Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera

Decision Date20 November 1995
Docket NumberNos. 94-8071,94-8103,s. 94-8071
Citation70 F.3d 1566
Parties, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,213 CLAJON PRODUCTION CORPORATION; Marion H. Scott, Mary C. Scott, husband and wife; and Salt Creek Ranch, L.L.C., a Wyoming limited liability corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Pete E. PETERA, Director of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in his personal capacity; Jay Lawson, Chief Game Warden of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in his personal capacity; the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission; Dan Kennedy, Kevin Dooley, Mike Hunzie, Hal Corbett, Mary Flitner, Kari Priewe, and David Steger, members of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, in their personal capacities, Defendants-Appellees, National Wildlife Federation; Wyoming Wildlife Federation; Phyllis Achison; Taylor Outfitters; Wyoming Outdoor Council; Dubois Wildlife Association; Heart Mountain Wildlife Association; Greater Yellowstone Coalition; Medicine Butte Wildlife Association; Wyoming Chapter of the Sierra Club; and Orion, The Hunters Institute, Intervenors-Appellees. CLAJON PRODUCTION CORPORATION; Marion H. Scott, Mary C. Scott, husband and wife; and Salt Creek Ranch, L.L.C., a Wyoming limited liability corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Pete E. PETERA, Director of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in his personal capacity; Jay Lawson, Chief Game Warden of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in his personal capacity; the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission; Dan Kennedy, Kevin Dooley, Mike Hunzie, Hal Corbett, Mary Flitner, Kari Priewe, and David Steger, members of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, in their personal capacities, Defendants, National Wildlife Federation; Wyoming Wildlife Federation; Phyllis Achison; Taylor Outfitters; Wyoming Outdoor Council; Dubois Wildlife Association; Heart Mountain Wildlife Association; Greater Yellowstone Coalition; Medicine Butte Wildlife Association; Wyoming Chapter of the Sierra Club; and Orion, The Hunters Institute, Intervenors-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

James R. Scarantino, Albuquerque, New Mexico (John MacPherson of MacPherson Law Offices, Rawlins, Wyoming, Karen J. Budd-Falen of Budd-Falen, Cheyenne, Wyoming, with him on the briefs), for plaintiffs-appellants-appellees.

Ron Arnold of the Office of the Attorney General, State of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming (Joseph B. Meyer, Mary B. Guthrie and Kristi Sansonetti, of the Office of the Attorney General, State of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Susan Morath Horner of Boulder, Colorado (James J. Tuchton of the National Wildlife Federation, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, and Thomas David Lustig of Boulder, Colorado, with her on the brief), for intervenors-appellees-appellants.

Before BALDOCK, ALARCON, * and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

This case is a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action challenging several Wyoming hunting regulations as violative of the federal and state constitutional rights of a number of Wyoming ranchers ("Plaintiffs") who offer hunting services to out-of-state residents. Plaintiffs commenced this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Wyoming officials who promulgated the challenged regulations and who are charged with administering them ("State Defendants"), 1 and the National Wildlife Fund and several environmental groups ("Intervenors") intervened in the case as codefendants (collectively "Defendants"). After both parties moved for summary judgment, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claims. See Clajon v. Petera, 854 F.Supp. 843 (D.Wyo.1994). The district court subsequently refused to grant Intervenors' request for attorneys' fees. See Clajon v. Petera, No. 93-CIV-0223-B (D.Wyo. Nov. 7, 1994). Plaintiffs appealed the district court's disposition of their federal constitutional claims, and Intervenors appealed the district court's denial of their application for attorneys' fees. We exercise jurisdiction over these consolidated appeals under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. 2

In this appeal, Plaintiffs complain that (1) Wyoming's restriction on the availability of hunting licenses to out-of-state residents violates the Commerce Clause; and (2) Wyoming's two-license limit on supplemental hunting licenses issued to large landowners violates the Takings and Equal Protection Clauses. 3 For the reasons stated below, we DISMISS Plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claim for lack of standing and we otherwise AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants and its denial of

Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Furthermore, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment that Intervenors are not entitled to attorneys' fees as a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988.

BACKGROUND

Over fifty years ago, the State of Wyoming enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate hunting and fishing. See Wyo.Stat. Secs. 23-1-101 to 901 (1991). This statutory scheme aspired to "provide an adequate and flexible system for control, propagation, management, protection and regulation of all Wyoming wildlife." Id. Sec. 23-1-103; see also O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo.1986) (same). To implement this goal, the Wyoming legislature established a Game and Fish Commission ("the Commission"), Wyo.Stat. Sec. 23-1-201 (1991), and granted it "extensive powers and duties," O'Brien, 711 P.2d at 1149; Wyo.Stat. Sec. 23-1-302 (Supp.1994). These powers include the authority (1) to promulgate regulations governing hunting and fishing; as well as (2) to direct the Game and Fish Department. See Wyo.Stat. Sec. 23-1-302; Sec. 23-1-401.

Pursuant to this broad mandate, the Commission annually determines the types of species available for hunting and the overall number of animals of each species that may be taken. 4 The Commission first sets the number of licenses that can be issued in "limited quota areas" 5 and then determines whether the number of applications for licenses exceeds the number of available licenses. If so, a random computer lottery assigns the licenses. See Clajon, 854 F.Supp. at 848-49.

To effectuate this system of allocating hunting licenses, the Commission promulgated a set of regulations entitled "Chapter XLIV: Regulation for Issuance of Licenses." In addition to outlining the criteria for licenses, these regulations specifically provide that landowners of 160 or more acres are granted two supplemental licenses in recognition of their land's support of wild animals, see Chapter XLIV Sec. 3 ("Section 3"), 6 and it allocates between residents and nonresidents the percentage of hunting licenses that each may receive through the lottery system, see id. at Secs. 5-6 ("Sections 5 and 6"). 7

Plaintiffs commenced this action to challenge Sections 3, 5 and 6 of the regulations contained in Chapter XLIV. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that (1) Sections 5 and 6's restriction on the percentage of licenses that can be issued to nonresidents unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce; and (2) Section 3's two-license limit for large landowners 8 no matter how large the landholdings effects an unconstitutional taking and violates the Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected Plaintiffs' claims, granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of the federal constitutional claims, and denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the Commerce Clause claim. Plaintiffs now appeal.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990). That is, we first consider if there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute; if not, we then determine if the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241.

In so doing, we hold in Part A that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the nonresident hunting license allocation scheme because they have failed to demonstrate any injury-in-fact arising from the allocation scheme. We therefore dismiss that claim. In Parts B and C, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Takings and Equal Protection Clause claims. Finally, in Part D, we AFFIRM the district court's ruling that Intervenors are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 9

A. COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE

We first address Plaintiffs' argument that Sections 5 and 6--the regulations allocating the percentage of hunting licenses between residents and nonresidents--violate the Commerce Clause. 10 However, because Plaintiffs have not established that the regulations interfere with their ability to provide commercial hunting services to out-of-state residents, Plaintiffs have not established injury-in-fact and thus lack standing to challenge the regulations under the Commerce Clause. 11

The requirement that a litigant have "standing" to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of the Article III justiciability doctrines. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1983). The constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury-in-fact." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Second, the injury must be "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324. "Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.' " Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (quoting Simon v....

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