70 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), 93-55863, Roland v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
|Citation:||70 F.3d 1279|
|Party Name:||James M. ROLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||November 22, 1995|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Submitted October 16, 1995. [*]
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, D.C. No. CV-92-02337-RSWL; Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding.
Before: HUG and LEAVY, Circuit Judges, and MUECKE, [**] District Judge.
James M. Roland ("Roland") appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of McDonnell Douglas Corporation ("McDonnell Douglas"). We affirm.
Roland argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on his 1) age and race discrimination claims in spite of the existence of genuine issues of material fact, 2) contract claims based on an improper application of California law in spite of genuine issues of material fact, and 3) fraud and negligence claims. Roland also contends that the district court improperly denied his discovery motions.
In mid-August 1992, the district court set the discovery cutoff date as February 26, 1993. Roland first moved for continuation of discovery on February 24, 1993, two days before the cutoff, and did not move to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents until March 5, 1993. The district court found that Roland had failed to diligently pursue discovery and that he did not adequately justify the untimely filing of his motion to compel. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roland's discovery motions. See Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir.1995) and Qualls By & Through Qualls v. Blue Cross, 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.1994).
Roland argues that summary judgment on his age and race discrimination claims was improper because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether less qualified employees outside the protected age and race groups were retained. Roland failed to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to this claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and...
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