Minnis, In re

Citation7 Cal.3d 639,498 P.2d 997,102 Cal.Rptr. 749
Decision Date21 July 1972
Docket NumberCr. 16127
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties, 498 P.2d 997 In re Norman Burke MINNIS on Habeas Corpus. In Bank

Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under appointment by Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Herbert L. Ashby, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Russell Iungerich, William R. Pounders and Nelson P. Kempsky, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

We issued an order to show cause in response to the application of Norman Burke Minnis for a writ of habeas corpus on allegations that the Adult Authority (Authority) abused its discretion when, after considering a statement filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.01 1 in which the district attorney set forth what petitioner claims are 'false opinions,' it not only fixed his sentence at maximum and denied him parole but also declared that future applications for fixing petitioner's term at less than maximum or for parole would not be considered. Additionally, petitioner contends that the procedures adopted by the Authority to implement its statutory powers of term-fixing and parole-granting violate the due process, double jeopardy, and equal protection provisions in the state and federal Constitutions and thereby render invalid those provisions of the California Penal Code commonly known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Although we reject petitioner's contentions based upon claims of constitutional infirmities, we agree that the Authority did abuse its discretion in the present case.

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of violating Health and Safety Code section 11911 (possession of restricted dangerous drugs for sale). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six months to three years and is now at the California Institution for Men at Chino.

Petitioner was committed to the Department of Corrections on May 1, 1970. In September of 1970 he appeared before a panel of the Authority for parole consideration and term-fixing. The Authority denied parole and fixed his term at maximum, adding the following order to the administrative form CDC--245 which announced its decision: 'No further consideration. Section 5077 PC complied with.' Complaints made by petitioner's wife to the Governor and other officials prompted the Authority's executive committee to review petitioner's case, but the executive committee affirmed the decision of the panel.

First, petitioner contends that although the Authority evaluated his application for parole in accordance with its usual procedures, it refused to fix his term at less than maximum or to grant him parole on the basis of a 'policy' that prisoners who have sold drugs or narcotics 'purely for profit' should be retained in prison for the maximum term permissible. He argues that the failure of the Authority to consider the individual circumstances of each prisoner, including his conduct in prison and his disposition toward reform, is contrary to the purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the parole system. It is urged, therefore, that the Authority abused its discretion by subsuming petitioner's case under a blanket rule.

To demonstrate that the Authority has adopted a policy of like treatment for a particular type of offender irrespective of other relevant circumstances, petitioner has submitted a copy of a letter written to his wife by a state assemblyman. The letter quotes the Authority's administrative officer as saying: 'The position of the Adult Authority has been that persons engaged in selling narcotics purely for profit should serve a full sentence.' Furthermore, the record supports an inference that petitioner's application did Not receive individualized consideration. He has not suffered any prior convictions. Before his arrest, he frequently participated in and assisted with charitable activities. Since his imprisonment, he has been retained in minimum security institutions. The record is devoid of any suggestion that he has been a disciplinary problem and the administrator of a prison camp where petitioner spent several months has stated that petitioner 'does have a lot to offer.' The existence of this favorable information indicates that the Authority may well have acted pursuant to a general policy and not upon individualized consideration.

'The Indeterminate Sentence Law . . . was enacted in 1917. It divests the trial judge of power to fix the term of imprisonment for offenses punishable by imprisonment in a state prison . . ..' 2 (2 Witkin, Cal.Crimes (1963) p. 941.) The length of time a male defendant will spend in prison or on parole is determined, within statutory limits, by the Authority. 3 (See 2 Cal.Criminal Law Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1969) p. 510.) The Authority has the power to fix and refix each prisoner's term. 4 The Authority also has the power to grant parole 5 after the inmate has been in prison for the statutorily specified minimum period. (See id. at p. 521.)

