People v. Machupa

• Decision Date: 25 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. S032885,S032885
• Citation: 872 P.2d 114,7 Cal.4th 614,29 Cal.Rptr.2d 775
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 872 P.2d 114, 62 USLW 2719 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daniel Neil MACHUPA, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 775

29 Cal.Rptr.2d 775

7 Cal.4th 614, 872 P.2d 114, 62 USLW 2719

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daniel Neil MACHUPA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S032885.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

April 25, 1994.

[7 Cal.4th 616] Kieran D.C. Manjarrez, Oakland, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

John T. Phillipsborn, Lewis A. Wenzell, San Diego, James McWilliams, Oakland, and Barbara B. Fargo, San Jose, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Brady, Stan M. Helfman and Michael E. Banister, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

ARABIAN, Justice.

We granted review to decide whether the so-called "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (hereafter Leon ), applies to a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a residence by police officers and the seizure of evidence that forms the basis for the subsequent issuance of a search warrant. In the metonymic language of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the question before us might be phrased as the extent to which the "good faith" exception extends to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

In Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, the high court modified the exclusionary rule "so as not to bar [subject to four exceptions] the use ... of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." (Id. at p. 900, 104 S.Ct. at 3409, italics added.) As will appear, our Court of Appeal--in line with the great majority of the federal circuit courts--has uniformly declined to cure the taint of warrantless searches and seizures by applying the Leon exception to the magistrate's subsequent issuance of a warrant, a result we approve. We thus agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that the "good faith" exception of Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, does not validate the search at issue here, and affirm the judgment of that court, although for reasons substantially different from those relied on by the Court of Appeal.

I

A

On the afternoon of October 22, 1990, Deputy Frank Battles and Sergeant Dale Morrison of the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office were directed to investigate a reported shooting in the 5600 block of San Pablo Dam Road in El Sobrante. The officers drove separately to that location, where they found a man with a gunshot wound sitting on the sidewalk at 5591 San Pablo Dam Road. Witnesses at the scene told the officers that the driver of a white Cadillac parked in a common driveway shared by several houses in the 5600 block had argued with the victim around the time of the shooting and had then driven off. The officers found a trail of blood leading from the wounded man to the common driveway.

As part of his investigation of the shooting, Battles began canvassing the houses sharing the driveway. Defendant answered the door to the house at number 5611; Battles identified himself and his purpose. Defendant said that he had been sleeping and had heard nothing; he did not recognize the name of the shooting victim. Battles returned to the shooting victim where he was joined by Sergeant Morrison.

Shortly afterward, defendant approached the officers, who were still at the scene of the shooting. Battles mentioned that two .32-caliber shell casings had been found at the site and asked defendant if he had any weapons. Defendant replied that he owned two guns and that neither was a .32-caliber. The officers asked to see the guns; defendant replied that he would get them from his house. As Deputy Battles later related in his testimony at the preliminary hearing, because the officers were investigating a shooting, Sergeant Morrison told defendant "to hang on a second and explained to him that since we were dealing with a shooting, we really didn't trust him to go inside and bring the gun back out by himself. And that we wished to accompany him into the residence while he picked up the gun for our own safety."

According to Battles, defendant responded "I guess," and entered the house, followed by the two deputies. Inside, defendant retrieved a .45-caliber Colt handgun and a shotgun from the bedroom and handed the weapons to the officers. While standing in defendant's bedroom, Battles saw on the bedside table a small plastic bag containing what appeared to be marijuana. Battles asked defendant for permission to look through the rest of the house to ensure that no one else was present. Defendant agreed. Morrison entered an adjacent room and saw within a substantial quantity of marijuana in plain view. The officers then arrested defendant and secured the house by posting a uniformed officer inside.

That evening, Detective Robert Hansen of the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office applied to a magistrate for a warrant to search defendant's house for marijuana and other evidence of drugs. His affidavit in support of the warrant application summarized the facts of the shooting investigation and the discovery of the marijuana in defendant's house as related to him by Battles and Morrison over the telephone. Because it is a key element in the government's claim that the "good faith" ¹ exception to the exclusionary rule applies here to validate Detective Hansen's subsequent warranted search of defendant's residence and the seizure of evidence therein, we summarize the contents of his five-page, handwritten affidavit.

As recited on the first page of Hansen's affidavit, Sergeant "Morrison said he was invited into [defendant's] residence along with Battles as [defendant] agreed to retrieve his two guns." (Italics added.) After describing seeing the baggie of marijuana in A magistrate issued the requested search warrant that evening and Hanson executed it that night. His search of defendant's residence turned up additional quantities of marijuana and other evidence of drug possession, on the strength of which defendant was charged with possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11359) and possession of cocaine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350; Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (a)).

                [872 P.2d 116] plain view in defendant's bedroom and a greater quantity in the study, Hansen's affidavit provided a more detailed account of the circumstances leading up to the entry into the house, including the following:  "In the course of questioning [defendant,] Battles asked 'Do you have any weapons.  When [defendant] replied 'Yes, two,' Battles asked, 'May we see them.'  [Defendant] replied, 'I'll get them.'   Battles then said to [defendant] that he and Morrison would have to go with him.   Battles said he and Morrison followed [defendant] into the house without any protest from [defendant]."  (Italics added.)   Hanson's affidavit closed with an account of the postarrest procedures the officers followed and of Battles's police training and experience
                

B

At the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized under the search warrant on the ground that the initial entry by Deputy Battles and Morrison was made without his consent and that the evidence seized in the subsequent warrant search was tainted because it was the product of the original unconsented entry. As relevant here, in support of his suppression motion, defendant claimed that as he walked back to his house to retrieve his two guns, "the deputies followed me. They were standing behind me on the porch when I opened the door. As soon as I walked in they followed me in and said something to the effect of, 'We can't let you go in there alone, there might be another body or another person in here.' ... I did not invite the deputies into my home. Neither deputy asked if they could come in my home. I never gave the deputies permission to enter my home."

After hearing testimony and argument on the suppression motion, the municipal court judge found that "there has been a discrepancy in testimony as ... to what exactly took place..... [T]he defendant [went] ... up to the officers and the officers apparently asked him if he had any weapons ... And that's when we get back to the house. We have some conflict as to what exactly took place. In the best scenario from [the prosecution's] standpoint, ... it was that he opened the door with the officers right there and walkedin. And they walked in after him with the understanding apparently there was implied consent. I'm going in. We're all going in. It's understood we're all going in. That of course is contradicted by ... the declaration of the defendant which was not controverted, or he says it somewhat differently. So, what I'm left with is whether or not that conduct, if believed, is sufficient to warrant implied consent.... So, the court finds that the consent wasn't any good."

The magistrate then turned to the prosecution's claim that the exception announced in Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, applied to validate the search under the warrant. He thought that "this is the type of case Leon was contemplating. I think the officers understood the theory on which they were trying to go in. They were trying to go in on a consent search. They put information into an affidavit [which], if believed, would have been a consent search. Looking at it now having heard the testimony of the officers, the declaration from [defendant], this court's ruling now finds that it was insufficient. But I cannot say that the officers were in any way acting in bad faith.... [T]here is clearly sufficient information in the affidavit if believed that would have allowed this magistrate to find that there was no material misrepresentation. So, the court upholds the warrant under the Leon doctrine." The superior court subsequently...