Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 81-2141
| Citation | 696 F.2d 293 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-2141,81-2141 |
| Parties | 30 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 825, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,255, 8 Ed. Law Rep. 561 Carolyn F. PATTERSON, Appellee, v. GREENWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT 50, a body politic and corporate, and Henry T. Cole, Administrative Superintendent of School District 50, in his official capacity and personally, and the following named persons who are members of the Board of Trustees of Greenwood School District 50, each of them being made defendants in his or her respective official capacity as Board Members and personally; Mr. James McDonald; Mr. L.B. Adams, Jr.; Mr. Harold Lumley, Jr.; Dr. Travis Stevenson; and Mr. Jack McDowell, personally, who was a member of the Board in 1975, Appellants, and Mr. Richard Stowe; Mrs. Audrey Goodwin, and the following named persons who are now members of the board in their official capacity as Board Members, Mrs. Katherine Martin, Mr. Forest Parker, Defendants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
David W. Robinson, II, Columbia, S.C. (Robinson, McFadden, Moore & Pope, P.A. Columbia, S.C., Emory Smith, Washington, D.C., William K. Charles, Jr., Charles & Charles, Greenwood, S.C., on brief), for appellants.
James J. Brudney, Washington, D.C. (Michael H. Gottesman, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C., Richard Mark Gergel, Medlock & Gergel, Columbia, S.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge, and SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges.
The Greenwood School District 50 of Greenwood County, South Carolina ("School District"), was the defendant below and is the appellant here. The district court, adopting the findings and conclusions of a magistrate, held that the School District had discriminated against Mrs. Patterson, appellee, on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. The appellee was one of four persons interviewed for a position of assistant principal for one of the intermediate schools located in District 50, and the only male interviewed was selected. The district court awarded Mrs. Patterson back pay and promotion to the next available administrative position as recommended by the magistrate.
The School District appeals from that portion of the district court's judgment awarding appellee back pay and promotion. It continues to deny improper motivation, but does not appeal the ruling finding it guilty of sex discrimination. The appellant contends that assuming it did improperly discriminate on the basis of sex, the discrimination did not result in Mrs. Patterson's failure to be selected as assistant principal because the other females interviewed would have been chosen ahead of her. We agree and reverse that part of the district court's judgment awarding plaintiff promotion and back pay.
The sole male of four persons interviewed for the position of assistant principal at East End Intermediate School was unanimously recommended for appointment by interviewers consisting of five male School District superintendents. The School District Board of Trustees subsequently confirmed the selection. The magistrate concluded that the appellee was sexually discriminated against in the selection process as evinced by the following facts: (1) although the job vacancy announcement limited the position to persons with a Masters Degree in Administration and Supervision, the male applicant did not have such a degree at the time he was hired; (2) applicants were interviewed by an all-male panel; (3) the male applicant hired had significantly less teaching experience than the other applicants; (4) although the usual procedure was to consult an applicant's immediate supervisor, the supervisor of both plaintiff and the male candidate was never consulted. The supervisor testified that in his opinion, Mrs. Patterson was a more qualified administrator than the male hired; (5) the selection panel was searching for a candidate who fit a male stereotype. The district court adopted the magistrate's conclusion of sex discrimination.
Appellant contends that even absent sex discrimination in selecting the male assistant principal, the other two female candidates interviewed would have been appointed ahead of Mrs. Patterson. Three of the interviewers testified that they graded the plaintiff the lowest of the three women interviewed. A fourth interviewer testified that he would have selected another female candidate over Mrs. Patterson. Although appellee apparently had a good record of performing administrative duties, these interviewers testified that based on her answers to questions and on characteristics she exhibited during the interview--such as "nervousness," a "high-pitched voice," and an "over-domineering personality"--they believed the other women interviewed would work better with parents, teachers and students as an assistant principal. The evidence in the record also indicates that the other two females interviewed were equally qualified, if not more qualified than appellee. Mrs. Patterson had a Masters Degree in Administration and Supervision and seventeen years of teaching experience but had no previous experience as an assistant principal. Another female candidate also had a Masters Degree in Administration and Supervision, nine years of teaching experience, and was appointed to a different administrative position shortly after the interview. The third female applicant had her Masters Degree in Education and Administration, nine years of experience in education including serving as a school principal, and is presently working as a principal for one of the School District's elementary schools.
When a court finds that a plaintiff has been discriminated against in violation of Title VII, it retains broad remedial powers to grant injunctive relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 200 (4th Cir.1981). When retroactive promotion and back pay are sought, however, further questions must be asked. The statute makes it clear that these forms of relief are available only where the employee would have received the promotion had she not been the victim of discrimination. 1 The case law is also plain that the purpose of...
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...circumstances, § 706(g) confirms that a court could not order the union to admit the unqualified individual. Patterson v. Greenwood School District 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (CA4 1982); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-177 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 3145......
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