Georgia R.R. v. Smith
| Decision Date | 27 February 1883 |
| Citation | 70 Ga. 694 |
| Parties | GEORGIA RAILROAD et. al. v. SMITH et al., RAILROAD Commisioners, et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
February Term, 1883.
[This case was argued at the last term, and the decision reserved.]
1. The object of the constitutional provision conferring power upon the legislature to regulate railroad freights and passenger tariffs, to prevent unjust discrimination and require reasonable and just freights and tariffs, and making it the duty of the legislature to pass laws in furtherance of this provision, was to give proper protection to the citizens against unjust rates for the transportation of freights and passengers over the railroads of the state, and to prevent unjust discrimination, even though the rates might be just. It was not expected tat the legislature should do more than pass laws to accomplish the ends in view. Nor were they required to enter into the details of settling freights and tariffs over all the railroads in the state. The railroad commissioners are officers appointed to carry into execution the laws passed by the legislature, and are constitutional officers.
( a. ) The powers of the railroad commissioners are not legislative. The power to adopt rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already passed, differs from a power to enact the law.
2. Acts of incorporation granting exclusive privileges to the corporators are always to be strictly construed, and whatever is not expressly given therein, or not necessarily implied therefrom, is withheld.
( a. ) The 12th section of the charter of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company was as follows: " That the said Georgia Railroad Company shall, at all times, have the exclusive right of transportation or conveyance of persons merchandise and produce over the railroad and railroads to be by them constructed, while they see fit to exercise the exclusive right; provided that the charge of transportation or conveyance shall not exceed fifty cents per hundred pounds on heavy articles, and ten cents per cubic foot on articles of measurement, for every hundred miles, and five cents per mile for every passenger" :
Held, that the exclusive right granted by this section, was the right of transportation or conveyance of persons, merchandise and produce over the railroad and railroads to be by them construed. The state did not contract with the company to guarantee to it the exclusive right to charge the maximum rates named.
HALL J., dubitante as to last point.
Railroads. Constitutional Law. Officers. Charters. Corporations. Before Judge SIMMONS. Fulton County. At Chambers. May 26, 1882.
Reported in the decision.
J. B CUMMING; A. R. LAWTON, for plaintiffs in error.
CLIFFORD ANDERSON, attorney general MYNATT & HOWELL, for defendants.
The Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, denying the power of the railroad commission of the state of Georgia to regulate freight and passenger tariffs over its road, has filed this bill that the right of the said commission to exercise this power may be judicially determined. This power is denied:
(1.) Because, by article 4, section 2, par. 1, of the constitution of Georgia, the duty is imposed on the general assembly to regulate freight and passenger tariffs.
(2.) Because the act of October 14, 1879, is unconstitutional and void, as being an attempt to delegate legislative powers to said railroad commission. And because it is in conflict with the constitution of Georgia, which forbids the imposing of excessive fines, or inflicting unusual punishments.
(3.) Because the charter of said company is a contract between the state and the company, by which the company has the right to charge any rates of freight and passenger tariffs not exceeding those limited by its charter; whereas, the said commission, under the authority given it by the act of October 14, 1879, forbids the said company, under heavy penalties, from charging the rates allowed by said contract. Wherefore the said act is, by virtue of par. 1, section 10, article 1, of the constitution of the United States, which prohibits the states from passing any law impairing the obligations of a contract, unconstitutional, null and void.
The prayer of the bill is: (1.) That the act of October 14, 1879, be declared null and void. (2.) That it be declared inoperative against the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company. (3.) That the said commission be perpetually enjoined from prescribing rates of fare and freight over the Georgia Railroad and its branches, or in any manner enforcing against it the provisions of the said act of October 14, 1879. (4.) For general relief.
The chancellor below, after considering the bill and exhibits of complainant, and cross-bill and exhibits of defendants, refused the injunction prayed for, and that refusal is assigned as error.
The questions to be determined by this litigation are:
(1.) Whether the act establishing the railroad commission of the state of Georgia, with its powers and duties, is not unconstitutional and void, because it is the duty of the legislature, under the constitution, to regulate freights and passenger tariffs, and this act seeks to delegate this power to the said commission.
(2.) Whether the said act, in so far as it attempts to interfere with the chartered rights of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, does not violate that clause of the constitution of the United States which prohibits the states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
1. The constitution of 1877 confers upon the legislature the power and authority of regulating railroad freight and passenger tariffs, preventing unjust discriminations, and requiring reasonable and just rates of freight and passenger tariffs. It further makes it the duty of the legislature to pass laws, from time to time, to carry into effect this constitutional provision, and to enforce the same by adequate penalties.
For this purpose and to this end was the act under consideration passed. It declares, among other things, substantially that, if any railroad doing business in this state, shall charge, collect, demand, or receive, more than a fair and reasonable toll or compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description, or for the use and transportation of any railroad car upon its track, the same shall be deemed guilty of extortion, and upon conviction, dealt with as by the said act provided.
In order that fair and reasonable tolls, or compensation for the transportation of passengers and freight, might be certainly had, it was also provided that there should be three railroad commissioners appointed, whose duty it should be to make reasonable and just rates of freight and passenger tariffs, to be observed by all the railroad companies doing business in the state on the railroads thereof. And that a schedule of such rates should be made for each railroad doing business in the state, which said schedule should be deemed and taken in all the courts of the state as sufficient evidence that the rates were just and reasonable charges for the transportation of passengers and freights and cars upon the railroads, in all cases brought against any road involving unjust discriminations or improper charges. Adequate penalties were likewise provided for the enforcement of the rules and regulations of the said commission for the establishing of reasonable and just rates to be observed by the railroad companies.
Thus it appears that the constitution provided that the legislature should have power to regulate the railroad freights and passenger tariffs, and to require reasonable and just rates for both; that it made it also the duty of the legislature to pass laws necessary for its execution; and that, in pursuance of that duty, the law complained of was passed.
The object of the constitutional provision and the legislative enactment was to give proper protection to the citizen against unjust rates for the transportation of freights and passengers over the railroads of the state, and to prevent unjust discriminations, even though the rates might be just. It was not expected that the legislature should do more than pass laws to accomplish the ends in view. When this was done, its duty had been discharged. All laws are carried into execution by means of officers appointed for that purpose; some with more, others with less, but all must be clothed with power sufficient for the effectual execution of the law to be enforced.
Legislative grants of power to the officers of the law to make rules and regulations which are to have the force and effect of laws, are by no means uncommon in the history of our legislation. I need only mention the power given to the judges of the supreme and superior courts of this state to establish rules which, if not in conflict with the constitution of the United States, of this state, or the laws thereof, are binding and must be obeyed. And it has never been claimed that they were unconstitutional because they had not been passed by the legislature and read three times, and on three separate days, in each house of the general assembly.
The act of October 14, 1879, provides that fair and reasonable rates only shall be charged by the railroads of the state. Did the constitutional convention, by paragraph 1, section 2 article 4, intend more than the passage of a general law, such as this, to carry into effect the clause here referred to? It certainly was not contemplated that the details of rates to be fixed over the...
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