Arsenault v. Crossman

• Decision Date: 05 May 1997
• Citation: 696 A.2d 418
• Parties: Heidi ARSENAULT, v. Richard CROSSMAN.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 418

696 A.2d 418

1997 ME 92

Heidi ARSENAULT, v. Richard CROSSMAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Feb. 6, 1997.

Reargued April 7, 1997.

Decided May 5, 1997.

Anthony K. Ferguson (orally) Roscoe H. Fales, Fales & Fales, P.A., Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Catherine R. Connors (orally) Jared S. des Rosiers, Portland, Roger J. O'Donnell, III, Platz & Thompson, P.A., Lewiston, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.

RUDMAN, Justice.

¶1 Richard Crossman appeals from the order of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Delahanty, J.) awarding him costs pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 68. ¹ On appeal, Crossman contends that the trial court erred by determining that the Rule allowed it to exercise discretion in reducing the amount of costs awarded. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

¶2 Heidi Arsenault brought suit against Richard Crossman seeking compensation for the injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. More than 10 days before trial, Crossman offered to allow judgment pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 68 in the amount of $10,000. Crossman's offer was not accepted. The matter proceeded to trial, and judgment was entered on a jury verdict in favor of Arsenault for $6,200.30, plus costs and interest.

¶3 Crossman filed a post-trial motion pursuant to Rule 68 to recover his costs from the date of his offer to the date of the judgment. He originally sought costs of $2,946.15 but later reduced his claim to $2,536.15. In response to Crossman's motion, Arsenault filed an affidavit asking the court to consider her lack of financial resources in making its award of costs. The court concluded that it had authority pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D (Supp.1996) ² to award less than Crossman had submitted as his bill of costs. It awarded him $304.89, the amount of the costs awarded Arsenault on her jury verdict. Crossman contends that the hardship provision of § 1502-D does not permit relief to one bearing the burden imposed by Rule 68. We disagree.

¶4 The Supreme Judicial Court in promulgating rules of civil procedure exercises its authority to enact measures that regulate court procedure. Your Homes, Inc. v. City of Portland, 285 A.2d 372, 374 (Me. 1972); 4 M.R.S.A. § 8 (1989). ³ If in the course of a proceeding to which the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable a procedural rule conflicts with a statute, the rule controls. M.R.Civ.P. 81(e). ⁴ Crossman argues that there is a conflict between Rule 68 and 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D because Rule 68 provides for the mandatory award of costs without permitting judicial discretion, while section 1502-D allows the court to reduce an award of costs. As a result of such conflict, Crossman suggests that the rule "trumps the statute." We conclude that Rule 68 and section 1502-D can be read together to avoid any conflict and thereby avoid the need to resort to Rule 81(e).

¶5 Our 112th Legislature adopted 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D as part of a larger restatement of the statutory scheme defining costs recoverable in civil actions.

The purpose of this bill is to clarify by law those costs which shall be allowed to people who win their suits in civil cases. In many cases people who have successfully sued do not get paid back for many out-of-pocket costs. For example, the costs of depositions alone can be substantial. This bill allows the courts to make the losing party pay some of these costs. The current law does not provide for recovery of filing fees, services of process fees, court reporter's fees or the expenses of discovery, such as for depositions. The current law is confusing as to the amounts allowed for travel expenses and attendance fees. This new bill gives discretion to the court to determine the amounts for travel, requires the winning party to apply to the court for costs and provides the opportunity for both parties to present oral and written argument. This new bill provides an escape valve in that the court may waive all or part of the costs in the interest of fairness.

L.D. 735, Statement of Fact (112th Leg.1985). ⁵

¶6 The proposed measure was, however, enacted by the legislature as three separate statutory sections, rather than the single section proposed by the legislative document. ⁶ Sections 1502-B, 1502-C, and 1502-D provide a means of determining the amount of money the party to whom costs have been awarded is entitled to receive. The Legislature clearly wanted to "clarify by law those costs which shall be allowed," and it has done so by enacting provisions in Title 14 that dictate what costs can be recovered. ⁷ Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 223 (Me.1981) ("The 'Statement of Fact' attached to the Act's legislative document is a proper and compelling aid to ascertaining the legislative purpose and intent.").

