Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters

• Decision Date: 07 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. 09-84-356,09-84-356
• Parties: TIDELANDS AUTOMOBILE CLUB, Appellant, v. Zibia WALTERS, Appellee. CV.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 939

699 S.W.2d 939

TIDELANDS AUTOMOBILE CLUB, Appellant, v. Zibia WALTERS, Appellee.

No. 09-84-356 CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Beaumont.

Nov. 7, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1985.

Fred Lewis, Houston, for appellant.

George Michael Jamail, Beaumont, for appellee.

OPINION

BURGESS, Justice.

This case involves the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Iva and Zibia Walters were members of the Tidelands Automobile Club. As part of Iva Walters' membership, a life insurance policy through Legal Security Life Insurance Company was issued in the amount of $2000.00 covering her life and naming her husband as beneficiary. Mrs. Walters was killed in a one vehicle accident on December 16, 1981.

Thereafter, a claim was filed to collect the proceeds of the policy. In connection with processing the claim, Tidelands requested information from a Justice of the Peace of Jefferson County concerning whether or not a blood test was made at the time of the autopsy of Mrs. Walter's body and if so, whether the test showed any traces of alcohol. ¹ In February, 1982, Judge Harold P. Engstrom responded in a letter informing Tidelands, that in the opinion of the Regional Crime laboratory, Mrs. Walters was not intoxicated.

In April, 1982, Mrs. Walters' daughter began to inquire why the claim had not been paid. Tidelands replied by sending the daughter a copy of a letter from Judge Engstrom wherein it stated Mrs. Walters was intoxicated. Upon receiving this letter, Mrs. Walters' daughter took the letter to Judge Engstrom and compared the two letters. A short time later, Mr. Walters was told of the reason the claim was being denied. According to Mr. Walters and his witnesses, the allegation that Mrs. Walters had been intoxicated caused him severe emotional distress. Mr. Walters then filed suit against Legal Security Life for payment of the policy benefits.

As the discovery process progressed, it became apparent someone had altered Judge Engstrom's original letter. Mr. Walters amended his petition bringing in Tidelands and seeking additional damages for severe emotional distress. Once Legal Security Life became aware that Mrs. Walters had not been intoxicated, they settled the insurance policy portion of the lawsuit. Mr. Walters continued with his claim against Tidelands for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

At the trial, representatives of Legal Security testified they had received Judge Engstrom's letter from Tidelands in the altered form. No one at Tidelands admitted to altering the letter, but, on the contrary, claimed to have sent the genuine letter to Legal Security. The court submitted the following special issues to the jury:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Tidelands Auto Club intentionally altered the letter of February 22, 1982, to read that Iva Walters was intoxicated?

Answer "We do" or "We do not".

Answer: "We Do"

"Intentionally" means the actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress or where he knows that such distress is substantially certain to result from his conduct.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 1 "We Do", and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the act of intentionally altering the letter by Tidelands Auto Club constituted extreme and outrageous conduct?

Answer "We do" or "We do not".

Answer: "We Do"

By the term emotional distress is meant any highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry. By severe is meant that the distress inflicted is so extreme that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it without undergoing unreasonable suffering.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 2 "We do", and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 3

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the altering of the letter by Tidelands Auto Club proximately caused Zibia Walters to suffer severe emotional distress.

Answer "We do", or "We do not".

Answer: "We Do"

By the term severe emotional distress is meant all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea. It is only where said emotional state is extreme that liability for severe emotional distress arises. By extreme is meant that the distress inflicted is so severe that not [sic] reasonable man could be expected to endure it without undergoing unreasonable suffering.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 4

Find from a preponderance of the evidence what sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Zibia Walters for his harm, if any, resulting from the occurrence in question.

ANSWER in dollars and cents, if any, with respect to the following element.

(A) His severe emotional distress which he has suffered, if any.

ANSWER: "$10,000"

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 5

Find from a preponderance of the evidence what sum of money, if any, should be assessed against Tidelands Auto Club as exemplary damages.

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as an example to others and as a penalty or by way of punishment, in addition to any amount you may have found as actual damages.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

Answer: "$40,000"

Based upon the jury's answers, the trial court entered judgment against Tidelands in the amount of $50,000.00. Tidelands brings this appeal setting forth five points of error. Point of error number one alleges that Texas does not recognize the doctrine of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Point of errors numbers two and three allege there was no evidence or insufficient evidence that Mr. Walters suffered severe emotional distress. Point of error number four alleges that the amount of damages for plaintiff's severe emotional distress was excessive. The final point of error alleges the jury's award of exemplary damages was not reasonably proportional to actual damages.

Appellant's argument regarding point of error number one is based solely on Harned v. E.Z. Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953). Appellant asserts that Harned holds that recovery for emotional distress or mental anguish cannot be had in the absence of other injury. Appellant further asserts that Harned has not been specifically overruled and thus this court of appeals is bound by the pronouncement of the Texas Supreme Court. Woodard v. Texas Department of Human Resources, 573 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1978, no writ); Jones v. Hutchison County, 615 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1981, no writ).

The case was pleaded, tried and presented to the jury as set forth by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sec. 46 (1965). The Restatement requires four elements for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. They are: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was "extreme and outrageous", (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe. We find no Texas cases which explicitly reject this tort.

Texas courts have, in the past, generally adopted and followed the Restatement's position. E.g., Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.1973); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.1967); Reddinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.1985). We find no cogent reason, in our jurisprudence, nor that of other jurisdictions, not to follow the Restatement in this instance.

As to appellant's argument that Harned, supra, precludes this court from recognizing this cause of action, we believe his reliance is misplaced. Harned was a case which dealt with mental anguish arising out of a debt collection. Harned held that the common law rule of not allowing damages for mental anguish absent physical injury would stand absent Legislative action to the contrary. Was Harned a narrow decision dealing solely with a cause of action based upon unreasonable debt collection practices? Was it a limited holding based upon the requirements that to recover for mental anguish there must be physical injury. Was it a general holding that specifically rejected section 46 of Restatement?

There is language in Harned which might lead one to reach any of the above suggested conclusions.

Duty v. General Finance Company, 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954), gives us insight into Harned. This too was a debt collection case. The court stated at 65:

"The majority opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is based on the conclusion that the case is ruled by our decision in Harned v. E-Z Finance Company, 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81, and that the language of that opinion clearly indicates that a cause of action was not alleged in this case. Petitioners do not attack that decision or call upon us to reconsider the question there decided. It is their position that, properly interpreted, the opinion in that case is no authority for denying them recovery in this case. We are in accord with their position. What was held in that case was that damages cannot be recovered for mental anguish alone, but the question of whether such damages may be recovered when there is also physical injury, injury to property, or other elements of actual damages was not before the court.... In the Harned case no question of damages for physical injury, loss of property or reputation was involved. Our opinion recognized that, had there been an allegation of physical harm, a different question would have been presented. In the instant case petitioners have alleged physical injury, loss of employment, and acts constituting, in effect, slander, as well as mental anguish. No authorities other than those cited in the Harned case, supra, need be cited in support of our conclusion that those allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action."

Thus in 1954, our Supreme Court...