Martinez v. Carson

• Decision Date: 17 October 2012
• Docket Number: 11–2200.,Nos. 11–2095,s. 11–2095
• Parties: Phillip MARTINEZ; Ricardo Sarmiento, Plaintiffs–Appellants/Cross–Appellees, v. Gary CARSON; Don Mangin, in their individual capacities, Defendants–Appellees/Cross–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

697 F.3d 1252

Phillip MARTINEZ; Ricardo Sarmiento, Plaintiffs–Appellants/Cross–Appellees,

v.Gary CARSON; Don Mangin, in their individual capacities, Defendants–Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

Nos. 11–2095, 11–2200.

United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.

Oct. 17, 2012.

Paul J. Kennedy (Arne R. Leonard with him on the briefs) of Kennedy & Han, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiffs–Appellants/Cross–Appellees.

Lisa Entress Pullen (Anita M. Kelley with her on the briefs) of Civerolo, Gralow, Hill & Curtis, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants–Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

Before LUCERO, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

In these cross-appeals, the parties raise challenges to various rulings made by the district court in a § 1983 action arising out of an allegedly unlawful seizure.

The incident underlying this action began when Defendants Gary Carson and Don Mangin, employees of the New Mexico Department of Corrections, observed Plaintiffs Phillip Martinez and Ricardo Sarmiento sitting or standing with a third man in a low-lit area outside an apartment building in a high-crime neighborhood at night. Defendants, who had been patrolling the area as task force members with police officers from the Rio Rancho Department of Public Safety, pulled up to the apartment building in an unmarked police car and turned on the emergency lights. The third man fled into the apartment building when Defendants approached, and Rio Rancho police officer Lieutenant Camacho pursued him. Meanwhile, Defendants forced Plaintiffs to the ground, handcuffed them, drew weapons, and conducted a pat-down search. When additional Rio Rancho officers arrived on the scene a few minutes later, Defendants transferred Plaintiffs, still in handcuffs, into the custody of these officers. The Rio Rancho police officers eventually arrested and booked Plaintiffs, holding Mr. Martinez for twelve hours and Mr. Sarmiento for five hours before their release.

In their § 1983 action, Plaintiffs raised claims of unlawful seizure against several Rio Rancho police officers as well as the named Defendants in this appeal. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, with a corresponding stay of discovery until the district court resolved the qualified immunity issue. The magistrate judge granted the discovery stay. During the discovery stay, though, Plaintiffs conducted consensual interviews of the Rio Rancho defendants. Defendants argued these interviews were actually depositions held in violation of the stay order, and they therefore submitted a motion to strike and requested sanctions. The district court agreed Plaintiffs had violated the stay order and thus ordered the interview of Lt. Camacho to be stricken, ordered all motions citing the interview to be denied without prejudice, and ordered Plaintiffs to pay the cost of taking Lt. Camacho's deposition. The Rio Rancho defendants subsequently settled the claims against them and were dismissed from the action.

Defendants filed a third motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The district court denied both motions, citing multiple factual disputes. The court held that the pertinent question for the jury to decide was whether Defendants had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they detained Plaintiffs—if so, the brief seizure was warranted as an investigative detention responsive to officer safety concerns; if not, it was an illegal seizure. The court further held that Defendants could only be held liable for their own allegedly unlawful conduct, not for the actions of the Rio Rancho officers. The district court thereby limited Defendants' liability on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims to the first few minutes of the seizure.

In pre-trial motions in limine, based on its earlier summary judgment ruling, the district court granted Defendants' motion to exclude (1) evidence of Plaintiffs' arrests, (2) evidence concerning the existence of probable cause for those arrests, and (3) evidence of any events that occurred after Defendants transferred custody of Plaintiffs to the Rio Rancho defendants.

The case then proceeded to trial, where the jury found for Plaintiffs on their unlawful seizure claim, finding Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial seizure, and awarded Plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages totaling $5,000 each—$2,500 compensatory and $2,500 punitive. Plaintiffs now appeal the district court's orders limiting Defendants' liability to the first few minutes of the seizure, as well as its earlier discovery sanction. On cross-appeal, Defendants raise issues regarding (1) the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, (2) the district court's denial of their Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, (3) various evidentiary rulings the district court made at trial, and (4) the inclusion of a punitive damages jury instruction.

DISCUSSION

We begin with Plaintiffs' appellate claims. We first review the district court's holding that Defendants' liability for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment was limited to the first few minutes of the seizure as a matter of law. We review this legal determination de novo. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.1987).

The question before us is whether Defendants are liable only for the two-to-three-minute period Plaintiffs were in Defendants' custody, or whether Defendants share in responsibility for the entire custodial arrests. Defendants contend they should not be held liable because they did not personally participate in Plaintiffs' arrests. The district court held:

There is no evidence indicating that Defendants promoted, suggested, or indirectly caused or conspired with any Rio Rancho DPS personnel to violate Plaintiffs' rights. Neither is there any evidence to infer in the slightest that Defendants knew, or should have known, that Plaintiffs would be deprived of their rights by the Rio Rancho DPS officers or Lt. Camacho. Defendants took no part in the decision to further detain or charge Plaintiffs once they transferred them to the custody of the Rio Rancho police officers.... Defendants may only be held liable for their own unlawful conduct in this case.

(Appellants' App. at 837.) We disagree with this conclusion.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a government official who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen .... to the deprivation of any rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, “[a]nyone who ‘causes' any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable.” Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The requisite causal connection is satisfied if [Defendants] set in motion a series of events that [Defendants] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive [Plaintiffs] of [their] constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[s]ection [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); see also McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 438–39 (6th Cir.2005). Thus, Defendants are liable for the harm proximately caused by their conduct. Trask, 446 F.3d at 1046. In other words, they may be held liable if the further unlawful detention and arrest would not have occurred but for their conduct and if there were no unforeseeable intervening acts superseding their liability. Id. at 1046–47. “That conduct of other people may have concurrently caused the harm does not change the outcome as to [Defendants].” Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1220 (10th Cir.2006).

We conclude that a reasonable jury could find Defendants' conduct to be the proximate cause of at least some portion of Plaintiffs' prolonged detention following Defendants' transfer of custody to the Rio Rancho officers. The jury found that Defendants had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they forced Plaintiffs to lie on the ground, handcuffed them, and transferred them, still in handcuffs, to the custody of Rio Rancho police officers. We conclude that a reasonable jury could further find this initial illegal detention and transfer of custody was the but-for cause of Plaintiffs' further detention in Rio Rancho custody—a jury could reasonably find that Plaintiffs' arrests and prolonged detentions would not have occurred had Defendants not seized them and transferred them to the custody of Rio Rancho officers. Finally, we conclude that the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom could support a jury finding that Defendants knew or should have known their illegal seizure and transfer of custody would result in Plaintiffs' prolonged detention after the transfer of custody. Although Defendants may not have foreseen the full extent of the detention, a jury could certainly find that they foresaw at least some additional period of detention while, for instance, the Rio Rancho officers conducted an investigation into probable cause. The extent to which Defendants can be held liable for the further detention depends upon what they reasonably foresaw when they transferred Plaintiffs to police custody, and we conclude that this question is sufficiently disputed to require resolution by a jury.

We thus reverse the district court's summary judgment conclusion that Defendants could only be liable for the first few minutes of the seizure. On remand, the district court should conduct a second trial on the limited issue of whether (and to what extent) Defendants should have known their unlawful seizure of Plaintiffs would result in their prolonged detention in Rio Rancho custody and, if so, whether any additional damages are appropriate. See Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1255–58 (10th Cir.1999).

W...