United States v. Castleman

Decision Date19 December 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–5912.,10–5912.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. James Alvin CASTLEMAN, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

695 F.3d 582

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
James Alvin CASTLEMAN, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 10–5912.

United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Sept. 19, 2012.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 19, 2012.
*


[695 F.3d 583]


ON BRIEF: Daniel T. French, United States Attorney's Office, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant.
Steven L. West, West & West, Attorneys, Huntingdon, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and MCKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.


CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MOORE, J., joined.
MOORE, J. (pp. 592–93), delivered a separate concurring opinion. McKEAGUE, J. (pp. 593–97), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

The government appeals orders granting Defendant James Castleman's motion to dismiss two counts of his indictment, which charged Castleman with possession of a firearm after conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and denying the government's motion for reconsideration. Because the district court correctly interpreted § 922(g)(9), we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2001, Castleman pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault in violation of Tennessee Code § 39–13–111(b). That statute makes a defendant

[695 F.3d 584]

liable for a misdemeanor if he “commits an assault as defined in § 39–13–111 against a domestic abuse victim.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39–13–111(b). Under § 39–13–101, a person is guilty of assault if he:

(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;

(2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or

(3) Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 39–13–101. Castleman's 2001 indictment asserted that he “did intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to [the mother of his child]” in violation of § 39–13–111(b), to which he pleaded guilty on July 16, 2001.


Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Under the Castlemans' scheme, Castleman's wife purchased firearms, allegedly lied on federal firearms paperwork by stating that she was the actual buyer of the firearms, and turned the firearms over to her husband, who was legally prohibited from purchasing firearms because of his domestic assault conviction. One of the firearms Castleman's wife allegedly purchased was recovered in a homicide investigation in Chicago, Illinois. An investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives led agents to the Castlemans.

A grand jury indicted Castleman on two counts of possession of a firearm after being “convicted ... of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Section 922(g)(9) states that:

It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (emphasis added). Section 921(a)(33)(A) of Title 18 defines a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to include any offense that:


(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and

(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim[.]

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (emphasis added).


On April 30, 2010, the district court dismissed the § 922(g)(9) counts in Castleman's indictment, reasoning that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction did not qualify as a domestic violence crime requiring the “use or attempted use of physical force” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Drawing upon cases from some of our sister circuits, the district court read § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) to require “force in the sense of violent contact” instead of merely “force as a scientific concept relating to the movement of matter.” (Order 5, R. 108.) In adopting that construction of § 922(g)(9), the district court rejected the construction adopted by other circuits and urged by the government, under which a

[695 F.3d 585]

domestic assault conviction resulting from “subtle and indirect uses of physical force” would permit liability under § 922(g)(9). (Gov't Br. 18.) Reasoning that Tennessee Code § 39–13–111(b)(1) would permit a conviction for assaultive conduct not involving physical contact, the court concluded that Castleman's conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of § 922(g)(9). The government moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied, and then timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Legal Framework

We review de novo a district court's decision of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). See United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 406 (6th Cir.2011). In order to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a § 922(g)(9) predicate offense, we apply the “categorical approach” from Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), in which we “look[ ] to the statutory definition of the offense and not the particular facts underlying the conviction.” United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir.2010); see United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674, 679 (10th Cir.2008). If a defendant can violate the statute in a manner that involves the use or attempted use of physical force and in a manner that does not, we “may consider the indictment, guilty plea, or similar documents to determine whether they necessarily establish the nature of the prior conviction.” Id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)).

II. Construction of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9)

Like other federal appellate courts that have applied § 922(g)(9) to prior state convictions, we must determine the degree of force necessary for a misdemeanor domestic battery offense to qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. See, e.g., Hays, 526 F.3d at 677–79;United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 13–18 (1st Cir.2001). The government argues that the district court incorrectly minimized the word “misdemeanor” in deciding whether Castleman's domestic assault conviction was “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under § 922(g)(9). The touchstone of the government's argument is that § 922(g)(9)'s reference to misdemeanor domestic violence crimes triggers § 922(g)(9) liability for a defendant convicted of any generic, common-law assault and battery offense that involves no more than slight physical touching. By the government's reckoning, Congress intended § 922(g)(9) to reach the typical common law assault or battery offense, which generally permits liability for causing bodily injury “by subtle and indirect uses of physical force.” (Gov't Br. 18.)

The government's argument is one of statutory interpretation. In construing § 922(g)(9), we seek Congress' intent and refer first to the statute's plain language. Chrysler Corp. v. C.I.R., 436 F.3d 644, 654 (6th Cir.2006); Herman v. Fabri–Centers of Amer., Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir.2002). We look to the statute's plain language with “the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 549 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S.Ct. 658, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985)). We presume every word or phrase in the statute has independent effect. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 537 (6th Cir.2004). If the statute is clear as

[695 F.3d 586]

written, the plain language is both our starting and ending point, making it unnecessary to delve into the statute's legislative history. United States v. Douglas, 634 F.3d 852, 858 (6th Cir.2011).

The government's argument is unpersuasive. It overlooks the nearly identical language of § 921(a)(33)(A) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 16(a) and 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) defines a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as a crime that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,” against a victim with whom the defendant shares a domestic relationship.1 Like § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), §§ 16(a) and 924(e)(2)(B)(i) use the phrase “physical force” to define “crime of violence” and “violent felony,” respectively. Section 16(a) defines a “crime of violence” in part as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” For its part, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) defines a “violent felony” in part as a crime “that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” By defining a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to require “the use or attempted use of physical force,” § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) drops the reference to “threatened use” from §§ 16(a) and 924(e)(2)(B)(i) but otherwise tracks the language of §§ 16(a) and 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The provisions' similarity supports the inference that Congress intended them to capture offenses criminalizing identical degrees of force.

That inference gains strength in light of the order in which Congress adopted the statutes. Congress adopted §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and 922(g)(9) over a decade after it codified the “use of physical...

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