¶7 Crossman contends that § 1502-D's provision of discretion to the court to waive or reduce the imposition of costs if it will "cause a significant financial hardship" applies to an imposition of costs to the prevailing party pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 54(d), ⁸ but not to the party who rejects an offer of judgment pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 68 and later recovers at trial less than was offered. Crossman argues that while Rule 54(d) makes reference to both the statute and the rules that apply to costs, and states that costs are awarded "unless the court otherwise specifically directs," Rule 68 makes no mention of either the statute or discretion of the court, and thus neither applies. We reject this construction. When the language of a statute is ambiguous, we "look beyond the words of the statute to its history, the policy behind it, and other extrinsic aids to determine legislative intent." State v. Fournier, 617 A.2d 998, 1000 (Me.1992) (citations omitted). The Legislature clearly intended § 1502-B, § 1502-C, and § 1502-D ⁹ to be read together in calculating what costs are recoverable in civil actions. Sections 1502-B and 1502-C delineate those costs that are recoverable, and section 1502-D provides a procedure for the parties to request an evidentiary hearing into the reasonableness of a bill of costs and for a party facing financial hardship to request a waiver of all or part of an award of costs. ¹⁰ Crossman would have us interpret the Legislature as having intended that the party seeking an award of costs pursuant to Rule 68 would resort to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 1502-B and 1502-C to determine what costs as the offeror she could recover, but the party against whom the cost award is sought could not seek relief due to financial hardship under § 1502-D. Such a reading of the statutes clearly runs contrary to the obvious purpose which the legislature had in mind, which is that the three sections should be interpreted together to preserve their ability to operate in concert. Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals v. Warren, 492 A.2d 1259, 1263 (Me.1985).

¶8 Crossman argues that reading § 1502-D as allowing the court to exercise discretion in awarding costs under Rule 68 serves to weaken the rule. As we have stated, the purpose of Rule 68 "is to promote settlement and avoid protracted litigation." Fuller v. State, 490 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Me.1985). Our Legislature has, however, enacted a statutory scheme that defines what costs are recoverable in a civil action and provides the court with discretion to waive those costs if it determines that their imposition will impose a significant financial hardship. Those provisions, read in tandem with Rule 68, provide the court presented with a bill of costs from an offeror whose offer was rejected, and whose opponent later recovered less than was offered at trial, with the discretion to reduce or waive the award of costs. By its plain terms, rule 68 may be mandatory; however, costs are defined by §§ 1502-B, C and D, and section 1502-D grants to the court discretion in determining what costs it will award when faced with a party's severe financial hardship.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

WATHEN, C.J., and GLASSMAN and CLIFFORD, JJ., concur.

DANA, Justice, with whom ROBERTS and LIPEZ, Justices, join, dissenting.

¶9 I respectfully dissent. Rule 68 leaves the court no discretion to refuse to award the offeror costs based on the financial circumstances of the offeree, and 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D does not dictate a contrary result.

¶10 Rule 68 provides that "the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer" if the judgment obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the pretrial offer. The plain language of the rule makes an award of costs mandatory; the court has no discretion to excuse the offeree's obligation pursuant to the Rule. United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 92 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 944, 136 L.Ed.2d 833 (1997); Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1278 (6th Cir.1991); Johnston v. Penrod Drilling Co., 803 F.2d 867, 869 (5th Cir.1986); Ezelle v. Bauer Corp., 154 F.R.D. 149, 152 (S.D.Miss.1994); Adams v. Wolff, 110 F.R.D. 291, 293 (D.Nev.1986); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F.Supp. 110, 113 (N.D.Cal.1979); Dual v. Cleland, 79 F.R.D. 696, 697 (D.D.C.1978); Darragh Poultry & Livestock Equip. Co. v. Piney Creek Sales, Inc., 294 Ark. 427, 743 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1988); Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 723 P.2d 925, 931-32 (App.1986); Imperial Developers, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 518 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.Ct.App.1994). See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 354-55, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 1151, 67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981) (defendant cannot invoke the mandatory award of costs under Rule 68 by making sham or nominal offers because Rule 68 does not apply when plaintiff recovers nothing at trial).

¶11 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D does not alter the mandatory nature of Rule 68. The provision in section 1502-D that gives the court discretion to waive the award of costs if the court determines that the imposition of costs would "cause a significant financial...