United States v. United Mine Workers of America, Civil Action No. 37764.
Decision Date | 05 December 1946 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 37764. |
Citation | 70 F. Supp. 42 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
John F. Sonnett, Asst. Atty. Gen., John Ford Baecher, Joseph M. Friedman, J. Francis Hayden, and Robert L. Werner, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., and George Morris Fay, U. S. Atty., of Washington, D. C., for the Government.
Welly K. Hopkins, of Washington, D. C., Edmund Burke, of Springfield, Ill., T. C. Townsend, of Charleston, W. Va., and Harrison Combs, Joseph A. Padway, Henry Kaiser, and James A. Glenn, all of Washington, D. C., for defendants.
The Court delivered the following opinion orally in overruling the motion of the defendants to discharge and vacate the Rule to Show Cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt:
The Court. Gentlemen, the Court is ready to rule.
It happens that the Court was a Member of Congress at the time the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq., became law and during the debates in the consideration of it. Mr. LaGuardia and I were legislatively always very close. I think I am correct in saying that I supported every measure that he was interested in — I mean primarily interested in — and that he supported every measure that I was primarily interested in. He directed his activities principally toward the labor movement, in what he considered the public interest; and mine were directed toward the currency.
As I said before, I am sure he always supported me; and, as far as I remember, I always supported him. So I am sure I am thoroughly familiar with the Norris-LaGuardia Act and its purposes and the reasons for it.
It is notorious that around, I guess, from 1890 on, the Federal courts were used by powerful interests for the purpose of defeating attempts on the part of labor to improve their welfare, increase their wages, improve their living conditions, and to help themselves in various ways.
Now, it takes a long time to arouse the public, sometimes, but the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq., was the first affirmative expression of their resentment of the action of the courts, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the culminating expression of their feeling that the courts were entirely in the wrong in the way they issued injunctions in labor disputes.
The Court remembers very distinctly the amendments that were offered by Mr. Beck, I think, of Pennsylvania — and I forget who offered the others — which endeavored expressly to exclude the United States in practically all cases, under all circumstances, from the operation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But those in favor of the Act felt that in inclusion — an express inclusion — might defeat the purposes of the Act in a great many cases, and that the Government was amply protected by the general principle where the Government was not specifically mentioned or included by necessary implication in a given case — that the language of the Act did not apply to the Government.
The leading case on that subject in this country — and it is still in force and effect — is the case of the Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, found in 19 Wall. 227, 22 L.Ed. 80. In that case the Federal Government brought an action of debt in Pennsylvania to collect a tax. The statutes provided that an ordinary common-law action of debt was not applicable in cases for the collection of taxes. There is a special statute that would ordinarily cover a case of that kind, a special statute for the collection of taxes.
The Federal Government brought an ordinary action for the collection of debt at common law, which the Savings Bank contended was not legal. Here is what the Court said. The Court did not take that view. The Court held that an ordinary action of debt if brought by the United States would lie. This is what the Court said:
Certain cases are cited.
As I said before, that is the leading case.
But the Court feels that the doctrine is stated with more and greater clearness than anywhere else that the Court has found it in Black on Interpretation of Laws, Second Edition. I am reading from pages 94 and 95:
In this case, what society, what the sovereign power, was endeavoring to do was to hold a matter involving the public interest, a matter involving a potential public calamity, by an entity which had been given power by the sovereignty itself, the labor union, from taking the contemplated action, which, as I said before, would amount to a public calamity, until there could be a judicial determination of whether it had the right to take such action.
The Court thinks that undoubtedly under the general rules which the Court has spoken of, the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not and does not apply; and following that opinion on the part of the Court, the Court had the same rights that the Court would have had prior to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act.
So it is perfectly clear that prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act, a court of equity had the right to enjoin a labor union which, in the opinion of the Court, was about to do something which was against the public interest, including the ultimate interest of the union itself.
The Court thinks that that opinion substantially disposes of this motion to discharge and vacate the rule to show cause, because under Section 385 of the United States Code Annotated, Vol. 28, the statement is made:
The Court thinks the defendants were notified by the rule to show cause, in detail, as to what they were charged with having done; and if what they were charged with having done amounted to a criminal contempt, they had notice of the fact that it was a criminal contempt.
Of course, I myself noticed some time ago, several days ago, that part of the rule which requires criminal contempt to be alleged, to be alleged as such; but in view of the fact that the specific charges were stated in the rule to show cause, and those charges were of a character of which the defendant had notice, if they were criminal, the defendant had notice of the fact that they were criminal; and if it is a mistake not to have charged that the contempt was criminal specifically, it is not sufficient at all to vitiate the proceeding.
In this particular case, under the circumstances it is an omission that could do no one any harm. The Court does not think that the contention that freedom of speech has been violated is a matter for serious consideration. The Court repeats again what the Court said several times on Wednesday: that this proceeding was for the sole purpose of holding the status quo until there could be a judicial determination of the contract between the United States and the United Mineworkers of America. The Court thinks that that must have been thoroughly understood by the union. It was thoroughly understood, certainly, by every other thinking person in the United States who was interested in the matter.
Furthermore, I think the Court should say that it was perfectly evident from the Court's order that what the Court was commanding was that this statement that the contract between the Union and the Government had expired should be...
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