This court has explained that 'the purpose of the indeterminate sentence law, like other modern laws in relation to the administration of the criminal law, is to mitigate the punishment which would otherwise be imposed upon the offender. These laws place emphasis upon the reformation of the offender. They seek to make the punishment fit the criminal rather than the crime. They endeavor to put before the prisoner great incentive to well-doing in order that his will to do well should be strengthened and confirmed by the habit of well-doing.' (In re Lee (1918) 177 Cal. 690, 692, 171 P. 958; italics added. See also Williams v. New York (1949) 337 U.S. 241, 247--248, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337.) 'In the general field of criminal law the Legislature has abandoned the ancient notion of categorical punishment, the infliction of fixed terms for certain crimes, and substituted the indeterminate sentence, leaving to the Adult Authority the judgment of the period of incarceration. The Authority does not fix that period pursuant to a formula of punishment, but in accordance with the adjustment and social rehabilitation of the individual analyzed as a human composite of intellectual, emotional and genetic factors.' (People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 642--643, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 207, 388 P.2d 33, 39; italics added; fns. omitted.)

We have similarly stated that '(t)he purpose and object of a parole system is to mitigate the rigor of the old (penitentiary system) and . . . to provide a more humane management and prison discipline under which there is extended to those who may show a disposition to reform and whose reformation may reasonably be expected, a hope and prospect of liberation from the prison walls under the restrictions and conditions of a parole. . . . (T)he interests of society require that under prison discipline every effort should be made to produce a reformation of the prisoner . . .. (T)he legislative policy (was to provide a system whereby) a hope was to be held out to prisoners that through good conduct in prison and a disposition shown toward reformation, they might be permitted a conditional liberty upon restraint under which they might be again restored to society . . ..' (Roberts v. Duffy (1914) 167 Cal. 629 634, 140 P. 260, 261--262; see also People v. Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d 631, 642--643, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, fn. 9; People v. Denne (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507--508, 297 P.2d 451.) The goals of the parole system can best be achieved by 'the liberation of a prisoner on parole at the earliest period when permitted by law and when On consideration of the merits of each individual case, parole ought, in the judgment of the board, to be granted.' (Roberts v. Duffy, supra, 167 Cal. at p. 637, 140 P. at p. 263; italics added.)

Many factors are to be considered by the Authority in deciding whether to fix a sentence at less than maximum and whether to grant parole. Although good conduct while incarcerated and potential for reform are not the only relevant factors, 6 this court has acknowledged their significance. (In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300, 57 Cal.Rptr. 600, 425 P.2d 200; Roberts v. Duffy, supra, 167 Cal. 629, 640, 140 P. 260.) Furthermore, the Authority has declared that these factors are among those of 'paramount importance.' (Cal.Adult Authority, Principles, Policies and Program (1952) pp. 8--9; see also Adult Authority Policy Statement No. 11 (June 27, 1966).) Any official or board vested with discretion is under an obligation to consider all relevant factors (cf. People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 338--339, 1 Cal.Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116), and the Authority cannot, consistently with its obligation, ignore postconviction factors unless directed to do so by the Legislature.

A policy that all prisoners who have sold narcotics purely for profit should be retained in prison for the maximum period permitted under the Indeterminate Sentence Law completely disregards the individual prisoner's conduct in prison and his disposition toward reform. If the Authority has in fact adopted such a policy, alteration of the term of imprisonment cannot be used to reward a prisoner for good behavior or to punish him for improper behavior. Neither can it be used to encourage participation in rehabilitative programs designed to prepare an inmate for his return to the outside world. (See, Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the Neal Doctrine (1970) 58 Cal.L.Rev. 357, 382.) If every offender in a like legal category receives identical punishment, prisoners do not receive individualized consideration. Such a policy violates the spirit and frustrates the purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the parole system. 7

This court has traditionally accepted its responsibility to prevent an authority vested with discretion from implementing a policy which would defeat the legislative motive for enacting a system of laws. In the case of...

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  • Fain, In re
    • United States
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    ...declaring that in-prison conduct and potential for rehabilitation were of ' "paramount importance." ' (In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 645, 102 Cal.Rptr. 749, 498 P.2d 997.) Most recently, the court has observed: '[The parole] power enables the Authority to give recognition to a prisoner'......
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