United States v. Quinn

• Citation: 698 F.3d 651
• Decision Date: 18 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 12–2260.,12–2260.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Nicolai D. QUINN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

698 F.3d 651

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Nicolai D. QUINN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 12–2260.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 2, 2012.

Decided Oct. 18, 2012.

Timothy M. O'Shea (argued), Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Jerome F. Buting (argued), Attorney, Buting Williams & Stilling, Brookfield, WI, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge.

Nicolai Quinn pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), and was sentenced to 97 months' imprisonment. His plea agreement contains a promise not to appeal the conviction and length of imprisonment. But Quinn did not promise to refrain from appealing his sentence of supervised release. He contends that the district judge erred by sentencing him to supervision for life.

Both the Criminal Code and the Sentencing Guidelines authorize lifetime supervised release for violations of § 2252. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2). Moreover, the Sentencing Commission recommends “the statutory maximum term of supervised release” for every sex offense. See § 5D1.2(b) hanging paragraph. Yet although Quinn's sentence is within the Guidelines range and entitled to a presumption of substantive reasonableness, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir.2005), a judge still must consider a defendant's serious arguments for a sentence below the Sentencing Commission's recommendations. See, e.g., United States v. Villegas–Miranda, 579 F.3d 798 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir.2008).

Quinn asked the judge to choose a ten-year term of supervised release. He submitted a forensic psychologist's evaluation, which concluded that he has a lower-than-normal risk of recidivism. He also submitted the testimony that two psychologists (Michael Seto and Richard Wollert) recently had presented to the Sentencing Commission regarding the recidivism rate for persons convicted of child-pornography offenses. The judge discussed the forensic psychologist's evaluation briefly when explaining why he chose a sentence of 97 months, but he did not discuss Seto's or Wollert's views. Indeed, the district judge did not discuss either the length of supervision or the terms that Quinn would be required to follow while under supervision.

The prosecutor has confessed error, and we agree with the prosecutor's conclusion that a district judge must explain important decisions such as the one at issue here. On remand the judge should consider not only how Quinn's arguments about recidivism affect the appropriate length of supervised release, but also the interaction between the length and the terms of supervised release. The more onerous the terms, the shorter the period should be. One term of Quinn's supervised release prevents contact with most minors without advance approval. Quinn has a young child, whom he has never been accused of abusing. Putting the parent-child relationship under governmental supervision for long periods (under this judgment, until the son turns 18) requires strong...