Leatherberry v. Odell

• Decision Date: 01 January 1880
• Parties: LEATHERBERRY v. ODELL, RAGAN & CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

7 F. 641

LEATHERBERRY v. ODELL, RAGAN & CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. North Carolina.

1880

Ruffin Pannill & King, for plaintiff.

Montgomery & Staples, for defendants.

DICK D.J.

(charging jury.) From the large number of ladies and gentlemen who have been in attendance on the court during the progress of this trial, it is evident that this case has excited considerable public interest. The trial has consumed much time, but not more than was necessary to develop the merits of the case. The testimony, in many particulars, is various and contradictory, but the counsel in their arguments have shown consummate skill in marshalling and arraying on both sides the mass of conflicting evidence in as lucid a manner as was possible.

I will not attempt to rehearse the evidence, as my notes are not full, and I would have to depend upon my memory. Under such circumstances, if I were to attempt to repeat the evidence, I would naturally arrange and present it in the order in which it has operated upon my mind, and I would thus unintentionally, indicate my opinion, and in some degree influence your verdict. I desire to leave all questions of fact to your determination, unbiased by any intimations of the court. As the counsel in their arguments have so ably and elaborately presented the rights of their clients, I hope you will be able to arrive at correct conclusions, and render a just verdict. The principles of law involved in this controversy are plain and simple, are founded in reason and justice, and are well established by adjudications in the courts.

The plaintiff alleges that she entered into a special contract with the defendants to serve them as a superintendent, and as a cutter and fitter, in a ladies' dress-making establishment in the city of Greensboro, for the term of one year at the sum of $600, payable in monthly instalments of $50; and the defendants engaged also to pay for her board lodging, and washing, and her traveling expenses to and from Baltimore, and her traveling expenses to be incurred in two visits to her home during the year of her employment; and the defendants, without any sufficient cause, dismissed her from their employment at the end of three months.

In the complaint there is no common count for work and labor performed, and it is conceded that she received payment for services performed, for board and washing for three months, and also her traveling expenses from Baltimore.

It is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of testimony the material allegations in her complaint which are denied in the answer. If she has proved to your satisfaction that she entered into a contract with the defendants to serve them one year upon the terms set forth in her complaint, and that she was able, ready, and willing to perform her part of the contract, then, nothing else appearing, she would be entitled to recover the amount she would have received had she remained in the employment of the defendants, to-wit: The wages for nine months, at $50 per month; her board and washing for nine months, at $22 per month; and her traveling expenses ($17) in returning to Baltimore. She is not entitled to recover the amount which would have been expended in her two promised and anticipated visits to her home during the year of service.

On the other hand, if the plaintiff has failed in making out her case, or if the defendants have satisfied you, by testimony, that no such special contract as that alleged by the plaintiff was entered into by them, but the contract with the plaintiff was for her services only so long as such services were satisfactory to them, then that finding would determine the case, as the plaintiff can only recover upon the special contract alleged in her complaint.

And, again, if you find that there was a special contract as alleged, and the defendants have satisfied you by the evidence that they had good and sufficient cause to discharge the plaintiff from their employment before the expiration of the term of service, then you should find a verdict for the defendants, as they were bound by their contract to keep the plaintiff in their employment only so long as she properly performed her part of the said contract.

What constitutes sufficient cause for avoiding a special contract of service is a mixed question of law and fact. The court must inform the jury what statements in the testimony, if ascertained by the jury to be facts, will or will not constitute sufficient cause of dismissal from service, and I will now proceed to perform this part of my duty.

The plaintiff alleges that she entered into the service of the defendants as a superintendent of a ladies' dress-making establishment, and as a cutter and fitter of ladies' dresses. Now, if you should find that she was unskilful and wanting in the taste usual in such employment, or that she was not faithful and diligent in her duties, then the court charges you that there was sufficient cause for her dismissal from the services of the defendants; for there was an implied contract on her part that she was competent to discharge the duties for which she was employed, and...