People Ex Rel. Ernst F. C. Klokke v. Wright

Citation70 Ill. 388,1873 WL 8619
PartiesTHE PEOPLE ex rel. Ernst F. C. Klokkev.LEVI P. WRIGHT.
Decision Date30 September 1873
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

This was a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto. The information charges that the defendant usurped the office of a commissioner of the board of police, in the county of Cook, and State of Illinois. The defendant pleaded to the information that he was rightfully acting as one of the commissioners of the board of police, by virtue of an appointment made by the mayor of the city of Chicago. To this plea two replications were filed: one, that the relator had been duly elected to said office by a vote of the people of Cook county, and had qualified and was acting as such officer at the time of the alleged appointment of the defendant, and that defendant had unlawfully evicted him; the other, that the appointment of defendant by the mayor was not legally made. A general demurrer was sustained to both replications, and a judgment for costs rendered against the relator.

Messrs. GOUDY & CHANDLER, for the appellant.

Mr. M. F. TULEY, Mr. JOHN LEWIS, and Mr. I. N. STILES, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

The first question arising upon this record is, does section one, of the act in force July 1, 1872, commonly known as the “Mayors' bill,” include within its purview commissioners of the board of police of the city of Chicago? That section is as follows:

“In all cities of this State, all city officers, (whose election by the qualified voters thereof is not provided for by law,) and also all members of boards organized under the charter (or amendments thereto) of any such city, except those appointed by the Governor of the State, shall be appointed by the mayor of the city, by and with the consent of the legislative authority thereof, a majority of all the members elect concurring, by yeas and nays, to be entered upon its journal. Any such city officer, or member of any such board, may be removed by the mayor of any such city, whenever, in his opinion, the interests of the city may require such removal. But he shall report, in writing, his reasons for such removal to the said legislative authority at its next regular meeting. In case of a removal from, or a vacancy in, any such office or board, a successor may be appointed by the mayor, with the like consent of the legislative authority of any such city.”

It is contended that commissioners of the board of police are not members of a board organized under the charter of the city of Chicago, or any amendment thereto. The first board of this description was organized under an act in force February 21, 1861. Public Laws of 1861, p. 151.

Although that act does not, in terms, profess to be an amendment of the charter of the city of Chicago, it is manifest that such was its necessary effect. It is entitled, “An act to establish a board of police in and for the city of Chicago, and to prescribe their powers and duties.” It requires the organization of an executive department of the municipal government of the city, to be known as the “board of police of the city of Chicago,” and to this board it transfers the control and management of the entire police of the city, and also of all public police property. Certain powers theretofore exercised by the mayor and common council are, thereafter, to be exercised by the board of police. Salaries are to be paid the officers of the department out of the city treasury; taxes are to be levied and collected from the taxable property in the city to raise the necessary funds to defray the expenses of the department, and to be paid into the city treasury; and all prior laws in conflict with any of the provisions of the act are expressly repealed.

From the time it became a law, this act was, therefore, the source of certain municipal powers, exercised by those whose functions in the city government related to the protection of the lives, property and liberty of the citizens. It became fundamental--a part of the organic law of the municipality; in other words, an amendment of its charter; and the mere fact that the act in its title does not profess to amend the city charter, is unimportant. It professes to, and does, enact that which makes new organic law for the city government, and this is sufficient. People v. Mahoney, 13 Mich. 481; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553. The circumstance that the police are authorized, in emergencies, to discharge duties beyond the city limits, neither changes the character of the act, nor in any degree impairs its force as a part of the fundamental law of the city. The paramount and controlling object in its enactment was, the welfare of the city, and all else is but incidental or subsidiary to this. Whether, in certain instances, the members of the police force exercise the powers and functions of constables in other parts of Cook county, or not, the board of police is still the “board of police in and for the city of Chicago.” The first section of the tenth chapter of “An act to reduce the charter of the city of Chicago, and the several acts amendatory thereof, into one act, and to revise the same,” in force February 13, 1863, (Private Laws of 1863, p. 109,) declares that there shall be established an executive department of the municipal government of the city of Chicago, to be known as the “board of police.” This is professedly a part of the city charter, and if there could be any doubt whether the board of police, organized under the act of 1861, was “organized under the charter of the city, or any amendment thereto,” it would seem to be impossible to question that a board organized under this section, was so organized.

