Exterior Siding and Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litigation (M.D.L. No. 454)., In re
| Decision Date | 29 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-1105,82-1105 |
| Citation | 696 F.2d 613 |
| Parties | 1982-83 Trade Cases 65,116 In re EXTERIOR SIDING AND ALUMINUM COIL ANTITRUST LITIGATION (M.D.L. NO. 454). Petition of ALSIDE, INC.; Alcan Aluminum Corporation; Aluminum Company of America; Bethlehem Steel Corporation; Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation and Kaiser Aluminum and Sales, Inc.; Mastic Corporation; Reynolds Metals Company; Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.; and United States Steel Corporation. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
See also 538 F.Supp. 45.
Eugene M. Warlich, Alan I. Silver, Elizabeth Hoene, Doherty, Rumble & Butler, St. Paul, Minn., for Alcan Aluminum Corp.
Gordon G. Busdicker, Wendy J. Wildung, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minn., for Aluminum Co. of America.
Leon R. Goodrich, Mark C. Peterson, Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly, St. Paul, Minn., for Alside, Inc.
Clay R. Moore, Mackall, Crounse & Moore, Minneapolis, Minn., Edwin P. Rome, Richard P. McElroy, Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, Philadelphia, Pa., for Bethlehem Steel Corp. and Mastic Corp.
Abraham N. Goldman, Jeffrey Slemmons, Chicago, Ill., John A. Cochrane, Stewart C. Loper, Cochrane & Bresnahan, St. Paul, Minn., Steven Ackerman, Chicago, Ill., for Hoyt Const. Co., Inc., Minnesota Exteriors, Inc., Western Builders, Inc., Lagar Const. Co., and Midwest Builders & Materials, Inc.
Before ROSS, ARNOLD and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners, defendants in the action below, seek a writ of mandamus, contending that the district court 1 improperly granted class certification to plaintiffs in this action.
Plaintiffs Hoyt Construction Company, Inc., and Minnesota Exteriors, Inc., originally filed an antitrust action against defendants Alside, Inc., et al., in the District of Minnesota in 1975. Plaintiffs alleged numerous antitrust violations, including conspiracies to monopolize the exterior siding and aluminum coil business. Plaintiffs attempted to have a class certified consisting of all parties who had purchased aluminum coil or exterior metal siding and related building products and accessories directly from defendants since the early 1970s. District Judge Donald Alsop, 2 to whom the case was assigned, denied class certification on August 24, 1978, in a comprehensive order in which he concluded that plaintiffs had failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3), Fed.R. of Civ.P. Plaintiffs then attempted to have a more narrowly defined class certified, but Judge Alsop refused on two occasions to reconsider his prior denial of class certification.
Subsequently on December 9, 1980, plaintiffs Western Builders, Inc. and Lagar Construction Company filed an action similar to the Hoyt case in the Northern District of California, and on December 22, 1980, plaintiffs Midwest Builders and Materials, Inc., filed another similar action in the Northern District of Illinois.
Defendants then moved to have the three cases centralized by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407, and requested that the consolidated action be assigned to the District of Minnesota for pretrial proceedings. Plaintiffs cross-moved for centralization of the actions, requesting that they be assigned either to the Northern District of California or to the Northern District of Illinois. The Multidistrict Litigation Panel found that the three actions involved common questions of fact, and that centralization in the District of Minnesota would best serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation. The Panel found that all three actions alleged similar antitrust violations and that overlapping class certifications had been sought in all three actions. The Panel assigned the California and Illinois actions to the District of Minnesota since the case there was the most advanced, 3 and designated Judge Charles R. Weiner, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to sit by designation in the District of Minnesota "for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings with the action already pending in that district."
After the actions were assigned to Judge Weiner, plaintiffs moved again for class certification. On August 3, 1981, Judge Weiner certified a class consisting of parties who had purchased aluminum coil or exterior aluminum siding and related building products and accessories directly from defendants since the early 1970's. Defendants subsequently moved to vacate Judge Weiner's class certification order or, in the alternative, to have the question certified for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). Judge Weiner refused to decertify the class, and further refused to certify for interlocutory appeal. Defendants have now petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Weiner to vacate his class certification order.
The only individual plaintiffs before Judge Alsop were Hoyt Construction and Minnesota Exteriors, both Minnesota corporations which installed aluminum siding in the residential market. Judge Alsop denied class certification in Hoyt because he found that Hoyt and Exteriors' claims were not typical of those of other members of the proposed class, which included groups as diverse as commercial and agricultural aluminum siding installers, aluminum siding manufacturers, and homeowners. Judge Alsop also found that plaintiffs Hoyt and Exteriors would not adequately represent the proposed class because their interests were not coextensive with the interests of the class, and because the interests of some class members were antagonistic to those of Hoyt and Exteriors. Judge Alsop also found that plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), concluding that common questions of law or fact did not predominate and that a class action was not a superior method of adjudicating the case since much of the evidence as to liability would relate to less than the entire proposed class and since some of the claims would require individualized proof as to liability, damages, or both.
The underlying facts did not change between the time Judge Alsop made his rulings in Hoyt and the time Judge Weiner certified a class in the consolidated cases. The California and Illinois plaintiffs made the same allegations as the Hoyt plaintiffs and sought overlapping class certification. During argument it was conceded that plaintiffs were in contact with each other before the filing of the new cases. Judge Weiner did not base his decision on changed circumstances. Rather, he stated that he simply "differed as to result" with Judge Alsop and that he was exercising his discretion to certify a class based on the facts before him.
The requirements for issuance of a writ of mandamus impose a substantial burden on the party seeking the writ. In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193, 196 (1980), the Supreme Court stated, "It is not disputed that the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." The Court stated:
[T]he writ of mandamus "has traditionally been used in the federal courts only 'to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.' " [quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 88 S.Ct. 269, 273, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967).] Only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.
Id. at 35, 101 S.Ct. at 190, 66 L.Ed.2d at 196.
A writ of mandamus will issue when a district court's actions have "so exceeded its discretion as to be a usurpation of power." Sperry Rand Corporation v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir.1977).
Although mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be used only in very unusual circumstances, this court has previously observed that it "remains available in those extraordinary instances when the district court, in granting the maintenance of a class action, has exceeded 'the sphere of its discretionary power.' " In Re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 518 F.2d 213, 216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 363, 46 L.Ed.2d 282 (1975). We conclude that, in this instance, Judge Weiner has so exceeded his discretion.
The class action certification issue was before Judge Alsop three times, and he denied class certification on all three occasions. His original order denying class certification is well-reasoned and detailed. After his initial denial of class certification, plaintiffs in Hoyt attempted to narrow their class certification definition to eliminate some of the problems which had concerned Judge Alsop. Even after the narrowing of their definition, however, Judge Alsop still found, in a second detailed opinion, that class certification requirements had not been met. He also denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion to alter and amend his class certification denial. The class definition which plaintiffs put before Judge Weiner was essentially identical to the one they had presented to Judge Alsop the first time. Thus, it was actually broader and less well defined than the second class certification definition which Judge Alsop had rejected as inadequate.
Class certification decisions are by their nature conditional and are subject to change. Id. at 215; Rule 23(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. However, Rule 23 does not contemplate that a judge should overrule a previous class certification decision without a sound basis. The Advisory Committee Notes on subsection (c)(1) state, "A determination once made can be altered or amended before the decision on the merits if, upon fuller development of the facts, the original determination appears unsound." This language contemplates that, although a Rule 23 ruling might be conditional, a judge will not alter a previous ruling unless a...
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