Atlanta v. Ray
| Decision Date | 28 February 1883 |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line Railway. vs. Ray. |
[This case was brought forward from the last term, under §4271(a) et seq. of the Code.]
Railroads. Damages. Negligence. Master and Servant. Before Judge Clark. City Court of Atlanta. December Term, 1881.
Reported in the decision.
Henry Hilller; L. J. Winn, for plaintiff in error.
Hopkins & Glenn, for defendant.
Samuel C. Ray, the defendant in error, was employed as a flagman by the Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line Railroad Company, to run on its passenger train from Atlanta, Georgia, to Charlotte, North Carolina, and back. Whilst so employed and engaged in its service, near Gaffney City, South Carolina, the train ran off, and the car in which he was riding was thrown down an embankment, and the stove, which had fire in it, turned over upon him, and he was severely injured.
He brought this suit to recover damages from the company, because of its negligence and carelessness in not having its stove in said car so securely fastened as to have prevented the injury which he received. He further alleged negligence in the company, in that it had a schedule for the train which was too fast for safety in the unsafe condition of its track, and that it was also otherwise negligent. The case, however, was tried upon the first ground only, and, saving a preliminary question, it is from that alone the exceptions spring which bring it up to this court.
1. The preliminary question arose in the selection of the jury to try the case. The defendant challenged one A. W. Hoffman, as being an incompetent juror, upon theground that he had already served four weeks at that term of the court, and was therefore disqualified under section 3938 of the Code, which declares that no person shall be allowed to serve as a traverse juror longer than that time in any one year.
The record shows that the juror was in the fifth week of his service at that term, which began in the month of December of the preceding year, and had then reached into the month of January of the succeeding year. The judge refused to sustain the challenge, and allowed the juror to serve. The law is that no person shall be compelled to serve as a grand or petit juror more than four weeks in any one year. Nor shall he be allowed to serve as a petit juror in the superior courts, or as a tales juror in any criminal case, or on any jury in other courts, more than four weeks in any one year. The legislature, in passing this law, intended to lighten and equalize the burden of jury duty upon the citizens, in the first place, and therefore granted this exemption, after the full performance of the service required. In the next place, it intended to exclude those who sought such service, and were known to bench and bar as " professional jurors, " and who, from constant attendance upon the courts, had a pretty thorough knowledge of the important cases to be tried, and whose opinions, inclinations and prejudices were not unknown to others who had business and duties in the court. Hence this act was passed, declaring that they should not be allowed to serve longer than the time provided.
It is true that this is a statute which should be construed liberally, so that the evil complained of might be suppressed, and the remedy advanced. But this juror was only in the first week of his service for the year when he was challenged, and, as section 4 of the Code requires that, whenever the word year is used in the statutes, it shall be construed to mean calendar year, there was no error in allowing the juror to serve. We think, however, that this law should be strictly and energetically enforced by thejudges in not allowing persons thus disqualified to serve. Whilst there are many men of good character and honest purpose who have availed themselves of the benefits de-rived from this service, yet it may be that all are not actu ated by the best of motives. But, whether so or not, the law says that they shall not be allowed thus to serve, and this should be sufficient for the courts.
2. The case went to trial upon the merits, and, under the evidence and instructions of the court, the jury found for the plaintiff the sum of $6,500 for his damages. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, because of the errors committed by the court in the charge given, and in the refusal to charge certain written requests asked for by his counsel.
Out of the many questions brought up by the record, there are but two which go to the vitals of the case and necessary to be considered here. The judge below narrowed the issues to be tried by the jury to the question of negligence in the defendant, in not having the stove so securely fastened as to provide against such accidents as were incident to railroad traveling; and to the negligence of the plaintiff in being away from his post of duty at the time he was injured.
The great error alleged to have been committed by the jndge in...
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