Taft v. Vines

• Decision Date: 16 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-2293,94-2293
• Citation: 70 F.3d 304
• Parties: Jeanette Teel TAFT, individually and as guardian ad litem for minor children, Onte Taft and Kimberly Taft; Onte Taft, minor; Kimberly Taft, minor; Harry Teel, Sr., as guardian ad litem for minor children, Harry Teel, Jr., and Shamesa Teel; Harry Teel, Jr., minor; Shamesa Teel, minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Terry VINES, Deputy Sheriff of Pitt County, in his position as Deputy Sheriff and in his individual capacity; Troy Boyd, in his official and individual capacity as a law enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville; Tim Peaden, in his official and individual capacity as a law enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville; Johnny Craft, in his official and individual capacity as a law enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville; Benny Dobbs, in his official and individual capacity as a law enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville, Defendants-Appellees, and Billy L. Vanderford, Sheriff of Pitt County in his capacity as Sheriff and in his individual capacity; City of Greenville; Nancy Jenkins, Mayor, in her official and individual capacity; Charles Hinman, Chief of Police, City of Greenville, in his official capacity; Kevin M. Smeltzer, Police Officer of the City of Greenville, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 304

70 F.3d 304

Jeanette Teel TAFT, individually and as guardian ad litem

for minor children, Onte Taft and Kimberly Taft; Onte Taft,

minor; Kimberly Taft, minor; Harry Teel, Sr., as guardian

ad litem for minor children, Harry Teel, Jr., and Shamesa

Teel; Harry Teel, Jr., minor; Shamesa Teel, minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Terry VINES, Deputy Sheriff of Pitt County, in his position

as Deputy Sheriff and in his individual capacity; Troy

Boyd, in his official and individual capacity as a law

enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville; Tim

Peaden, in his official and individual capacity as a law

enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville;

Johnny Craft, in his official and individual capacity as a

law enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville;

Benny Dobbs, in his official and individual capacity as a

law enforcement officer in and for the City of Greenville,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

Billy L. Vanderford, Sheriff of Pitt County in his capacity

as Sheriff and in his individual capacity; City of

Greenville; Nancy Jenkins, Mayor, in her official and

individual capacity; Charles Hinman, Chief of Police, City

of Greenville, in his official capacity; Kevin M. Smeltzer,

Police Officer of the City of Greenville, in his official

and individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 94-2293.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 2, 1995.

Decided Nov. 16, 1995.

Rehearing In Banc Granted; Opinion Vacated Jan. 4, 1996.

ARGUED: Robert Lee White, White & Shearin-White, Greenville, North Carolina, for Appellants. Kenneth Ray Wooten, John Randolph Green, Jr., Ward & Smith, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and YOUNG, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part by published opinion. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge YOUNG joined. Judge MOTZ wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:

The case before us presents issues arising from allegations by Appellants, Jeanette Teel Taft, Onte Taft, Kimberly Taft, Harry Teel, Jr., and Shamesa Teel, that they were harassed by local law enforcement officials in violation of their civil rights, when their car was mistakenly stopped and searched in Greenville, North Carolina. On July 30, 1993, the Appellants filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging violations of 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331, 1343, 1651, and 2201, and of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The Appellants filed an amended complaint on August 20, 1993 adding a Fifth Amendment due process claim. The named defendants at that initial stage of the litigation were the Sheriff of Pitt County, North Carolina; a Deputy Sheriff of Pitt County; the City of Greenville, North Carolina through its Mayor, Nancy Jenkins; the Chief of Police of the City of Greenville; and the six individual Greenville police officers personally involved in the vehicular stop, the Appellees here.

On September 13, 1993, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By an order dated October 22, 1993, the district court dismissed all of the Appellants' claims except for their Sec. 1983 claims. The district court also gave the Appellants an opportunity to file another amended complaint to describe more particularly the alleged conduct of each of the named defendants. Additionally, the district court ruled that the remaining Sec. 1983 claims against the defendants in their individual capacities for money damages, and in their official capacities for injunctive relief, would be held in abeyance pending the expiration of the 20 days within which the Appellants could amend their complaint.

The Appellants filed a second amended complaint on November 5, 1993. By an order dated December 13, 1993, the district court held that the amended claim sufficiently stated claims of excessive force against the six police officers in their individual capacities for monetary damages, and that the motion to dismiss was therefore denied as to them. However, the court dismissed the claims against Sheriff Billy Vanderford, the City of Greenville, Mayor Jenkins, and Police Chief Charles Hinman, and held that any claims for injunctive relief were also dismissed.

