÓN, JJ., joined. MOORE, J. (p. 577), also delivered a separate concurring opinion.

OPINION

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

In 2006, Plaintiffs-appellees/Cross-appellants Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (“NEOCH”) and Service Employees International Union, Local 1199 (“SEIU”) brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against then Ohio Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell challenging several provisions of Ohio's 2006 Voter ID law. The parties negotiated consent orders in 2006 and 2008. In 2009, NEOCH and SEIU filed a motion for attorneys' fees with respect to the 2008 orders, which the district court granted. The Ohio Secretary of State appealed the fee and cost award, and the parties ultimately negotiated a consent decree signed by the district court in April 2010. In June 2010, the plaintiffs filed another motion for attorneys' fees and costs, this time for work performed (1) regarding prior motions for attorneys' fees submitted in the litigation, (2) during the appeal of the award of attorneys' fees, and (3) negotiating the consent decree. The district court granted the motion in part, but because it found that the motion regarded a supplemental fee request, it reduced the fee award to three percent of the award granted in the main case pursuant to Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.1986).

On appeal, the State of Ohio and the Ohio Secretary of State argue that the 2010 consent decree was a settlement in full of all of the plaintiffs' claims, thus waiving any subsequent claim for further attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs cross-appeal, arguing that the district court erred in applying Coulter to limit their supplemental fee award. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

This appeal over an award of attorneys' fees stems from litigation over Ohio's voter identification laws, passed in 2006, which culminated in a consent decree entered into by the parties in 2010. Although the parties' appeal and cross-appeal focus on the consent decree and the district court's grant of the motion for attorneys' fees filed after the consent decree was entered, the parties' arguments are premised in part on an understanding of the factual and procedural background leading up to the consent decree.

In 2006, NEOCH and SEIU brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against then Ohio Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell in his official capacity seeking to have portions of the Ohio “new voter-identification laws” declared unconstitutional. On November 1, 2006, the parties entered into a consent order, which governed the November 2006 general election and provided specific guidance and clarification to County Boards of Elections regarding identification procedures. An enforcement order was entered on November 14, 2006, after it was discovered that some Board of Election employees failed to follow the provisions of the consent order.

On January 4, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920 for attorneys' fees and costs which were incurred in relation to the November 2006 consent order and the November 2006 enforcement order. Over the defendants' ¹ opposition, on September 30, 2008, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees pending a hearing to determine a reasonable fee award.

Prior to the November 2008 election, the plaintiffs sought leave to file a proposed supplemental complaint, citing concerns that the County Boards of Elections would continue to apply inconsistent standards to their evaluation of provisional ballots, and also requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the voter identification laws in the 2008 election. In order to settle the ongoing litigation, then Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner issued Directive 2008–101, which provided guidelines for Ohio's “boards of election in processing and counting provisional ballots.” By agreement of the parties, the district court issued an order on October 24, 2008, which adopted the directive. The court also issued an additional order on October 27, 2008, which addressed the effect of poll worker error on the counting of provisional ballots and instructions regarding acceptable addresses for persons without a permanent addresses.

On January 20, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their second motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The second motion requested fees and costs related to procuring the October 2008 orders as well as fees reasonably related to the orders. On July 28, 2009, the district court granted the second motion for attorneys' fees and costs and also awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs relating to the first motion for fees and costs. In total, the district court awarded $474,418.50 in attorneys' fees and $29,995.61 in costs and expenses.

The State of Ohio, as intervenor-defendant, appealed the award of attorneys' fees to this court. The parties subsequently began to work with the office of the circuit mediator in an effort to resolve the appeal.² The district court approved and entered a consent decree on April 19, 2010. The parties included the following explanation of the decree in the preamble:

The parties, desiring that this action be settled by an appropriate Consent Decree ... and without the burden of protracted litigation, agree to the jurisdiction of this Court over the parties and the subject matter of this action. Subject to this Court's approval of this Decree, and subject to the continuing validity of this Decree if it or its terms are challenged in any other court, the parties waive a hearing and findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues, and further agree to the entry of this Decree as final and binding among and between themselves as to the issues raised in the Plaintiffs' Complaint and Supplemental Complaint, and the matters resolved in this Decree.

This Decree, being entered with the consent of the parties, shall in no way constitute an adjudication or finding on the merits of Case No. 2:06–CV–896, nor be construed as an admission by the Defendants of any wrongdoing or violation of any applicable federal or state law or regulation.

In resolution of this action, the parties hereby AGREE to, and the Court expressly APPROVES, ENTERS, and ORDERS, the following....

The consent decree provided for general injunctive relief, including (1) the adoption of Directive 2008–80 issued by the Ohio Secretary of State as an order of the district court, and (2) the agreement that the Secretary of State would instruct the County Board of Elections to follow agreed-upon rules governing the casting and counting of provisional ballots for persons lacking identification other than a social security number. The consent decree further provided that the Secretary of State “shall issue a Directive to all Boards of Elections that sets forth the text of the injunctive relief described....” The consent decree also provided that it was to remain in effect until June 13, 2013, and that “[a]ny of the parties may file a motion with the Court to modify, extend or terminate this Decree for good cause shown.” Finally, the consent decree contained a “miscellaneous provision [ ]” where the parties agreed that within sixty days of the decree's entry the Secretary of State “shall pay to counsel for Plaintiffs the attorneys' fees that were previously awarded by this Court, as follows: $321,942.15.51 [ sic ] to Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, $99,722.58 to Carlile Patchen & Murphy LLP, and $82,749.38 to The Chandra Law Firm, LLC.”

On June 3, 2010, the plaintiffs filed their third motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The motion requested attorneys' fees and costs for (1) briefing and arguing the prior fees motions, (2) opposing and settling the appeal of the district court decision granting the prior motions, and (3) “negotiating the April 19, 2010 Consent Decree which terminated th[e] litigation.” The requested fees and costs covered work the attorneys engaged in between January 2009 and April 2010.

The defendants opposed the third motion for attorneys' fees and costs, arguing that the consent decree was final and binding as to the claims set forth in the complaint, and that as a result, the plaintiffs waived any opportunity to seek additional fees by entering into the consent decree. The defendants submitted affidavits from an attorney in the Secretary of State's office and an attorney in the Ohio Attorney General's Office who acted as client contact for the...