Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Snyder
| Decision Date | 12 June 1886 |
| Citation | 7 N.E. 604,117 Ill. 376 |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO. and anotherv.SNYDER, Adm'x, etc. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from appellate court, First district.
This was an action brought by Mary A. Snyder, administratrix of the estate of John H. Snyder, deceased, against the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Company, to recover damages caused by the death of her husband, who was killed on the seventh day of October, 1882, by a collision of two trains of said defendants at a crossing near Western avenue, in Chicago. It is averred, in substance, in the declaration, that the two defendants are corporations owning and operating lines of railroads that cross and intersect each other at grade in the city of Chicago; that said companies maintained at such crossing a joint agent, who was in the joint employment of both companies, whose duty it was to regulate, direct, and control the passing of all locomotive engines and cars over said crossing, so as to prevent accidents, by means of certain signals, well understood by and known to all the agents and employes of said companies, and that it was the duty of such employes to observe the signals; that John H. Snyder was a conductor in the employ of the Chicago & Northwestern Company, having the charge of a certain locomotive engine, and car thereto attached, belonging to said last-named company; that, at the time of the alleged injury, Snyder was in charge of and upon a certain train of cars and engine, and that he, and those engaged with him in the management of said train, were in the exercise of due care and diligence, observing the proper signals made by the joint agent or employe at said crossing, directing the said Snyder, as such conductor, to approach and pass over the said crossing with his said train of cars, and that, after Snyder had approached within so short distance of said crossing that it was impossible to stop his engine, the said joint agent, without due care, reversed or changed his signal, thereby directing a locomotive engine, and train of cars thereto attached, belonging to the said Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Company, to pass over said crossing, and that in consequence of such signal said trains collided at said crossing, causing the injury to and death of said Snyder. In the second count it is averred that Torrence, the joint agent of the defendants, so carelessly, negligently, and improperly operated and controlled the semaphore, and the engine and car of the Northwestern Company, and the train of the St. Paul Company, that without the fault or negligence of Snyder, or those under his direction, there was a collision, by which Snyder was killed. To the declaration the defendants pleaded the general issue, and on a trial of the cause in the superior court of Cook county the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $5,000, which, on appeal, was affirmed in the appellate court.
No question has been raised in regard to the decision of the court in the admission or exclusion of evidence; but it is claimed that the court erred in giving plaintiff's third instruction, and in refusing instructions Nos. 2, 4, and 5 asked in behalf of the St. Paul Company, and instruction No. 6 asked by the Northwestern Company.
The third instruction given for the plaintiff was as follows:
‘(3) The jury are instructed that if they find from the evidence that John H. Snyder, the deceased, was injured by a collision of the cars of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Company and the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, the defendants in this case, at the crossing of the railroad tracks of the said companies in the city of Chicago, on or about the seventh day of October, A. D. 1882, and that by reason of such injuries he, the said John H. Snyder, afterwards, on the same day, died; and if the jury further find from the evidence that said collision occurred solely by reason of the gross negligence of one H. E. Torrence in and about the management and operating of the semaphore, or signal light, at or near said crossing, and that, at the time of such collision and injury, he, the said H. E. Torrence, was in the joint employment of the two defendant companies in and about the management and operation of said semaphore or signal lights; and if the jury further find from the evidence that, at the time of such collision and injury, the said John H. Snyder was a conductor in the employ of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, one of the defendants, having the control and management of the way car and engine of said last-named company in question, and was at the time aforesaid exercising due and proper care, caution, and diligence, as such conductor, in and about the control and management of said way car and engine, and for his own personal safety, and that at and before the time of said collision and injury the said John H. Snyder and H. E. Torrence were employed in different departments of labor, wholly disconnected with each other, and were not associated with each other in the performance of their respective employment, and could have no control over or influence upon the conduct of each other; and if the jury further find from the evidence that the said John H. Snyder left surviving him a widow, who is still living, and that such widow was pecuniarily injured by reason of the death of the said John H. Snyder, as aforesaid, and that such widow is the plaintiff herein, and was, at the time of the commencement of this suit, the administratrix of the estate of the said John H. Snyder, deceased,-then the jury should find both of the defendants guilty, and should give to the plaintiff such damages as, from the evidence, the jury shall deem a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury, if any, resulting from such death to the said widow, not exceeding the sum of $5,000.’
Several objections have been made to this instruction.
First, that it assumes as true the negligence of Torrence. If the instruction was liable to the objection urged, it would certainly be erroneous, because it was for the jury to determine from the evidence who had been guilty of negligence, and it was not within the province of the court to direct the jury, in the instructions, that any person was negligent, or assume as a fact in the instructions the negligence of Torrence, or any of the parties alleged to be responsible for the accident. That the collision of the trains resulting in the death of Snyder occurred through the negligence of some one was a fact over which there was no controversy. It was...
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