On May 2, 1994, the six remaining defendants--Terry Vines, Kevin Smeltzer, Tim Peaden, Benny Dobbs, Johnny Craft, and Troy Boyd ("Appellees")--filed a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging entitlement to qualified immunity. On May 18, 1994, the Appellants filed a motion for continuance, asking for an order postponing the hearing on the partial summary judgment motion until such time as the Appellants had taken depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admissions from the Appellees regarding their qualified immunity defense. On that date, the Appellants also filed a memorandum in response to the Appellees' motion for partial summary judgment. On May 23, 1994, the district court filed an order allowing the Appellants' motion to compel discovery for production of certain documents which had been filed on February 16, 1994, but stayed all other discovery until it ruled on the motion for partial summary judgment; the court held that its order staying discovery therefore rendered moot the Appellants' earlier motion for continuance.

By order filed July 8, 1994, the district court granted the Appellees' motion for summary judgment as to certain of the claims arising from their execution of the actual stop and search. However, the district court further found that the Appellants had not sufficiently responded to the motion for partial summary judgment, and thus directed the Appellants to file, within 15 days, a brief and memorandum of law, supported by proper affidavits or other competent documentation, particularizing (1) their allegations of sexual abuse of the minor Appellants, and (2) their charges that the Appellees cocked and clicked loaded weapons against the minor Appellants' heads.

On July 25, 1994, the affidavits were filed. By order filed August 5, 1994, the court denied the Appellees' motion for partial summary judgment as to their conduct in frisking the Appellants, as to whether such conduct amounted to sexual abuse, and as to the various gun-pointing allegations. On August 5, 1994, the Appellees filed an objection to the affidavits and to the Appellants' memorandum of law. On August 9, 1994, the court filed an order that superseded and withdrew its previous August 5 order, and granted the Appellees' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity as to all of the Sec. 1983 claims, thereby disposing of all of the issues in the case against the Appellees. ¹ On August 19, 1994, the Appellants filed a "motion for a new trial or to amend findings and judgment" pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court denied that motion on September 14, 1994. The Appellants filed a notice of appeal on September 30, 1994.

On appeal, the Appellants put forth two arguments: (1) that the district court erred in finding that there existed no genuine issues of material fact as to the Appellees' entitlement to qualified immunity; and (2) that the district court erred in denying the Appellants' motion to continue the summary judgment hearing until discovery on the issue of qualified immunity was completed. We affirm the district court's decision to grant summary judgment as to those claims arising from the Appellees' actual decision itself, based on reasonable suspicion, to stop the vehicle and frisk its occupants, but reverse the district court's decision to grant summary judgment as to the claims that the Appellees used excessive force in conducting the actual search. We also reverse the district court's decision in effect denying the Appellants' motion for continuance by staying discovery until it had ruled on the Appellees' motion for summary judgment.

I. Statement of Facts

On January 29, 1993, Vincent Wooten ("Wooten") shot and wounded a person with whom he had a disagreement. Wooten was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to kill, but was released on bond. On February 9, 1993, Wooten shot and killed another individual, Maurice Wilson, while on release. The police began a search for Wooten immediately thereafter.

On February 9, 1993, at approximately 10:25 p.m., Appellant, Jeanette Teel Taft, an African-American female, was driving with her children, Appellants, Onte Taft and Kimberly Taft, and her niece and nephew, Appellants, Shamesa Teel and Harry Teel, Jr., all minors. They were travelling in Greenville, North Carolina in a light blue Oldsmobile, on their way from a basketball game. The minor Appellants were ages 10 to 16.

At that time, the Appellees were requested over the police radio to stop the Appellants' car. The reason was that the vehicle was believed to carry Wooten. The radio request was based on the fact that the Appellants' car had left the same mobile home park in which Wooten resided.

As the Appellants' car turned from Green Street onto Highway 33, the police officers, Appellees Terry Vines, Kevin Smeltzer, Troy Boyd, Tim Peaden, Johnny Craft, and Benny Dobbs, initiated the stop of the vehicle. In response, Jeanette Taft stopped the car at the side of the road.

Appellee Dobbs, over the P.A. system, ordered Jeanette Taft to throw her keys onto the road. She did so. Dobbs also ordered each individual in the car, including the minor Appellants, to get out of the car with their hands up. Jeanette Taft was the first to step out of the vehicle; Taft stated in her affidavit that, as she tried to get out of the car, the Appellees clicked and cocked the barrels of their police weapons.

Jeanette Taft's son, Appellant ...