An act, in force February 16, 1865, is entitled “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to reduce the charter of the city of Chicago, and the several acts amendatory thereof, into one act, and to revise the same,’ approved February 13, 1863.”

By the 11th section of this act, (Private Laws of 1865. vol. 1, p. 286,) it is provided that “the commissioner of the board of police of said city, now having the longest term to serve, shall continue in office until the next general election for county officers in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, and until his successor shall be elected and qualified; the other two commissioners of the board of police of said city, shall continue in office until the day for the general election for county officers in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, and until their successors shall be elected and qualified.”

By the 12th section it is enacted that “at the general election in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, for county officers, there shall be elected, by the qualified voters of Cook county, two commissioners of the board of police, as successors to those whose terms of office will then expire by the provisions of the foregoing section, and the commissioner so elected from the north division of said city shall continue in office for six years, and the commissioner so elected from the south division of said city shall continue in office for four years, and until their successors shall be elected and qualified; and at the general election for county officers in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, and biennially thereafter, there shall be elected, by the qualified voters of said county, one commissioner of said board of police, as successor to the commissioner whose term of office will then expire by the provisions of this act, who shall hold his office for the term of six years, * *.”

It is provided by the 13th section that “said commissioners shall receive an annual salary of twelve hundred dollars each, and the president of the board shall receive an additional sum of three hundred dollars per annum.”

By the 14th section, “the salaries shall be paid out of the city treasury monthly.”

The 18th section requires that each of the commissioners shall, on or before the first Monday of May, (then next,) give bonds to the city in the sum of $25,000, conditioned for the faithful performance of their duties under the provisions of the act.

Section 21 declares that all firearms and military equipments belonging to the city shall be in the custody and under the control of the board of police.

Section 23 requires the board of police to assume and exercise the entire control of the fire department of the city, and gives it full power and authority over its organization and government, as also the custody and control of the engine houses, engines, hose carts, trucks, ladders, horses, telegraph lines, and all other public property and equipment belonging to the fire department. It would, in our opinion, in view of the various enactments referred to, be absurd to hold that the “board of police” is not what the law declares it to be--“the executive department of the municipal government of the city of Chicago,” nor can we hesitate to say that it was organized under amendments to the charter of the city.

The board is the creature of legislation, and it was in the legislative discretion to provide how the commissioners should be selected or appointed, and to change the mode from time to time, as the welfare of the city seemed to demand, as it was, also, to abridge...

To continue reading

Request your trial
83 cases
  • State v. Coffin
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • December 26, 1903
    ...... "control" is well stated in People v. Burr, 41 How. Pr. 293; cited in 8 Ency. of Law, 2d ...Gaylord, 61. Ill. 276; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388; People. v. Deaconesses, 71 Ill. 229; ... 515; State v. Sinks, 42 Ohio St. 345; People ex. rel. v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 595; Hinze v. People, . 92 Ill. 406, ......
  • State v. Clements, 3 Div. 915.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • January 28, 1930
    ...... and whose funds are supplied by the people at large in the. state. Neither can it be denied that such ... rule in this state is well stated in State ex rel. Clarke. v. Carter, 174 Ala. 266, 279, 56 So. 974, and ... board of police. People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388;. Allen v. Hirsch, 8 Or. 412, 423, wherein ......
  • Anderson v. Ritterbusch
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • December 21, 1908
    ...... represents the opinions, feelings, and wishes of the people;. and, being directly dependent upon them for support, it ...(Tex. Civ. App.) 95 S.W. 727; State v. Wright et al., 14. Or. 365, 12 P. 708; Kennamer v. State, 150 ... State ex rel. Morgenthaler v. Crites, Auditor, 48. Ohio St. 142, 26 ......
  • State, Relation of Gammons v. Shafer
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • February 10, 1933
    ......585, 354 P. 946, 62 A.L.R. 1341;. State ex rel. Gibson v. Richardson, 48 Or. 309, 8. L.R.A. (N.S.) 362, ... Bodenoch v. Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N.E. 31;. People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N.E. 155. See also. State v. ...504, 62 Am. St. Rep. 154;$! $@Farris v. Wright, 158 Ark. 519, 250 S.W. 889,. 890;$! $@Grable v. ...358, 18 So. 767;$! $@People ex rel. Klokke v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388;$! $@Timm v. Harrison,. 109 Ill. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT