Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc.
Decision Date | 26 November 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-3781,92-3781 |
Citation | 7 F.3d 795 |
Parties | 68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 245, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,611 Langston BRADLEY, Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervenor-Appellant, v. PIZZACO OF NEBRASKA, INC., doing business as Domino's Pizza; Domino's Pizza, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Samuel Alan Morcosson, Washington, DC (Donald R. Livingston, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Vincent J. Blackwood and Samuel A. Norcosson, on the brief), for intervenor-appellant.
Soren J. Jensen, Omaha, NE (Soren S. Jensen and James C. Zalewski, on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
This appeal requires us to decide whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. III 1991), applies to a case that was pending at the time of its effective date, where the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") is the only remaining plaintiff and seeks relief only in the form of an order requiring the employer prospectively to recognize a narrowly limited medical exception to the employer's no-beard policy.
The EEOC appeals a judgment entered in favor of defendants Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., and Domino's Pizza, Inc. (collectively "Domino's"). This action arose out of a Title VII employment discrimination claim brought by Langston Bradley, a former Domino's delivery man. Bradley alleged that Domino's discriminated against him on the basis of race when it fired him for failure to appear clean-shaven in compliance with the company's no-beard policy. The no-beard policy is established nationwide by Pizzaco's franchisor, Domino's Pizza, Inc. Bradley alleged that he suffered from pseudofolliculitis barbae ("PFB"), a skin condition affecting approximately fifty percent of African American males, half of which number cannot shave at all. Bradley claimed that the no-beard policy deprived him and other African American males suffering from PFB of equal employment opportunities in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
After a trial of the entire case, including the question of Domino's business justification for its strict no-beard policy, the District Court ruled in favor of Domino's, finding that Bradley and the EEOC failed to show the no-beard policy has a disparate impact on African American males. The court's opinion did not reach the business justification issue. On appeal, in Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610 (8th Cir.1991) (Pizzaco I ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 933, 117 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992), we reversed the District Court's finding of no disparate impact. We held that the evidence presented by the EEOC clearly established a prima facie case of disparate impact on African American males and that the District Court erred in finding otherwise. Pizzaco I, 939 F.2d at 613. We affirmed the District Court's finding that Bradley suffers only a mild case of PFB and can appear clean-shaven as not clearly erroneous. Bradley thus was not entitled to relief and is no longer a party to the litigation. Because the EEOC sought injunctive relief, however, we remanded with directions that the District Court rule on the issue of business justification.
On remand, the District Court analyzed the trial record in light of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), and found for Domino's on the question of business justification. Accordingly, the court denied relief to the EEOC and this appeal followed. We reverse and remand for entry of the injunction sought by the EEOC.
The EEOC contends that because it seeks relief from Domino's ongoing, presently in-place no-beard policy, the 1991 Act governs this case. All that it seeks, the EEOC points out, is the prospective application of the 1991 Act to enjoin a current policy.
It is settled in this Circuit that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retrospectively to actions pending at the time of its enactment. Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (8th Cir.1992) ( ); Hughes v. Matthews, 986 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir.1992) ( ); Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 982 F.2d 295, 299 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc) ( ), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1993) (No. 92-1538). We conclude, however, that Fray and the other cases proscribing retroactivity do not restrict us from granting the relief sought by the EEOC in this case. Here, the EEOC seeks to enjoin a current, ongoing policy. The EEOC does not seek relief in any form for actions Domino's took or policy it maintained prior to November 21, 1991, the effective date of the 1991 Act. The posture of the case is exactly as it would be had the EEOC filed its action against Domino's after the effective date of the 1991 Act. Thus, application of the 1991 Act to the facts in this case is purely prospective, and we hold that the 1991 Act governs the case.
The EEOC contends that, on remand following Pizzaco I, the District Court erred by applying the Wards Cove standard to determine the business justification issue. We agree. In the circumstances of this case, Wards Cove was not the applicable legal standard. The relief sought here is prospective only, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 became effective on November 21, 1991, after we remanded for consideration of the business justification issue but long before the District Court's decision on remand was filed on August 19, 1992. The 1991 Act expressly reinstated the law of "business justification" as it existed before Wards Cove was decided. The 1991 Act states in its preamble that it is meant "to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, Sec. 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (citations omitted). Thus, as urged by the EEOC, we hold that the District Court should have applied the standard of proof first enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), and reinstated by the 1991 Act.
The 1991 Act returned the burden of persuasion regarding business justification to the defendant employer. Under Wards Cove, after the plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the defendant employer bore the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate business justification in defense of the challenged policy. The burden of persuasion, however, remained on the plaintiff. Under the Griggs standard, the burden is on the defendant employer to prove both a "compelling need" for the challenged policy, and the lack of an effective alternative policy that would not produce a similar disparate impact. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir.1983) (quoting Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n. 6 (8th Cir.1980) (emphasis omitted)).
Domino's has had its day in court on the business justification issue. Wards Cove was not decided until after the Pizzaco I trial. Griggs was the governing standard at the time of trial and the standard enunciated in Wards Cove was not applied to this case until the District Court did so on remand. Domino's thus had a full and fair opportunity at trial to meet its burden of proof for a business justification defense under the Griggs standard. Accordingly, there is no reason to require a new evidentiary hearing on the business justification issue, as the issue properly can be decided on the existing trial record.
The EEOC contends that the record conclusively demonstrates that Domino's has failed to show business justification under Griggs for its inflexible no-beard policy and that we need not remand to the District Court for a determination of that issue. We agree. Though ordinarily we would leave to the trial court the task of applying, in the first instance, the correct legal standard to the facts of the case, there are times when considerations of judicial efficiency call for a different approach. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 621, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1027, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508, 71 S.Ct. 470, 472, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951) ( ); Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir.) ("there are occasions ... where reviewing courts resolve issues normally decided by lower courts in order to bring protracted litigation to a close" ), that cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987). The approach taken in such cases is, as Justice Holmes observed, "a concession to the shortness of life." Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 28, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887), quoted in Eastway, 821 F.2d at 124.
The instant case is one in which the interests of judicial efficiency weigh heavily in favor of resolving the business justification issue here and terminating the litigation now. This case dates back over six years...
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