Kaplowitz v. Kay, 6055.
| Decision Date | 09 April 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 6055.,6055. |
| Citation | 63 App. DC 178,70 F.2d 782 |
| Parties | KAPLOWITZ v. KAY. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
I. H. Minovitz, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error.
Henry I. Quinn and Austin F. Canfield, both of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.
A review of a judgment of the municipal court of the District of Columbia in an action for damages arising out of an automobile collision.
The case was tried in the municipal court without a jury, and judgment was entered by the court for the defendant.
The testimony tended to show that on the evening of July 15, 1932, Max Kay, the minor son of the defendant, Goodman Kay, while driving his father's automobile, received the plaintiff, Isadore Kaplowitz, as a passenger in the automobile, and they rode together to an evening entertainment. While returning home, their car was struck at a street crossing by an automobile driven by one Acrouri, and a serious collision resulted, from which the plaintiff suffered severe injuries. The present action was brought to recover damages for this cause.
At the trial it was contended in behalf of the plaintiff that the accident resulted from the negligence of Max Kay in the operation of the automobile at the time of the accident; that the automobile was owned by the defendant, the father of Max Kay, who provided it for the use of the members of his family; and that defendant was liable for his son's negligence in this instance under the "family service doctrine."
On the other hand, it was contended by the defendant that the evidence failed to sustain the claim that the car was maintained by the defendant as a "family purpose car"; that the evidence failed to show negligence on the part of Max Kay while driving the car at the time of the accident; and that the evidence disclosed the fact that the plaintiff had received from Acrouri, whom the plaintiff claimed to be a joint tort-feasor with Max Kay in the accident, the sum of $500 in satisfaction of the injuries sustained by plaintiff in the collision, and had released Acrouri from all liability because of the accident.
We are of the opinion that the decision of the lower court should be sustained upon the ground that, when the plaintiff released one of the alleged joint tort-feasors from liability, the other tort-feasor was ipso facto released from...
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Noonan v. Williams
...of Columbia At common law, a release of one joint tortfeasor operated as a release of all joint tortfeasors. See Kaplowitz v. Kay, 63 App. D.C. 178, 179, 70 F.2d 782, 783 (1934). "The traditional rationale given for this rule was that where two or more tortfeasors acted in concert to cause ......
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McKenna v. Austin
...was $3,000. In this state of the pleadings defendant moved for summary judgment, which the court granted, relying upon Kaplowitz v. Kay, 1934, 63 App.D.C. 178, 70 F.2d 782. The plaintiffs The release is set forth in the margin.1 The plaintiffs first covenant not to sue Independent on accoun......
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...satisfied by or on behalf of one of the jointly liable parties, then it cannot be demanded from another. See, e.g. , Kaplowitz v. Kay , 70 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1934).As the Trustees pointed out at oral argument, however, the "unusual scenario" in this case is "one of Arch’s own making." When......
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Hansen v. Collett
...agreement operated to discharge the defendant. The court referred to 'the more generally prevailing rule' adopted in Kaplowitz v. Kay, [63 App.D.C. 178, 70 F.2d 782] to the effect that the release of one joint fortfeasor discharges the others. As against this, plaintiff asserted that the in......